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CHAPTER 1




Solidarity has received heightened attention in public debates during the 
last decade, because the various crises affecting the European Union have 
put the idea of European solidarity under stress. This is true in regard to 
the economic and financial crisis that has severely hit many European 
countries since 2008. Even though the European Union has developed a 
number of policy measures (e.g., the ‘European Financial Stability Facility’, 
the ‘European Stability Mechanism’, and the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’) 
which have opened the door to financial assistance, the European Union 
remained committed to a bail-out policy package that discarded a com-
munitarization of debts and put the main burden on countries threat-
ened with bankruptcy by imposing strict austerity measures. As a reaction, 
most commentators converged upon the conviction that international 
solidarity was dead (see Habermas 2017; Balibar 2010). A similar con-
clusion was drawn in regard to the issues emerging in reaction to the 
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increased inflow of refugees from Syria and other regions affected by wars 
in 2015 and the inability of the EU institutions and its member states to 
agree on a coordinated asylum policy and mechanisms of admission and 
integration. Consensus could only be reached in regard to the external 
dimension (e.g., frontier controls, fight against human trafficking), leaving 
the issue of fair burden sharing through national quotas and relocation pro-
grams unsolved.
The success of populist parties in many European countries (e.g., 
France, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Italy, Spain), the Brexit vote, and 
the mobilization of Eurosceptic and xenophobic protests across Europe 
has raised further concerns that European solidarity might be at risk in a 
more fundamental and all-encompassing manner. In times of crisis, we 
might not only be witnessing the erosion of cooperation between member 
state governments but also the corrosion of social cohesion at the level of 
the European citizenry, thus threatening the social foundations on which 
EU institutions and policies are built. Does the crisis of European integra-
tion translate into a crisis of European solidarity, and, if so, what are the 
manifestations at the level of individual citizens? Is European solidarity 
really on the retreat within the European citizenry? How strongly is soli-
darity rooted at the individual level, both in terms of attitudes and prac-
tices? And which driving factors and mechanisms tend to contribute to the 
reproduction and/or corrosion of solidarity in times of crisis?
We are urgently in need of sound empirical evidence in order to answer 
these questions. Public debates and contentions continue to return to this 
issue, but we so far have very little empirical evidence on which to draw in 
order to inform this debate. Listening to these public debates, it seems as 
though pessimists are on the forefront. According to these views, the vari-
ous crises affecting the European Union are putting European solidarity 
under strain. In times of economic growth and optimistic economic out-
look, it should be easier to profess cooperation and help, while solidarity 
seems to be much more difficult to sustain in times of recession and scar-
city. This is particularly true given that populist and xenophobic political 
entrepreneurs can draw on the exacerbation of citizens’ fear and griev-
ances and that the crisis overlaps with a long history of ineffective policies 
in key domains, such as poverty and unemployment, immigration, and 
asylum. Under these circumstances, political debates seem to be marked 
increasingly by antagonism, conflict, and mistrust between governments 
and citizens, to the detriment of social cohesion and solidarity. In spite of 
this pessimistic outlook, there is, however, some room for optimism left. 
C. LAHUSEN AND M. GRASSO
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It remains to be said that 60 years of European integration have gradually 
established feelings of belongingness to the European community, enabled 
shared identification with European institutions, as well as European and 
cosmopolitan identities (Delanty and Rumford 2005; Beck and Grande 
2007). Moreover, European integration has furthered cross-national 
experiences and contacts among citizens, as well as transnational trust 
between European peoples (Delhey 2007). Finally, public opinion polls 
show that, in the midst of the European crisis, a majority of respondents 
still agree that it is desirable to give financial help to other countries in the 
name of European solidarity between member states (see Eurobarometer 
2011; Lengfeld et al. 2012). The same is true for the readiness of European 
citizens to support a fair burden sharing in regard to refugees, if this is 
necessary to uphold the achievements of the European Union, such as 
Schengen (de Vries and Hoffmann 2016).
This book tries to systematically shed light into this debate by present-
ing findings of a population  survey among citizens of eight European 
countries, namely, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The survey was conducted in the 
context of an EU-funded research project devoted to the study of 
European solidarity (‘European Paths to Transnational Solidarity in 
Times of Crisis’—TransSOL). TransSOL aimed to increase knowledge 
about solidarity within the general population, organized civil society, 
and the media. The consortium consisted of members from the following 
institutions: the University of Siegen (Germany), the Université de 
Genève (Switzerland), the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques 
(France), the Glasgow Caledonian University (United Kingdom), the 
University Panepistimio Kritis (Greece), the University of Florence 
(Italy), the University of Warsaw (Poland), the University of Copenhagen 
(Denmark), the University of Sheffield (United Kingdom), and European 
Alternatives Ltd. (Germany and United Kingdom). The project received 
funding under the Horizon 2020 program (Grant Agreement No: 
649435). The survey was subcontracted to a specialized polling company 
(Info GmbH).
The aim of the survey was to build a comparative dataset that would 
allow us to measure levels of solidarity among the member states’ citi-
zenry and to help identify those social and political factors that might 
promote or inhibit solidarity both within the member states and across 
their borders. This study was demanding, given the fact that solidarity is 
a complex phenomenon that requires careful reflection, definition, and 
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operationalization and that a nuanced conceptualization is particularly 
necessary when addressing the notion of European solidarity. Hence, 
before we move to the presentation of findings for each of the eight coun-
tries, it is thus necessary to engage in a conceptual discussion of European 
solidarity. For this purpose, we will present available evidence on the topic 
and systematize this knowledge within a conceptual framework apt to 
guide our empirical analyses.
contrIbutIng Knowledge to an establIshed FIeld 
oF research: concepts, MeasureMents, 
and assuMptIons
Solidarity is one of the key phenomena studied in the social sciences. 
Research in sociology, economics, political sciences, and psychology, 
among others, has been inquiring for many decades into the forms and 
conditions of social integration and cohesion in order to better under-
stand the social foundations of societies (Durkheim 1893/1997; Marshall 
1950; Parsons 1966). However, the focus has been on national societies, 
which means that our knowledge about the transnational dimension of 
solidarity, and in particular about European solidarity, is rather limited. 
The limitations are even more serious once we move to the individual level 
and inquire into the attitudes and practices of the European citizenry with 
reference to European solidarity. How strongly is the idea of European 
solidarity shared by citizens throughout Europe, and to what extent are 
they engaged in solidarity-related activities? Is solidarity limited to specific 
communities or target groups, or do we detect also a universalist or cos-
mopolitan philanthropy dimension? What can we say about the social 
traits, beliefs, and convictions of people engaged in solidarity activities? 
And which are the factors inhibiting solidarity dispositions and practices?
In order to answer these questions, we need to develop a clearer 
understanding of what we mean by (European) solidarity. In this regard, 
we propose to follow a much quoted definition by Stjerno who defines 
solidarity as the preparedness to share one’s own resources with others, 
be that directly by donating money or time in support of others or indi-
rectly by supporting the state to reallocate and redistribute some of the 
funds gathered through taxes or contributions (e.g., Stjerno 2012: 2). 
Under this wide conceptual umbrella, research has tended to focus on a 
series of different expressions of solidarity. Studies have been interested in 
C. LAHUSEN AND M. GRASSO
 5
interpersonal ‘social’ solidarity in informal groups or networks (e.g., 
Hechter 1987; Markovsky and Lawler 1994; Komter 2005). They have 
addressed volunteering, membership and support of voluntary associa-
tions, civil society organizations, and social movements (Curtis et  al. 
2001; Putnam et  al. 2003; Giugni and Passy 2001). And they have 
focused on citizens’ support of the welfare state and its redistributive 
policies (e.g., Svallfors 1997; Fong 2001; Amat and Wibbels 2009; 
Rehm 2009; Rehm et al. 2012).
As useful as this initial definition might be, it does not yet grasp what 
we consider to be the specific nature of solidarity. In fact, we see the need 
to distinguish solidarity more clearly from charitable help, care, or human-
itarian aid by stressing the group-boundedness and reciprocity of solidar-
ity. According to this conceptualization, solidarity is tied to an (imagined) 
community or group, whose members are expected to support each other 
in order to fulfill the mutual rights and obligations associated with group 
membership (Hunt and Benford 2004). While this conceptualization is 
admittedly close to the notion of political solidarity (Scholz 2008), as it 
leans toward a rights-based definition, we argue that it is applicable to 
social and civic solidarity between individuals, as well. In fact, ‘solidarity 
groups’ might be informal cliques, formal organizations, or full-fledged 
nation-states, but all of them will be based on the idea that membership is 
tied to the expectations of mutual support, even if these expectations 
might range from informal to formalized, from voluntary to binding rights 
and obligations.
This definition has many advantages for the analysis of European soli-
darity. On the one hand, we need to remember that European solidarity is 
only one of the many potential group-bound solidarities, besides the 
region, the nation, or humanity, among many others. On the other hand, 
we must acknowledge that solidarities are in themselves contentious, 
because groups maintain both complementary but also competitive rela-
tions to each another (Bandy and Smith 2005; Scholz 2008). As an indi-
vidual, one might feel in solidarity with one’s own family, neighborhood, 
region, and nation, and this feeling might not stand in competition to a 
sense of solidarity with Europe or humankind in general. In this case, 
national and European solidarities would be part of a more encompassing, 
universalist or cosmopolitan notion of solidarity. However, particularly in 
times of crisis, where citizens are exposed to feelings of scarcity, relative 
deprivation, and distributional conflicts, (Grasso and Giugni 2016) group 
solidarities might be either prioritized or sorted out. And this could mean 
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that citizens center their solidarity more strongly on their own country 
and/or specific groups therein, even if they do not discard—in principle—
the need to help other Europeans. In this sense, group solidarity acquires 
a particularistic orientation, because one’s own support of others is condi-
tional on the ego-alter’s membership in the same group, or at least depen-
dent on its social proximity to it.
These conceptual clarifications highlight that we are dealing with a 
complex and multifaceted phenomenon that requires prudent operation-
alization. For this reason, we developed a questionnaire that aimed at 
measuring individual solidarity along its major components. First, our sur-
vey insisted on the need to measure solidarity in its different manifesta-
tions. In this regard, we opted to look at attitudes and reported activities 
at the same time. This differentiation is necessary because it is to be 
expected that the preparedness to help others does not translate inevitably 
into factual activities. The latter might disclose prioritized group solidari-
ties much more neatly than the mere readiness to help. We thus opted to 
include a number of questions in our survey that gather information about 
the respondents’ reported activities of solidarity. These questions pre-
sented a wider range of potential activities, ranging from more conven-
tional to more unconventional activities, for example, donating money or 
time, buying or boycotting products, and active participation in voluntary 
associations and protest actions (Grasso 2011, 2016).
Second, our conceptual framework insists on the need to measure soli-
darity in its charitable and political dimensions. Scholarly writing has 
tended to focus on the (financial) help to the needy, thus privileging the 
charitable dimension of solidarity. While this aspect is important, it 
downplays the political and rights-based dimension of solidarity. In fact, 
people demonstrate solidarity with other persons in struggle or in need 
when participating in collective actions (e.g., public claims-making, politi-
cal protests, communication campaigns) that strive to improve the situa-
tion of these groups by mobilizing on behalf of their rights and entitlements 
(Giugni and Passy 2001; Scholz 2008). This political dimension seems of 
particular importance when dealing with the European Union. In fact, 
European solidarity is present when people help other European citizens 
to raise their voice and make it heard, particularly if we are speaking of 
social groups at the fringes of society that are severely hit by the European 
crisis (Balme and Chabanet 2008; Lahusen 2013; Baglioni and Giugni 
2014; Giugni and Grasso 2018). The survey aimed at measuring both 
dimensions of solidarity, the charitable and the political. In particular, 
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the questions about reported solidarity activities were based on a rights-
based concept of solidarity, because it asked respondents whether they 
actively supported the rights of various groups by means of the activities 
listed in the questionnaire. Additionally, we assembled information on 
political activities and orientations related to solidarity, ranging from pro-
test participation to policy-related issues (e.g., European solidarity 
measures).
Third, solidarity can be organized at different levels of organization and 
aggregation, as indicated by previous research. Studies have focused on 
social solidarity at the micro level, that is, on the interpersonal relations of 
mutual support between individuals (Hechter 1987; Markovsky and 
Lawler 1994; Komter 2005). Research has also shown that solidarity is a 
collective endeavor promoted—at the meso level—by civil society organi-
zations and social movements (Hunt and Benford 2004; Giugni and Passy 
2001; Curtis et  al. 2001). And, finally, scholars have focused—at the 
macro level—on welfare state institutions and social policies as an instru-
ment of redistribution committed to the idea of solidarity (Fong 2001; 
Rehm 2009; Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Rehm et al. 2012). This differ-
entiation provides tools for survey-based research, because it allows mea-
suring individual solidarity as a multiscalar phenomenon. In our survey, 
for instance, we included questions that asked individuals to report inter-
personal practices of support within and beyond their country, to indicate 
whether they supported civil society organizations or social movement 
activities and whether they are against or in favor of redistributive policies 
within their country and between European member states. Even though 
the focus of this book is primarily on the micro- and meso level, we will 
see that these various levels of organization and aggregation make a differ-
ence. Reported activities of individual solidarity seem to be less diffused, 
when compared to forms of delegated solidarity, that is, the support of 
civil society and the welfare state.
Finally, the analysis of solidarity has to take the group-boundedness of 
solidarity seriously. This means in particular that solidarity might be, more 
often than not, a particularist commitment. Previous research has consis-
tently shown that solidarity is of little analytic and practical use when con-
ceived of as a generalized disposition or practice. Studies recurrently 
highlight that solidarity is tied to specific groups (Hechter 1987; Hunt 
and Benford 2004; Scholz 2008) and thus conditional on the assumed 
social proximity, neediness, or deservingness of the targeted recipients 
(van Oorschot 2006). For this reason, it is not enough to measure a 
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general disposition to help others. More than that, it is essential to list 
various potential target groups. In spatial terms, it is necessary to differen-
tiate between solidarity with people within the respondents’ countries, 
with other people within the European Union, and beyond Europe. 
Moreover, it is important to assess whether citizens make a difference 
when dissimilar target groups are addressed, such as refugees/asylum 
seekers, the unemployed, and the disabled.
The conceptual clarifications presented so far guided the design of our 
survey and allowed us to assemble a comprehensive comparative dataset. 
Our data enables us to describe levels of solidarity dispositions and activi-
ties within the eight countries under study and give a nuanced and differ-
entiated picture of various forms of (target-specific) solidarity. Among 
other things, we are able to contextualize European solidarity and com-
pare it with other (group-bound) forms of solidarity. This descriptive aim, 
however, was not the only objective of this survey. More than that, 
TransSOL was geared to shed light on those factors that are beneficial or 
detrimental for solidarity at large, and European solidarity in particular. 
Building on previous research, as indicated below, we know that solidarity 
among citizens is highly patterned by a battery of factors, namely, socio- 
demographic traits, social class, political allegiances, social capital, reli-
gious beliefs, and values among others; we included these variables in our 
study. In order to systematize this evidence, we propose to distinguish 
between three strands of inquiry.
A first source of inspiration comes from empirical research about redis-
tributive preferences. These studies are interested in identifying those fac-
tors that guarantee the support of citizens for the welfare state at large, 
and various social policies in particular, and thus spur the backing of insti-
tutionalized forms of wealth redistribution and help (Alesina and Giuliano 
2011; Amat and Wibbels 2009; Fong 2001; Rehm 2009; Rehm et  al. 
2012; Svallfors 1997). Studies have addressed a variety of social policy 
fields, among them pensions (Jaime-Castillo 2013), poverty (Alesina and 
Glaeser 2004; Scheepers and Grotenhuis 2005), and immigration (Banting 
and Kymlicka 2006; Mau and Burkhardt 2009). Evidence suggests that 
the support for redistributive preferences is influenced by the respondents’ 
position in society, for example, the ‘rational calculations’ tied to their 
state of vulnerability (Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rehm 2009). Additionally, 
cognitive and ideational factor also play a role. Research has pointed to the 
role of religion and religiosity (Stegmueller et al. 2012; Lichterman 2015) 
and political socialization (Grasso et al. 2017a), but also general beliefs 
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about the causes of income inequality (Fong 2001) and perceptions of 
deservingness (van Oorschot 2006) are important factors, too. In regard 
to the latter, research has identified several criteria that influence the 
 judgment of deservingness: (1) the level of perceived responsibility and 
neediness, (2) social and spatial proximity and identity, including loyalties 
to ethnic groups, and (3) the recipients’ attitudes and the degree of recip-
rocation (receiving and giving) (van Oorschot 2000, 2006; Alesina and 
Glaeser 2004; Luttmer 2001).
Second, the extensive field of studies on social capital and social cohe-
sion is relevant for our discussion here, as well. In part, this research strand 
measures a similar phenomenon, as it is interested in forms of voluntary 
engagement within civic groups and organizations (Putnam et al. 2003; 
van Oorschot et al. 2006). However, social capital is not identical with 
solidarity, because social capital refers to those resources or ingredients 
that need to be mobilized into acts of solidarity. In this sense, this research 
strand provides helpful indications for our explanatory purposes, as it is 
interested in the conditions of interpersonal help and support. Here, in 
particular, it highlights the importance of interpersonal and institutional 
trust, of norms of reciprocity, and of informal networks as necessary ingre-
dients of social cohesion (Chan et al. 2006; Jeannotte 2000; Delhey 2007) 
and thus as determining factors that help in explaining interpersonal soli-
darity. Moreover, studies of social cohesion have corroborated the impor-
tance of social class, age, and gender. They have shown that post-materialist 
values and religious beliefs play a beneficial role, whereas societies with 
social cleavages, political conflicts, and less developed welfare state institu-
tions provide a less conducive environment (Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; 
van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Gelissen et al. 2012).
Finally, there are also lessons to be drawn from research on political 
behavior, in general, and social movement and protest participation, more 
specifically. These strands of research focus on the political dimensions of 
solidarity, and thus help to answer the question of whether political soli-
darity is determined by similar factors as the ones discussed above. Scholarly 
writing seems to support some of the research assumptions presented 
before, by showing how political behavior is patterned by social inequali-
ties and forms of social exclusion (Brady et  al. 1995; Kronauer 1998; 
Grasso 2013; Dunn et al. 2014; Giugni and Grasso 2015a; Grasso et al. 
2017b). Moreover, studies agree on the fact that solidarity is also highly 
patterned by political preferences and orientation, for example, along the 
left-right scale (Likki and Staerklé 2014). Social movement analysis adds 
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relevant knowledge by pointing to the importance of mobilization pro-
cesses lead by existing organizations and groups, with the latter considered 
as collective means of mobilizing, organizing, and  perpetuating (transna-
tional) solidarity in terms of binding norms, commitments, and behaviors 
(Smith 1997; Balme and Chabanet 2008; della Porta and Caiani 2011; 
Baglioni and Giugni 2014; Giugni and Grasso 2015b). That is, being a 
member or follower of a certain initiative, association, organization, or 
movement implies a commitment not only to specific norms of solidarity 
but also to palpable acts as well (e.g., membership fees and charitable 
donations, joint political protests, events of claims-making).
Based on these insights, the survey included a series of questions that 
geared to gather data on all these explanatory factors. This information 
should allow us to identify those variables that tend to boost or inhibit 
solidarity dispositions and practices along the various dimensions identi-
fied before. In particular, it will enable us to ascertain whether European 
solidarity is inhibited or promoted by the same factors as solidarity with 
other reference groups. First, we are interested to see whether socio- 
demographic characteristics like age, gender, and race make a difference in 
regard to solidarity activities and dispositions. The study of civil societies, 
for instance, has shown that voluntary engagement tends to replicate the 
public/private divide by centering more strictly on male-dominated and 
‘public’ activities, to the detriment of female networks of care and help 
(Neill and Gidengil 2006; Valentova 2016). It has been shown that 
younger and older citizens are more active in social movements, following 
different grades of ‘biographical availability’ in the life course (Beyerlein 
and Bergstrand 2013). And we know that migrants are often involved in 
cross-national networks of support and help (Glick Schiller et al. 1995; 
Morokvasic 1999; Recchi and Favell 2009). Second, we wish to test 
whether solidarity is patterned by the differential access of citizens to val-
ued resources and skills, such as income and education, by the respon-
dents’ social status and affiliation to social class (Verba et al. 1978; Cainzos 
and Voces 2010) and by different levels of social exclusion and deprivation 
(Kronauer 1998). Third, we wish to analyze to what extent solidarity is 
conditioned by social capital, following the propositions of research 
devoted to civil society and social movements (Putnam et al. 2003; van 
Oorschot et al. 2006; Jenkins 1983). In particular, we wish to highlight 
the role of institutional and interpersonal trust, of informal networks and 
social relations, and of associational involvement in a wide range of social, 
cultural, and political organizations and groups. Fourth, we aim to identify 
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the interrelation between political orientations and behaviors on the one 
side, and solidarity dispositions and practices on the other. In particular, 
we try to assess whether relevant factors investigated at the national level, 
for example, levels of political participation, political preferences, and ide-
ological orientations (e.g., Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Amat and 
Wibbels 2009; Likki and Staerklé 2014; Giugni and Grasso 2017), also 
differentiate citizens with regard to solidarity. Finally, we wanted to iden-
tify the role of ideational and cognitive factors, too, assuming that the 
collective identities and the attachment to groups and communities might 
condition levels of solidarity (Luttmer 2001; Komter 2005) as much as 
religion and religiosity (Stegmueller et al. 2012; Lichterman 2015), moral 
norms, and visions of a desirable social order (Stets and McCaffree 2014).
structure and objectIves oF the booK
This book is based on data gathered by a comparative research project and 
aims to answer a number of questions related to solidarity. How developed 
are solidarity attitudes and practices among citizens of European member 
states? How diffused are these orientations when comparing various target 
groups, among them refugees/migrants, unemployed people, and the dis-
abled? And how strongly are citizens engaged in helping people outside 
their country, both within and outside Europe? Which groups in the 
European citizenry are strongest supporters of European solidarity, and 
which segments exhibit distance from  European or global solidarity? 
Available studies have shown that the idea of solidarity across borders is 
supported by a considerable proportion of the European citizenry, sug-
gesting  that the long history of European integration has had an impact 
on the ideas and preferences of the population (Lengfeld et al. 2015; de 
Vries and Hoffmann 2016). However, this evidence is far from painting a 
comprehensive picture. Moreover, most studies have focused on the sup-
port of public policies of redistribution and burden sharing, to the detri-
ment of studies about civic and interpersonal forms of solidarity.
The survey data presented in this book provides fresh insights into this 
topic. It is based on an online individual survey conducted in the winter 
months of 2016/2017  in Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Poland, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The same questionnaire 
was administered in the relevant languages to approximately 2000 respon-
dents in each of the countries of the project, thus assembling data on more 
than 16,000 European citizens. Respondent samples were matched to 
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national statistics with quotas for education, age, gender, and region, and 
population weights are applied in the analyses presented in this volume. 
The questionnaire was drafted to measure solidarity in its various 
 dimensions and manifestations, as indicated before, and to assemble data 
on a number of potential factors that might help to explain this practiced 
solidarity.
The chapters included in this volume aim to answer the above stated 
questions in regard to each of the eight countries under study. They are 
committed to three overall objectives. First, national chapters engage in a 
descriptive account of levels and forms of solidarity practices in each of the 
eight countries. The dependent variables consist of reported solidarity 
practices, such as donating time or money, buying or boycotting products, 
protest participation, or passive and active associational membership. 
Depending on the national contextual relevance, the chapters also compare 
levels of solidarity in regard to various reference groups: for example, soli-
darity with people from the own country, from other European country, or 
countries outside Europe; solidarity with disabled people, the unemployed, 
and refugees/migrants. These findings enable the portrayal of country-
specific levels of reported solidarity practices. Second, national chapters 
analyze the forces that affect practiced solidarity and in portraying the 
social profile of the most and least solidarity-prone groups of the popula-
tion. For this purpose, the national chapters engaged with analyzing the 
explanatory relevance of the different factors introduced in this chapter. 
On the one hand, chapters focus on the social traits of the respondents, 
arguing that their position in the social structure impinges on the means 
and opportunities they have to commit themselves to solidarity. On the 
other hand, we assume that reported solidarity is conditioned also by atti-
tudinal dispositions and preferences, such as political attitudes, social 
beliefs, or cultural values. Finally, each chapter explores specific aspects that 
seem particularly important either for the country under analysis and/or in 
view of research debates and questions awaiting empirical validation.
The book ends with a concluding chapter that wishes to paint a com-
parative picture of civic solidarity within and across European member 
states. For these purposes, we describe the main findings from our survey 
in comparative terms by presenting and highlighting the various levels of 
solidarity-driven practices and attitudes, and by identifying the impor-
tance of European solidarity, when compared to national or global soli-
darities in Europe. Moreover, knowledge assembled by the various 
national chapters will help us to assess whether solidarity—and European 
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solidarity in particular—is driven by similar or different forces in the vari-
ous countries under analysis. In this way, this volume provides a unique 
resource for understanding solidarity in contemporary Europe.
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CHAPTER 2
Toward a New Conditionality of Welfare? 




The Danish (Scandinavian) welfare model is based on the principle of uni-
versalism: providing equal services in the form of tax-financed benefits to all 
citizens independently of their individual contributions. Solidarity tradition-
ally has a high value in the small and egalitarian Scandinavian societies and 
can rely on the homogenous composition of the populations in terms of 
ethnic, religious and linguistic unity. This is generally seen as generating high 
levels of support for the welfare state. At the same time, a strong and omni-
present welfare regime can be said to release citizens from the need to invest 
in substantive support action. The basic needs of vulnerable groups like the 
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unemployed, people with disabilities or refugees are served by the universal 
welfare state as a centralized care-taker for the well- being of society.
At the same time, the traditional inclusive welfare regime in Denmark 
has over the last decade undergone an important, and often unnoticed, 
transformation. In a series of reforms by the liberal-conservative coalition 
which governed the country from 2001 to 2011 and, again, since 2015, 
welfare services have, in general, become more conditional and distinc-
tions between various layers of need have been introduced. The new con-
ditionality of welfare services applies, for instance, in the labor market with 
an emphasis on ‘flexicurity’ and the measurement of individual contribu-
tions on which unemployment and welfare benefits are made dependent 
(Strøby-Jensen 2011). The inclusiveness of welfare state services has also 
been questioned with regard to the Europe of free movements, where the 
same rights apply indiscriminately to all EU citizens moving to and resid-
ing in Denmark.
In this chapter, we analyze engagement in solidarity actions in support 
of marginalized groups within the Danish population. We first provide an 
overall picture of the level of involvement of Danes in solidarity actions 
toward different kinds of vulnerable groups at the local, national, 
European and global level. Second, we look at how Danes contest solidar-
ity toward these groups at different levels. The overall question to be 
examined is the inclusiveness of solidarity engagement within Danish 
society and the way in which solidarity in a traditionally welfare-generous 
country is currently performed in the backdrop of a European context 
that faces the challenges of migration, economic recession and increasing 
competiveness. It is argued that universal welfare states are put under 
pressure by such developments, first by external challenges and the neces-
sity to respond to demands of new and increasingly diverse groups in need 
of assistance; and second, by the internal contestations of citizens who 
withdraw their support, oppose a further extension of welfare services and 
redefine solidarity.
contextualIzIng SolIdarIty: the danISh caSe
High-tax welfare states, like Denmark, arguably rely on strong ties of soli-
darity (Jöhncke 2011). The kind of solidarity ties that support redistribu-
tive welfare regimes must go beyond schemes of charity and include a 
notion of reciprocity in terms of sympathy felt toward co-citizens and a 
notion of shared responsibility in terms of acting together as a political 
community (Habermas 2013). Solidarity that supports redistribution 
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therefore typically goes hand in hand with a strong civil society and with 
civic associations that promote trust and mutual support among the mem-
bers of the political community (Banting and Kymlicka 2017; Hall 2017; 
Calhoun 2002). To make a strong welfare state sustainable, citizens should 
not only support the principle of reciprocal solidarity in abstract terms but 
also put it into practice in their daily interactions of mutual support and 
ties of sympathy among the citizens.
The advance of neoliberal market economies based on private initiative, 
including the cutting of public expenditures and deregulation, have posed 
a threat to this idea of civic solidarity (English et al. 2016; Grasso et al. 
2017; Temple et al. 2016). Liberal market policies have been backed by all 
Danish governments over the last two decades and, in particular, by the 
liberal-conservative coalitions which have governed the country since 
2001. As a consequence of such policies, Denmark has experienced a gen-
eral retreat of universal welfare services with a new emphasis on individual 
responsibility (Jensen and Torpe 2016; Larsen et al. 2015). The weaken-
ing of social provisions of redistribution and a cutting down of welfare 
services can be expected to correlate with a decline of solidarity. Taxation 
as a core indicator to reciprocal solidarity (Stjernø 2004: 2) is challenged 
as fewer people are prepared to share resources with others, or simply 
because the capacities of the welfare state to redistribute income are lim-
ited. Strong and universal welfare states are in this sense particularly vul-
nerable, when their solidarity is tested by global developments or pressures 
of European market competition (Martinsen 2005). This holds in particu-
lar for a high-tax country like Denmark, which has adapted the universality 
of welfare services to the new flexibility of Europeanized and globalized 
labor markets. On the one hand, such transformations of the welfare state 
bear the risk of damaging traditional forms of centralized, universalistic 
solidarity, but, on the other hand, they also open the possibility that at the 
same time, and parallel or in direct response to Europeanization and mar-
ket liberalization, new forms and practices of decentralized solidarity 
toward different groups of society may develop. European integration is in 
this sense perceived by some groups within Danish society both from the 
right and from the left as a major threat to national solidarity, but it could 
also lead to a general reorientation of solidarity practices. As such, solidar-
ity becomes increasingly contested by new organizations and new forms of 
civic mobilization addressing European and global issues and increasingly 
operating at a European and global scale. In Denmark, such new solidarity 
contestations are proposed, on the one hand, by the Danish People’s Party 
(Dansk Folkeparti) which is Denmark’s second largest party, gaining 21.1% 
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of the vote in the 2015 general elections and supporting the current right- 
liberal minority government in Parliament. The Danish People’s Party 
defends an exclusive notion of national solidarity as a community of 
belonging based on strong ethnic ties. It is opposed to strong and central-
ized welfare regimes emphasizing instead individual responsibility, subsid-
iarity and the need to cut down the high-tax burden in Denmark. In the 
European Parliament, the Party joined the Eurosceptic European 
Conservatives and Reformists group opposing EU sovereignty transfers, 
EU redistributive policies and European and global solidarity engage-
ment. On the other hand, solidarity contestations are pushed by the politi-
cal left, in particular by the Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten) gaining 
7.8% of the vote in the 2015 elections. The left opposition emphasizes the 
fight against social inequality and poverty as one of their main priorities 
and is in favor of strengthening and expanding the welfare state. This 
includes solidarity toward marginalized groups, including foreigners and 
refugees. As such, Enhedslisten combines a perspective of national and 
global solidarity but is explicitly anti-EU and campaigns for a withdrawal 
of Denmark from its European commitments.1
Civil society associations have reacted to the new conditionality of the 
welfare state by shifting orientations and providing new services for the 
increasing number of those who are falling through the security net. As we 
are able to show in our survey of Danish civil society activism, solidarity 
actions by civil society organizations is shifting from being supplementary 
of state-based services to becoming more substantial and also more con-
frontational. Instead of assisting the state in implementing welfare, civil 
society is found to increasingly replace the state and to fight in opposition 
to state imposed restrictions and financial cuts (Duru et al. forthcoming; 
Spejlborg Sejersen and Trenz 2017).
The economic and financial crisis that was triggered in 2008 marks 
some further modest changes but not a radical rethinking of the Danish 
welfare regime. In general terms, Denmark has turned more restrictive 
toward vulnerable groups in society cutting welfare state expenditures and 
putting stronger emphasis on the obligation to work. As a result of the 
most recent policy changes, social benefits for the unemployed, refugees 
and people with disabilities persons have been cut or have become more 
conditional with preference given to measures that seek to reintegrate wel-
fare recipients into the labor market.2 This is however in line with the 
tradition of the Danish welfare state, which has always combined a gener-
ous social safety net and free education with the obligations to pay high 
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taxes and to contribute actively to the wealth of society through work, 
volunteering and social responsibility (Christoffersen et al. 2013).
The robustness of the welfare system in times of crisis can be explained 
by Denmark’s efficient crisis management and quick economic recovery 
after having suffered from recession in the initial crisis years. Macroeconomic 
data shows, in fact, that the country and its population did not suffer from 
a substantial loss in wealth, and, while recession or economic stagnation 
were endured in many parts of Europe, Denmark soon profited again from 
economic growth.3 Denmark does not only continue to be the country 
with the most equal income distribution in Europe, its average annual wage 
is also one of the highest in Europe, while inflation is at an historical low.4 
Unemployment is steadily declining since 2011 with a current unemploy-
ment rate (December 2016) of 6.5%, which is below the EU28 average of 
8.3% and far below the rate of countries most hit by crisis like Italy (11.9%), 
Spain (19.1%) and Greece (23.1%). Youth unemployment is with 10% in 
2016 far below the average in other European countries were the youth 
unemployment rate is generally double or more than double the unem-
ployment rates for all ages.5 This downward trend indicates the recovery of 
the labor market which offers job opportunities for young adults not only 
from Denmark itself but also increasingly young mobile EU citizens. More 
recent periods (2011–2014) saw a strong increase in intra-EU mobility 
flows toward Denmark (+44%), made up mainly by young adults in the 
East, South-East and South of Europe who escape economic hardship by 
moving to Denmark (European Commission 2014: 20–21).
In the field of immigration and asylum, we observe over the last five 
years a shift in the number of incoming migrants from non-EU to intra-
 EU mobility, the former group discriminated by new restrictive legislation 
and the latter group profiting from the principle of nondiscrimination of 
EU citizenship and attracted by labor and education opportunities.6 These 
circumstances have become a concern for the Danish government and 
society, which—according to Jørgensen and Thomsen (2013)—is reflected 
in an increasing negative tone in the media toward both groups: EU and 
non-EU migrants. A more recent stage was marked by the arrival of refu-
gees which has led to a political controversy regarding the humanitarian 
obligations of Denmark as well as with respect to solidarity within the 
EU. The Danish government’s restrictive policies in the autumn of 2016 
were criticized by neighboring Sweden and Germany and ultimately led to 
the suspension of Schengen rules of free movement and border control 
which still persists to this day.
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Despite these general challenges and tendencies in the transformation 
of the welfare state, Denmark remains exceptional in the European con-
text in terms of the modest economic impact of crisis and de facto eco-
nomic growth over the last few years. This might explain why the economic 
crisis also left only a low imprint on the attitudes of Danes, which remain 
strongly supportive of the high-tax and welfare regime, express high trust 
in the state, political parties and parliamentary representation7 and accord-
ing to the World Happiness Report published annually by the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network continue to be 
among the world’s ‘happiest nations’. Happiness, trust and life satisfaction 
have become a matter of national pride, and the good comparative rank-
ings of Denmark are widely publicized and commented upon in the media 
and by political representatives. Our survey confirms these patterns, in 
terms of high life satisfaction, which is also backed by material gains: 72.5% 
of all Danes are satisfied or highly satisfied (6–10 on Likert scale) with 
their life (compared to 36% in Greece), and the great majority of Danes 
(86.7%) declare that their financial situation has improved over the last five 
years (6–10 on Likert scale where 0 means much worse and 10 means 
much better), compared to only 11.4% in Greece.
In line with this image of Denmark as the worlds’ happiest nation, 
a strong emphasis is placed on solidarity, which has two components: 
(1) support of redistribution measured, for example, in the willingness to 
share income through taxes and (2) trust and civic virtue, measured, for 
example, in the willingness to engage in solidarity action and contribute 
actively to the well-being of the community of citizens. This is often paired 
with an attitude of moralizing solidarity, that is, to emphasize the duties of 
active contributions to communal life and to blame deviants. Solidarity is 
a civic virtue but it is also a moral obligation. An attitude of moralizing 
solidarity can, in fact, be used as a justification of exclusive practices toward 
‘non-deserving’ groups of society, an argumentation often used by 
populist- right parties. This raises the question whether there is a widening 
gap between perceptions of Denmark as the happiest country in the world 
and practices of exclusion toward growing numbers of poor or persons 
deprived of rights. The Danish pride in welfare and solidarity might thus 
nourish an illusion, if Danes continue to believe in the uniqueness of their 
welfare system and continue to trust in the state’s capacities of care-taking 
while at the same time failing to recognize important systemic changes 
that put pressures on people in need, push more and more Danes into 
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private insurance schemes or exclude them from the net of social security. 
As has been noted in a recent report published by a NGO active in the 
field:
Although Danish society claims to uphold the basic principles of a welfare 
state—solidarity among citizens and provisions for the needy—in practice, 
public discourse and government policies have been creating a more liber-
tarian, individualistic model that strays from its founding principles. Until 
the Danish people stop moralizing about solidarity and acknowledge the 
changing nature of their welfare system, Denmark’s poor and excluded will 
grow in number to fill this dangerously widening gap between perception 
and practice.8
We have identified and described the changing state-civil society rela-
tions and new solidarity practices elsewhere (Duru et  al. forthcoming; 
Spejlborg Sejersen and Trenz 2017). Based on these insights, it is now our 
task to analyze more closely public attitudes and public attention in rela-
tion to these new solidarity challenges and contestations.
We organize our analysis around a set of questions relating to the atti-
tudinal and behavioral dimensions of solidarity. The question is whether 
public opinion is leaning more toward a universalistic or an individualistic 
welfare arrangement. Do Danes continue to support universalistic welfare 
or do they back the new state policies that make welfare conditional of 
contributions? Are Danes also aware of the European and global dimen-
sions of solidarity and of the challenges and opportunities offered by 
European market integration? The question is further whether restrictions 
in welfare state services and policies that affect particularly vulnerable 
groups within society, such as refugees, migrants or unemployed, are also 
noticeable in a reorientation of civic practices (so-called solidarity actions). 
Does solidarity action turn toward these new people, such as for instance 
refugees or the long-term unemployed, in need of assistance? Is there a 
general awareness of the transition of the Danish welfare model from uni-
versalism providing services indistinguishably to all persons in need to 
more conditionality?
The overall question thus is whether this new conditionality of the wel-
fare state is also supported by general attitudes and new practices of soli-
darity. From a European comparative perspective, this is relevant in order 
to establish whether Danes still support universal welfare regimes and rec-
ognize the needs of new groups of recipients for solidarity recognized by 
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the Danish population. We further wish to understand whether such tra-
ditional notions of an inclusive, service-oriented welfare state can be com-
bined with an awareness of global solidarity challenges and possible 
solutions. This includes an analysis of the extent to which citizens them-
selves are involved in such transnational and local networks or individual 
forms of solidarity action.
We organize our analysis of reported solidarity practices around an 
alternative set of hypotheses: the first concerns support of the traditional 
belief systems and the notion of universal welfare, and the second con-
cerns the conditionality of solidarity based on the notion of deservingness. 
In the first case, reported solidarity practices and attitudes would uphold 
the founding principles and distinctive traits of the Danish (Scandinavian) 
welfare regime. In line with the existing literature (Christoffersen et al. 
2013; Jöhncke 2011), we would expect high levels of support for the wel-
fare state and involvement in solidarity practices to be distributed equally 
among the population encompassing all age groups, gender, regions and 
ideological and political affiliations. Such a uniform pattern of solidarity 
would reflect the homogeneity of Danish society represented by central-
ized state structures. We would further expect that a centralized, strong 
and omnipresent welfare regime releases citizens from the need to invest 
in substantive support action. Danes would trust that the universal welfare 
state takes care of the basic needs of vulnerable groups like the unem-
ployed, people with disabilities or refugees. Mutual support would be vol-
untary and not required for the subsistence of these persons in need. We 
would therefore expect Danish civil society to assume a subsidiary func-
tion vis-à-vis state-centered welfare: solidarity action would often supple-
ment existing services and not be substitutive for the well-being or survival 
of vulnerable groups (in contrast to countries where state solidarity is lack-
ing or inefficient). Citizens would rather opt for indirect instead of direct 
support actions and their solidarity would encompass several levels: trust 
and mutual assistance at the local and national level and a European and 
global problem awareness. We would ultimately expect that the universal 
welfare state releases forces for the mobilization of transnational solidarity, 
which becomes especially a target of private, individual support action and 
charity.
In the second case, we would be able to identify patterns of condition-
ality in the reported solidarity practices. We would be able to describe 
how Danes distinguish between different recipients of solidarity along 
criteria of deservingness that justify an unequal distribution of services 
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and differentiated access to welfare. We would further expect that solidar-
ity varies along the lines of the expected contributions of solidarity recipi-
ents to Danish society. An instrumental view on solidarity would thus 
prevail over the inclusive norms of universal welfare. In particular, we 
would be able to describe whether solidarity is redefined in a way that 
either claims of welfare chauvinism or claims of nativism become more 
legitimate. In the first case, we would assume that Danes support the 
claims that welfare benefits should become conditional on individual con-
tributions measured in terms of ‘having served’ for the national commu-
nity (deservingness based on merit). In the second case, Danes would 
support the claims that welfare benefits should be reserved only for those 
considered ‘natives’ by being born into the national community (deserv-
ingness based on ethnic and cultural bonds).
As a result of this shift from universalism to deservingness, we would 
further expect that solidarity would become more confrontational with 
citizens either supporting restrictions of welfare through the application of 
criteria of deservingness or opposing them. This confrontation would fol-
low an ideological left-right cleavage, leading to the polarization of the 
Danish population shifting from the support of center-right or center-left 
parties to the political extremes. Conditionality in the reported solidarity 
practices would also encompass several levels, with strong preference given 
to the local and national enactment of solidarity and more exclusive atti-
tudes toward European and global solidarity action. As regards patterns of 
transnational solidarity, we would, on the one hand, expect many Danes to 
be reluctant to extend welfare services to groups of European migrants or 
refugees and to make access of these groups conditional. On the other 
hand, following the new confrontational style through which solidarity is 
negotiated, we would expect Danes to engage in more political forms of 
solidarity action in direct opposition of state policies or in response to defi-
cits of state welfare.
FIndIngS
Reported Solidarity Practices
First of all, we wish to investigate whether reported solidarity practices in 
Denmark reflect a new conditionality in the way Danish population 
 distinguishes solidarity receivers as deserving or undeserving. As shown in 
Table 2.1, approximately half of the population (46.6%) declares to be 
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engaged in some sort of solidarity action in Denmark, but only about one- 
fourth in the EU (23.9%) and little more than one-third (36%) outside the 
EU. In line with previous findings on the inclusiveness of Danish welfare, 
a relatively widespread solidarity culture in Denmark thus persists and is 
measurable not only at the level of attitudes but also translates into various 
forms of solidarity practices accounting for the needs of vulnerable groups 
primarily inside Denmark but also with a strong focus outside of Denmark, 
both in Europe and globally.
Table 2.2 shows the type of solidarity actions that people become 
involved in at the national level. Among the solidarity actions listed at 
national level, low engagement activities such as donating money is by the 
far the most widespread activity (28.4% of all Danes), followed by buying 
or refusing to buy products in support of solidarity goals (17.5%). High 
engagement activities such as donating time (12.8%), engaging as a passive 
(10.8%) or active (9.6%) member of a solidarity organization rank lower 
and participating in a protest march lowest (9.2%) among the reported 
solidarity activities.
Low engagement activities like donating money or consumer awareness 
are expectedly more widespread than more engaging activities like donat-
ing time, protesting in the streets or aligning with an organization. This is 
in line with our hypothesis that the availability of state help for persons in 
need correlates with more indirect forms of solidarity action. Solidarity 
Table 2.1 Engagement in solidarity 
action at national, European and global 
level (% participated in some form of action)
National EU Outside EU
46.6 23.3 34.5
Table 2.2 Type of soli-
darity action at national 
level (in %)
Participated





Bought or refused to buy products 17.5
Engaged as passive member of an 
organization
10.8
Engaged as an active member of an 
organization
9.6
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action is however not apolitical, as some political awareness is needed, for 
instance, when consumers decide as citizens to boycott particular prod-
ucts. Explicit political activism in support of solidarity like participation in 
street protests or active membership in political groups is however not 
widespread (Grasso 2011, 2016), that is, only one out of ten Danes 
engages in such activities.
Looking more closely at conditional factors of solidarity behavior, we 
first test a number of social structure variables. When it comes to age, we 
find that solidarity action at national level is equally spread over all genera-
tions, but there are greater differences between younger and older people 
with respect to solidarity action in the EU and outside of EU, that is, the 
younger generations below 35 is generally more engaged in European and 
global solidarity action (Table 2.3).
In other words, young people do not withdraw from national solidarity 
action and replace it with European and global engagement but engage 
more equally at all levels. There is thus no trade-off between national and 
European/global solidarity. The higher engagement of young people in 
transnational solidarity action is even more striking if one considers the 
necessity to invest higher resources for transnational actions, like time and 
money that are more easily available for elder generations. Moreover, age 
differences are more pronounced when it comes to solidarity within the 
EU. Comparing the young age group of 18–24 with the middle age group 
of 45–54, their engagement in national solidarity action is identical (both 
47.6%), their engagement in global solidarity action is wider (41.1% vs. 
32.8%), but the widest gap is to be found in European solidarity engage-
ment (32.2% vs. 20.0%).
Table 2.3 Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global 
level (% participated in some form of action) by age group
National EU Outside EU
18–24 47.6 32.2 41.1
25–34 50.0 30.3 37.7
35–44 44.4 21.1 29.8
45–54 47.6 20.0 32.8
55–64 48.5 22.7 33.6
65 years and older 42.9 18.6 34.2
Total 46.6 23.3 34.5
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These differences are even more pronounced when comparing the 
young generation with the elder generation (above 65), which shows low-
est engagement in EU solidarity (18.6%) but a slight increase in global 
solidarity action (34.2%). Possible explanations for this EU bias are differ-
ences in support of the EU between the age groups that translate into 
different patterns of national, European and global solidarity. Based on 
political socialization theory, we could hypothesize that perhaps genera-
tions coming of age during the time of EU consolidation and making use 
of EU opportunities for education, work and travel feel more solidarity at 
this level (Grasso 2014). Other possible explanations refer to differences 
in support action (like donating money, which typically involves elder age 
groups and is more typical for expressing global solidarity and less com-
mon as an expression of European solidarity).
There are instead no gender differences when it comes to explaining 
support action at all levels (Table 2.4) and only slight differences when it 
comes to residence (city or rural areas) (Table 2.5). On the other hand, 
education explains higher engagement in solidarity action at all levels 
(Grasso 2013), with differences more marked for European/global soli-
darity action (Table 2.6). Moreover, there are also important inequalities 
Table 2.4 Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global 
level (% participated in some form of action) by gender
National EU Outside EU
Male 46.1 22.9 35.3
Female 47.0 23.6 33.7
Total 46.6 23.3 34.5
Table 2.5 Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global 
level (% participated in some form of action) by place of residence
National EU Outside EU
A big city 48.7 27.0 36.6
Suburbs or outskirts 49.4 22.8 36.2
Town or small city 43.8 20.7 32.1
Country village 43.8 19.8 32.7
Farm or home in the country-side 50.1 29.6 37.5
Total 46.6 23.3 34.5
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by occupational class of chief of household with professionals participating 
in national actions of solidarity at 15 points higher than those in unskilled 
manual jobs (Table  2.7). Overall, we can thus conclude that solidarity 
action is spread relatively equally between genders and places of residence 
but spread unevenly in terms of social class with individuals holding more 
resources more likely to get involved (Grasso 2017). Accounting for these 
class differences is however not only income but also education,  occupational 
opportunities and social capital (as shown in Tables 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8).
Social capital as measured through sociability (i.e. meeting friends) is 
associated with national level solidarity, that is, with those who meet 
friends regularly also most engaged in solidarity action at the national level 
(Table 2.8). Higher social capital does not show a higher likelihood to 
engage in European and global solidarity, however. Differences in 
European and global solidarity engagement may be explained therefore 
rather by the nature of the network of friends (homogeneity/heterogene-
ity) than by frequency of meetings.
Table 2.6 Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global 
level (% participated in some form of action) by education
National EU Outside EU
University or higher degree 54.6 30.0 45.9
Secondary school 48.1 23.9 35.4
Less than secondary school education 38.6 17.6 24.9
Total 46.6 23.3 34.5
Table 2.7 Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global 
level (% participated in some form of action) by occupational class
National EU Outside EU
Professional or higher 56.3 30.4 49.0
Manager or senior administrator 52.4 26.6 38.2
Clerical 42.2 17.0 30.4
Sales or services 47.9 22.5 33.3
Foreman or supervisor 46.8 30.1 41.2
Skilled manual work 46.4 25.5 31.0
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual 41.0 18.3 27.3
Other (e.g. farming) 38.2 21.1 26.7
Total 46.6 23.3 34.5
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Summing up the social structure variables, we find that solidarity behav-
ior of the Danish population is overall rather uniform and follows expected 
patterns. The preferred action forms for Danes are passive activities like 
donating money, but still a substantial portion of the population also 
invests in more engaging and political forms of solidarity. Gender and resi-
dence do not impact on solidarity engagement, while there are interesting 
differences between age groups, educational levels and occupational 
classes.
Among the attitudinal patterns, it is interesting to note that strength of 
national identity measured in terms of attachment to one’s country mat-
ters less to explain engagement in national solidarity action but more to 
explain European and global solidarity. People who feel least attached to 
Denmark as a country would still engage in national solidarity and are 
those most likely to engage in European and global solidarity. Whereas 
people who feel strongly attached to Denmark as a country are engaged in 
national solidarity action (even though interestingly to a lower extent that 
those who feel no attachment), these groups of people are the least likely 
to engage in European and global solidarity.
This is different when the strength of national identity is measured in 
terms of ethnic belonging: respondents who feel highly attached to other 
Danes show a very similar pattern of solidarity engagement at all levels 
with a clear focus on national solidarity compared to the group of respon-
dents who feel a strong attachment to Denmark as a country. People who 
feel no attachment to other Danes are instead expectedly least engaged in 
national solidarity but do also show lower solidarity engagement at all 
levels compared to the group of Danes that feels attachment to Denmark 
as a country (Table 2.9). Strong ties of ethnic belonging thus translate 
into strong patterns of national solidarity as much as strong ties of territo-
Table 2.8 Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global 
level (% participated in some form of action) by social capital (frequency of meet-
ing friends)
National EU Outside EU
Less than once this month 34.0 30.4 49.0
Once or twice this month 45.9 26.6 38.2
Every week 52.9 17.0 30.4
Almost everyday 47.9 22.5 33.3
Total 46.6 23.3 34.5
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rial belonging generate national solidarity. Weak ties of ethnic belonging 
instead translate into weak solidarity engagement at all levels, whereas 
weak ties of territorial belonging go hand in hand with strong solidarity 
engagement at all levels.
Danes who feel no or little attachment to other Danes born in the 
country also engage less in national solidarity action compared to Danes 
who feel a strong attachment to fellow Danish citizens. Yet the ratio of 
engagement in European and global solidarity between these two groups 
is the same, that is, those who feel no attachment to fellow nationals do 
not compensate their lack of attachment by higher engagement in 
European and global solidarity, while those who feel a strong attachment 
to their co-nationals also translate this into solidarity action toward them 
and engage to minor degrees in global and European solidarity. Again, we 
find that there is no trade-off between engagement in national and 
European/global solidarity, which are not exclusive but complementary. 
A strong feeling of solidarity with co-nationals is thus also a good predic-
tor for engagement in global and European solidarity, while respondents 
who feel not attached to co-nationals show low solidarity engagement at 
all levels.
We further find a strong correlation with political interest (Grasso and 
Giugni 2016), which matters at all levels, but most when it comes to 
global solidarity and least when it comes to solidarity within the EU 
(Table 2.10). Political awareness makes it more likely that Danes engage 
in global solidarity and to a minor degree also national solidarity but 
affects least engagement in EU solidarity.
Table 2.9 Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global 
level (% participated in some form of action) by attachment to country and fellow 
citizens
Attached to Denmark Attached to people in Denmark
National EU Outside EU National EU Outside EU
Not at all attached 51.0 36.9 42.8 38.5 29.8 31.2
Not very attached 49.5 34.5 45.8 51.4 34.0 46.4
Fairly attached 50.8 25.9 37.5 44.3 21.5 31.6
Very attached 45.9 21.5 33.1 49.2 23.3 37.4
Don’t know 15.8 13.6 15.7 46.5 22.3 29.5
Total 46.6 23.3 34.5 46.6 23.3 34.5
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From the literature, we would expect that in a consociational democ-
racy, like Denmark, ideological cleavages matter less and that citizens, 
while aligning with political parties, show similar patterns of solidarity and 
support for the welfare state (Christoffersen et  al. 2013). This is not 
exactly corroborated by our data where a left-right cleavage in solidarity 
action is clearly visible (Table 2.11). While supporters of all political  parties 
are involved in forms of solidarity action to some extent, we find that sup-
porters of right and liberal parties are less engaged in solidarity action than 
supporters of left and social-democratic parties (Giugni and Grasso 2015). 
The two solidarity poles are marked by citizens who feel attached to the 
populist Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party) (39.4% involved in soli-
darity action) and citizens who feel close to the left-socialist Enhedslisten 
Table 2.10 Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global 
level (% participated in some form of action) by political interest
National EU Outside EU
Not at all interested 28.8 14.6 18.0
Not very interested 40.5 18.9 27.4
Quite interested 48.0 21.8 36.2
Very interested 63.8 39.5 51.1
Don’t know 21.8 13.8 17.7
Total 46.6 23.3 34.5
Table 2.11 Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global 
level (% participated in some form of action) by party attachment
National EU Outside EU
Socialdemokratiet 48.9 22.6 38.2
Dansk Folkeparti 38.5 16.3 22.0
Venstre 42.5 21.6 30.7
Enhedslisten 64.1 41.1 56.2
Liberal alliance 43.8 25.7 33.2
Det Radikale Venstre 57.6 34.2 53.2
Socialistisk Folkepar 63.4 29.2 48.2
Det Konservative folk 38.7 24.2 32.1
Other party 55.8 29.6 47.6
No party 39.3 16.2 26.3
Don’t know 38.8 18.5 24.5
Total 46.6 23.3 34.5
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(Red-Green Alliance) (66.4%). This difference between the left and the 
right is even more pronounced when it comes to engagement with global 
solidarity with the same poles formed by Danske Folkeparti (22.8% 
involved in global solidarity action) and Enhedslisten (57.8%). In the case 
of solidarity action within the EU, engagement is generally lowest and 
party differences matter less, but it is interesting to note that the two 
Eurosceptic parties Dansk Folkeparti and Enhedslisten form again the 
poles, with only 16.9% of Dansk Folkeparti supporters engaged in EU soli-
darity action and 42.6% of supporters of Enhedslisten.
The closer you feel connected to a political party, the more likely you 
are to engage in solidarity action; closeness to a political party impacts on 
solidarity action most in the case of global solidarity and least in the case 
of solidarity within the EU (Table 2.12). In general, it appears that the 
contours of the field of EU solidarity action are still blurred, while Danish 
citizens across all variables prefer to engage in solidarity nationally and to 
a lower extent invest in global solidarity action (the half-third-fourth 
model: that is, 50% national, 33% global and 25% EU). While Danes have 
a generally positive attitude toward the EU, their willingness to invest 
personally in solidarity action within the EU is low and, in fact, lowest 
among the supporters of Eurosceptic right-populist parties.
There is a slight positive bias in engagement in solidarity action among 
those who are more positive about EU membership (Table 2.13). The 
same thing is true of those who think the country benefited from EU 
membership (Table  2.14). On the other hand, a substantial number 
(20.2%) of Danes who think that EU membership is a bad thing still 
engage in EU solidarity action (compared to 23.3% of the whole popula-
tion and 27.6% among those who think that EU membership is a good 
thing).
Table 2.12 Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global 
level (% participated in some form of action) by closeness to political party
National EU Outside EU
Not very close 43.0 18.5 32.3
Quite close 51.0 25.3 37.8
Very close 54.7 35.6 46.9
Don’t know 36.6 21.3 28.2
Total 46.6 23.3 34.5
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Moreover, opponents of EU redistribution policies engage less in soli-
darity action at all levels, which either reflects a general non-solidary atti-
tude or a preference of altruistic forms of solidarity action over redistributive 
ones (Table 2.15). There does not seem to be a trade-off between solidar-
ity at different levels.
Finally, personal perceptions of justice tend to be linked to a strong 
focus on engagement in national solidarity action (Table  2.16). Those 
Table 2.13 Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global 
level (% participated in some form of action) by opinion on EU membership
National EU Outside EU
A good thing 51.2 27.6 41.6
A bad thing 46.1 20.2 29.7
Neither good nor bad 47.0 23.8 33.8
Don’t know 27.7 12.7 20.6
Total 46.6 23.3 34.5
Table 2.14 Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global 
level (% participated in some form of action) by opinion on whether country ben-
efits from EU membership
National EU Outside EU
Benefited 51.4 27.7 40.7
Not benefited 45.7 20.9 31.1
Don’t know 36.9 16.8 25.4
Total 46.6 23.3 34.5
Table 2.15 Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global 
level (% participated in some form of action) by support for EU debt relief
National EU Outside EU
Strongly disagree 37.5 13.7 23.4
Disagree 44.1 21.0 27.9
Neither 47.2 22.6 34.7
Agree 57.4 32.2 48.5
Strongly agree 65.9 44.5 58.4
Don’t know 31.2 14.4 22.8
Total 46.6 23.3 34.5
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who thought they received less than their just share would still be willing 
to invest in national solidarity, and to some extent global solidarity, but are 
less likely to engage in EU solidarity action. The biggest differences 
between those who feel they have more or about their fair share and those 
who feel they get less are in EU and global solidarity.
Our results have shown that a substantial number of Danes who feel 
strongly attached to their country would still engage in European and 
global solidarity action. This confirms findings from other studies, which 
have shown that identities expressed at different levels are not exclusive: 
people can feel attached to their nations but at the same time feel also 
belonging to a European and global community (Risse 2010). This differ-
ence between attitudinal variables and engagement in solidarity action is 
weakest in the case of support of EU membership.
‘Cosmopolitans’ and ‘Europeanists’ differ to some degree from ‘nation-
alists’ but are not fundamentally different in their engagement in transna-
tional solidarity action. Instead, we find a strong partisan division line with 
supporters of extreme left parties being strongly engaged in transnational 
solidarity and supporters of extreme right parties weakest. This division is 
however less visible when comparing supporters of the two center- 
mainstream parties Social-Democrats and Venstre, showing very similar 
patterns of national and European solidarity engagement and only some 
minor deviation in the case of global solidarity engagement. Left-leaning 
and right-leaning Danes are thus clearly distinct in their solidarity behav-
ior, while the center-leaning majority displays very similar patterns of soli-
darity engagement. If polarization happens, this takes place mainly at the 
fringes of the political spectrum. Given the strong mobilization potential 
of Dansk Folkeparti with a potential to affect the whole population (as in 
Table 2.16 Engagement in solidarity action at national, European and global 
level (% participated in some form of action) by what the respondent feels they 
receive relative to others in their country
National EU Outside EU
More than your fair share 51.5 41.9 51.9
Your fair share 49.1 22.7 37.9
Somewhat less than your fair share 49.3 26.7 34.4
Much less than your fair share 47.6 24.0 31.9
Don’t know 30.5 13.4 16.7
Total 46.6 23.3 34.5
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the case of the refugee crisis), such forms of enhanced solidarity contesta-
tion still mark an important shift from the consensus orientation that has 
traditionally characterized Danish society.
concluSIon
In this chapter, we have identified a number of factors that condition soli-
darity practices in Denmark. By putting to the test the principled universal-
ism of the Danish welfare state, we found that solidarity practices are 
relatively widespread across the population in Denmark and that Danes in 
all age groups and independently of gender and residence engage in soli-
darity above all at the national level but to significant degrees also at global 
and European level (the half-third-fourth model: that is, 50% national, 33% 
global and 25% EU). To the extent that a formally universal welfare state is 
upheld, Danes also continue to be proud of their high-taxed, universal 
welfare regime, even though in practice many welfare services have become 
conditional, and criteria of deservingness are applied when deciding about 
the needs of diverse groups of people. In line with our hypothesis, we can 
thus conclude that the belief in the value of universal welfare is still deeply 
ingrained in the Danish mindset, but the question of how to redistribute 
welfare and cover the needs of specific groups is increasingly contested.
In line with this new conditionality in the implementation of state- 
centered welfare services, we found that also reported solidarity practices 
and attitudes distinguish different degrees of deservingness for deciding 
on the access to welfare. Our findings in this sense rather support our sec-
ond hypothesis reflecting a reality of conditional solidarity and unequal 
access to welfare that is justified by criteria such as ethnic belonging or 
expected contributions of solidarity recipients to Danish society. An instru-
mental view on conditional solidarity prevails at the level of reported soli-
darity practices and restrictive attitudes toward specific groups in need (in 
particular migrants, refugees and long-term unemployed), while in terms 
of general beliefs, the inclusiveness of universal welfare is still upheld as a 
counterfactual norm that distinguishes Denmark in Europe and in the 
world. This new conditionality of solidarity attitudes and practices is partly 
explained by socio-structural variables such as education and occupational 
class with less resourceful individuals less likely to engage in different 
forms of solidarity action. Apart from these socio-structural variables, we 
also considered a number of attitudinal variables. Among those, identity 
(as measured through territorial and ethnic belonging) matters less, but 
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party affiliation is found to be a strong predictor for differences in solidar-
ity behavior with adherents of the right-populist Danish People’s Party 
engaged less in solidarity at all levels and the sympathizers of the Red- 
Green Alliance engaged most. In future analyses, the conditionality of 
solidarity needs to be also tested with regard to manifestations of solidarity 
toward different vulnerable groups in society. This would allow for a more 
systematic identification of conditional factors of solidarity in relation to 
different levels (national, European, global) and reference groups (unem-
ployed, people with disabilities and immigrants/refugees) which could be 
developed further in future work.
noteS
1. See, for instance, their statement on ‘Europe in the crisis’ with an explicit 
reference to solidarity and welfare in the wider Europe and the world 
(http://org.enhedslisten.dk/tema/europa-i-krise-fakta-og-muligheder last 
accessed May 10, 2017).
2. See our overview of most recent policy changes and restrictions in the field 
of unemployment, disabilities and immigration/asylum in Duru et  al. 
(forthcoming).
3. Comparative GDP per capita indices over the period 2008–2016 are pro-








7. Trust in political institutions and impact on the crisis on political attitudes are 
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CHAPTER 3
Solidarity Activism in Germany: What 




During the summer of 2015, an unprecedented wave of solidarity with 
incoming refugees from Syria and other countries of the Middle East, 
Africa and Asia swept through Germany. Innumerable initiatives and indi-
vidual citizens committed to what was called the new German “welcom-
ing culture”. These initiatives not only engaged in the provision of 
immediate help (e.g., clothing, food, shelter, language courses and assis-
tance with German administration) but also rallied in support of migrant 
and refugee rights. The inability of German authorities to handle the 
inflow of migrants and the growing mobilization of populist, right-wing 
and xenophobic groups, dampened the “welcoming culture” consider-
ably and boosted conflicts on the correct policies for the German admin-
istration to pursue. As a consequence, solidarity became a contested issue. 
While some rallied for solidarity with all people in need of help—refugees 
included—and insisted that “we can do this” (Schiffauer et al. 2017), oth-
J. Kiess (*) • C. Lahusen • U. Zschache 
Department of Social Sciences, University of Siegen, Siegen, Germany
44 
ers proclaimed the need to refrain from unlimited assistance and instead 
opt for the exclusive support of Germans, fearing that the multiple crises 
in the world would eventually hit Germany as well. Consequently, it seems 
as though solidarity has become a contentious field that separates people 
with different cultural orientations, political beliefs and social standing.
Given this background, it is important to map the field of solidarity 
within the German population. For this purpose, we will make use of the 
survey data provided by the “European paths to transnational solidarity at 
times of crisis: Conditions, forms, role models and policy responses 
(TransSOL)” project. Our aim is to answer the following series of ques-
tions. How diffused is the disposition to engage for solidarity within the 
German population, and are there differences in the degree of reported 
activities when distinguishing between various target groups? What can we 
say about those people who report being committed to solidarity activities 
when compared to those indicating they abstain? Are there specific social 
traits (e.g., socio-demographic characteristics, social standing, attitudinal 
dispositions or cultural values) that distinguish one group from the other? 
In order to answer these questions, the chapter will proceed as follows. 
Firstly, we will briefly introduce previous research on solidarity dispositions 
and activities in order to identify the core social traits that play a role in 
distinguishing the “active” from the “inactive”. Secondly, we will describe 
the frequencies of different solidarity actions in regard to various target 
groups: on the one hand, with reference to spatial entities (people in the 
respondents’ own country, within the EU and outside the EU), and on the 
other hand, in regard to three issue field specific target groups, namely, 
refugees, the unemployed and people with disabilities. Thirdly, we will con-
duct a series of multinominal regression analyses in order to identify the 
social profile of the “active” and thus to validate the various research 
assumptions about relevant social, economic or cultural differences between 
the groups acting and not acting on behalf of others. In this context, we 
will also deal with issue field specific motivations and beliefs that might 
explain why people decide to engage for specific target groups. Finally, we 
will summarize and briefly discuss the core findings of this chapter.
theorIes of solIdarIty actIvIsm
Our analysis of solidarity in Germany requires a brief summary of previous 
research findings in order to identify those potential traits that might 
enable us to distinguish active from the inactive citizens, and thus to 
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 identify those social traits that might increase the probability of being 
engaged in solidarity activities. Relevant insights come from different 
strands of research because social solidarity touches the study of public 
support for redistribution and redistributive policies, of social capital and 
social movements, among others. Many of these studies tend to paint a 
similar picture of solidarity-related activities. First of all, we know from 
research on political behaviour and social movements that resources, skills 
and opportunities do matter (Brady et al. 1995; Verba et al. 1978; Jenkins 
1983), which means that the socio-demographic characteristics of citizens 
determine to a certain extent their readiness to engage in political and 
social activities. Age, for instance, matters in terms of biographical avail-
ability (Beyerlein and Bergstrand 2013), since people might reduce their 
social and political activities because of personal constraints, for example, 
due to marriage or family responsibilities. The unequal access to resources 
and skills (e.g., income and education) impinges on levels of political and 
civic engagement as well, meaning that socially excluded people might be 
more affected by a lower degree of social and political engagement (Verba 
et  al. 1978; Kronauer 1998). Finally, we need to look at the effect of 
migration, because research has shown that migrants might be involved in 
(cross- national) forms of solidarity in support of ethnic diasporas or com-
munities (Morokvasic 1999; Schulze 2004).
Building on these observations, we might expect—secondly—that social 
class might be a relevant factor as well (Cainzos and Voces 2010). Following 
the findings of other studies, we expect the middle classes to be overrepre-
sented in political and social activism, as this reflects their preferences, civic 
norms and their economic, cultural and social capital (Kriesi 1989; Eder 
1993). At the same time, however, we know from studies on the support 
of redistributional policies that vulnerability and deprivation do impinge 
positively on solidarity disposition (Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rehm 2009), 
at least in regard to target groups exposed to similar risks of social exclusion 
and degradation. In this regard, we thus need to measure the potential 
effect of several variables that are related to social class and social exclusion. 
For this purpose, we will also look at subjective class affiliation and feelings 
of deprivation. Beyond that, we will look at the living situation and inter-
national exposure (housing situation and number of friends from different 
countries) in order to assess whether social isolation and contact with indi-
viduals outside one’s social group might be related to social solidarity.
A third set of expectations is related to ideational factors, such as feel-
ings of collective identity, political beliefs, religiosity and trust. The social 
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movement literature holds it that cultural and moral resources, in addition 
to material, organizational and human resources, are important for 
explaining the successful emergence of collective action (Edwards and 
McCarthy 2004). In the first instance, we know that individual disposi-
tions to engage in solidarity activities and support redistributive policies 
are closely related to religiosity, given that religion generally supports the 
idea of helping others (Stegmueller et  al. 2012; Lichterman 2015). 
Moreover, we assume that solidarity is determined by collective identities, 
in the sense that feelings of belongingness to certain collectivities might 
increase the readiness to support members of these (imagined) communi-
ties. National identities should thus be interrelated to forms of solidarity 
with fellow citizens, European identification with solidarity activities in 
support of people living in other European member states (Bauböck 
2017). Additionally, we expect that political preferences and orientations 
make a difference in regard to solidarity. In general terms, solidarity might 
be more diffused among respondents with leftist political orientations and 
preferences for multiculturalism, while xenophobic, right-wing and popu-
list dispositions might be more probable among the inactive, as corrobo-
rated in regard to public policies (Likki and Staerklé 2014). However, the 
latter ideological preferences might be linked to certain forms of group- 
bound solidarity, for example, within nations or specific target groups 
(e.g., the unemployed). Finally, solidarity could also be more common 
among people with higher levels of interpersonal trust, when considering 
research on social capital that highlights the importance of trust, member-
ship and active participation in civic associations and groups (Putnam 
et al. 2003; van Oorschot et al. 2006).
A final set of factors to be taken into consideration is related more 
strictly to specific issue fields. This last group follows the basic idea that 
solidarity is not necessarily a universal disposition of support related to 
anybody, that is, to all human beings. Possibly, solidarity is always group- 
bound, meaning that citizens tend to centre their engagement to certain 
groups to which they feel particularly attached. This argument puts an 
emphasis on the fact that solidarity needs to be activated (against poten-
tially detrimental factors such as lack of resources, social exclusion or apa-
thy) and that this is more probable in regard to people to whom one feels 
personally attached. Feelings of social proximity between oneself and the 
target groups seem to play a role here (van Oorschot 2006; Stegmueller 
et al. 2012), which means that empathy with significant others is thus an 
important “opener” that helps to mobilize support. At the same time, 
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however, this means that solidarity might be—per se—limited to specific 
groups, a predisposition that has been called philanthropic particularism 
(Komter 2005). Hence, we expect feelings of attachment towards specific 
groups and the belief that a fair society implies the inclusion of and assis-
tance to specific groups to increase solidarity activity towards them.
measurement
Our analysis draws on an original dataset of 2064 respondents (aged 18+) 
in Germany matched for age, gender, region and education level quotas to 
national population statistics. Weights were applied in all descriptive analy-
ses and all models control for age, gender and education. Data retrieval 
was conducted as part of the Horizon 2020 project TransSOL using 
CAWI method (computer-assisted web interviewing) and took place 
between December 2016 and January 2017.1 The dependent variables 
intend to measure reported solidarity activity on behalf of different groups 
and on different levels. The questionnaire specifies for all three groups 
(“Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights 
of…”). We report all variables used for modelling, including recoding pro-
cedures, in the Appendix.
fIndIngs
In this section we present findings on solidarity actions in Germany across 
three levels (national, EU, outside EU) as well as three fields of solidarity, 
namely, the support of refugees and asylum seekers, of the unemployed 
and people with disabilities. We begin with descriptive findings along the 
six dimensions. In the second part, we present findings of multinominal 
regression analyses identifying socio-structural and ideational factors that 
influence the probability of people choosing to engage in solidarity actions. 
In a third subsection, we turn to group specific motifs and beliefs to better 
explain engagement in solidarity activities.
Frequencies of Solidarity Action: Descriptive Results
Table 3.1 shows two patterns: first, solidarity depends on proximity since 
engagement is more frequent in support for people and their rights in the 
respondent’s own country than abroad and support for people outside the 
EU is also quite frequent, but focused on activities like donating money 
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and buycotting/boycotting products. Moreover, our data allows us to dis-
tinguish between the support for our three main target groups: asylum 
seekers/refugees, unemployed and disabled people. Here we observe, 
overall, the highest frequencies in the field of disability rights. Support of 
refugees is more limited but still exceeds support of the unemployed. This 
shows that solidarity is not a generalized disposition or practice but that it 
is linked to specific issues and target groups drawing a pattern of affinity: 
in spatial terms people in one’s own country receive the most support, as 
do disabled if we compare between issue fields. In comparison, people in 
other EU countries and the unemployed receive the least support. In this 
respect, the findings provide a first hint to the fact that solidarity is shaped 
by feelings of attachment to particular groups. We will return to this issue 
in the third part of our analysis.
Beyond descriptive frequencies, we were interested in the connections 
between different solidarity actions people engage in and also similarities 
across issue fields (i.e., solidarity towards the unemployed, disabled and 
refugees). Some types of action may be considered more demanding, for 
example, in terms of resources, than others. Likewise, some fields may be 
more prone to attract civil engagement because of current media attention 















people in own 
country
12.7 24.0 19.0 20.7 5.5 10.2 49.0 0.58
Support of rights/
people in other 
EU country
6.5 13.4 8.8 15.0 3.4 4.7 68.6 0.59
Support of rights/
people in country 
outside EU
5.8 20.8 9.3 19.0 3.0 4.1 60.0 0.50
Support rights of 
asylum seekers/
refugees
5.3 15.2 14.1 9.2 2.8 6.3 65.9 0.50
Support rights of 
unemployed
4.7 8.2 10.2 9.6 2.6 4.9 73.0 0.49
Support disability 
rights
3.9 26.5 19.0 18.6 5.4 7.5 48.4 0.44
R2 0.68 0.51 0.74 0.73 0.59 0.67 0.81
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or differently perceived proximity to the target group. Moreover, activists 
who join certain activities may do so across levels (national, European and 
outside Europe) and across issue fields.
In a next explorative step and following these considerations, we con-
ducted principal factor analyses for both the issue fields and levels of soli-
darity (do people in one field engage in multiple activities?) and the 
activities across fields (do people choosing one activity in one field also 
chose this in another field?). In regard to the activities within levels and 
fields, we found—to some surprise—that at no level and in no issue field 
did the analysis reveal more than one factor2: there do not seem to be dif-
ferent types of activists, for example, those who protest on behalf of 
 refugees on the one hand and those who spend time and money on the 
other hand. In this respect, we may expect variation rather between those 
opting to engage and those not acting at all. Similarly to the fields of activ-
ity, we could not find any differences within action types across fields. This 
suggests that people who protest or spend money do so with—to this 
point—no relevant difference in terms of activity chosen across fields. 
Simple bivariate regression shows, for example, a correlation between pro-
testing for unemployed and protesting for refugees. We may conclude that 
people protesting for one group are also prone to protest for another.
This does not indicate, however, that the same people are likely to 
engage in all different types of solidarity action and for all groups at the 
same time. It is more likely that actions vary enough to disguise specific 
patterns—other than that solidarity activities in one field and one type are 
likely to go together with activity in another field and commute with other 
activities. Moreover and as we will argue below, active people choose their 
field of activity based on attachment towards specific groups or issues. 
Before we turn to this, we want to differentiate and compare the intensity 
of activity in each issue field to complete this descriptive subsection.
Table 3.2 shows the intensity of engagement, thus revealing if and to 
what extent active persons are engaged in several forms of action.3 On first 
sight, the table provides a clear picture with the frequencies declining in 
parallel with the intensity of engagement. However, we also observe that 
only a very small minority engages more deeply in either field and on either 
level of solidarity. If we consider the threshold for engaging in one activity 
only as relatively low (e.g., it could be a one-time action of donating five 
euro to an integrative school project with no further involvement and, more 
importantly, no indication of repetition), the percentage of people engaging 
considerably in solidarity activities in the population is between 10 and 20%.
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These findings led us to choose the summary frequencies in the differ-
ent solidarity fields as our dependent variable for further analysis4: We 
decided to differentiate between three groups: those not engaging at all, 
the one-action activists and multiply engaged respondents. Even though 
different action forms were only moderately interrelated in each of the 
fields and on each of the levels (with Cronbach’s alpha’s at only around 
0.5, see last column of Table 3.1), the usage of summary variables for each 
issue field and distinguishing along intensity, while making sure through 
factor analyses that there are not different dimensions involved, seems to 
be an acceptable compromise.
Comparing the Active and the Inactive: Socio-structural 
and Ideational Factors
Following the findings of our descriptive analysis, we opted for multi-
nominal regression models. This allows us to compare those who do not 
engage with the “one-action activists”, as well as those who engage in 
different activities. This was done without assuming linearity of our depen-
dent variable, which might not hold considering the small Cronbach’s 
alpha. We will present different models, including different sets of vari-














people in own 
country
49.0 28.1 11.9 6.2 2.7 1.8 0.3
Support of rights/
people in other EU 
country
68.6 19.5 6.4 3.7 1.1 0.5 0.2
Support of rights/
people in country 
outside EU
60.0 25.5 9.4 3.2 1.3 0.4 0.2
Support rights of 
asylum seekers/
refugees
65.9 21.5 8.5 2.7 0.9 0.5 0.1
Support rights of 
unemployed
73.0 18.1 6.0 1.9 0.7 0.2 0.1
Support disability 
rights
48.4 32.9 11.8 4.3 1.8 0.8 0.1
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ables, and will focus in this subsection on the comparison of the different 
fields and levels of solidarity. Thus, we calculated each of the models (1–3) 
separately for the different fields and levels of solidarity (indicated by a–f).
In the first step, we only included socio-economic variables (as well as 
the country weight). While increasing age may increment opportunities to 
engage in solidarity activities, income and education can be interpreted as 
variables indicating resources. Thus higher income and higher education 
may increase the probability of engagement as well. We include gender as 
a control variable. Migrant background sometimes comes with additional 
social capital but also vulnerability. Accordingly, we may expect a positive 
influence on solidarity activities. As Table 3.3 shows, we find a lot of sig-
nificant correlations, but there are some differences we will need to point 
out. First, if we compare those engaging in one activity with those not 
engaging, age is significant across all fields and levels, excluding the sup-
port of disability rights. Moreover, the effect suggests that the younger 
people are, the more likely they are to engage in one action relative to 
none. If we compare with those engaging in at least two activities, how-
ever, the effect is only significant for engagement for people outside of 
Europe. In this case, the effect for solidarity with people with disabilities is 
reversed: those engaging for the rights of this group in various forms are 
more likely to be older. Income is positively correlated with engagement 
Table 3.3 Multinominal regression models 1a–1f (socio-economic variables)
Germany Other EU Global Refugees Unemplo Dissabil
One 
action
Age −0.169** −0.217** −0.164** −0.236** −0.224** 0.039
Income 0.121* 0.139* 0.184** 0.122* 0.114 0.189**
Education 0.109 0.131* 0.214** 0.092 0.080 0.037
Male −0.005 0.137 −0.228* −0.004 0.150 −0.001
Migrant 0.008 0.213 0.160 0.088 0.151 0.123
_Cons −0.510** −1.329** −0.695** −1.084** −1.444** −0.369**
Multiple 
actions
Age −0.029 −0.127 −0.179* −0.103 −0.006 0.166*
Income 0.115 0.181* 0.242** 0.238** 0.028 0.110
Education 0.289** 0.190* 0.393** 0.213** 0.174* 0.286**
Male −0.067 0.212 −0.330* −0.165 0.333* −0.014
Migrant 0.198 0.388* 0.537** 0.500** 0.556** 0.277
_Cons −0.753** −1.926** −1.358** −1.701** −2.328** −0.975**
N 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800
Pseudo-R2 0.0117 0.0151 0.0263 0.0159 0.0130 0.0122
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
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for both groups, the “one-action” activists and the “multiply active”. 
However, the effect is not significant for both groups concerning the 
rights of the unemployed. Moreover, education is for “one-action” activ-
ists only relevant if they engage on the European or global level. But for 
the “multiply active”, we find that higher education leads to more engage-
ment on all fields and issues relative to non-actives. Gender has a very 
limited impact overall. Migrant background, finally, has no impact on 
single-activity engagement, but it increases chances to be multiply active 
on the European and global level, on behalf of refugees and also on behalf 
of the unemployed. To summarize, our findings suggest in line with the 
literature (Brady et  al. 1995; Verba et  al. 1978; Jenkins 1983) that 
resources play an important role and the young are more frequently 
engaged in one action relative to none, but we must also emphasize that 
the explained variance through these variables is very low. This means that 
other factors must play a role.
In a second series of calculations, we added further and also subjective 
socio-structural variables to our model (see Table 3.4). Age remains sig-
nificant for the one-action activists (with the exceptions of global solidarity 
and disability rights), and education underlines its importance for all issue 
fields and solidarity levels. Self-placement in a lower social class reduces 
only solidarity on the European level for one-action activists—which is in 
line with current observations in the EU (e.g., Brexit). However, income 
loses its limited effect almost entirely, and there are no clear effects across 
fields. Material resources do not seem to play a dominant role, and this 
observation seems plausible, because the type of activities we asked our 
respondents to comment on are not particularly costly.
If we turn to the perception of (collective) resources, this changes 
only on first sight: for one-action activists, positive perception of living 
conditions in Germany seems to mobilize for solidarity in and beyond 
Europe as well as for the unemployed and people with disabilities, rela-
tive to inactives. However, this result does not hold for our second 
group, those who engage in multiple activities, relative to inactives. 
Here, having friends from other countries spurs solidarity towards refu-
gees, disabled people but also people within the country in general. The 
experience of relative deprivation increases the chances of multiple activ-
ism on behalf of the unemployed (and vice versa) but has no effect on 
other fields of solidarity. Overall, we find that being younger and having 
German residence generally has a positive effect on having participated at 
least once relative to never. Education is the most important factor for 
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distinguishing between multiple activists and inactives—this confirms 
resource-based and civic voluntarism theories in the literature (Verba 
et al. 1995). Moreover, there are specific effects of other variables like 
social class for helping people in other EU countries, relative deprivation 
for helping unemployed and having friends from different countries and 
helping refugees.
In a third series of calculations, we included variables for cultural and 
ideational factors (see Table  3.5). Religiosity and social trust seem to 
impact solidarity activity considerably. This is in line with the literature, 
Table 3.4 Multinominal regression models 2a–2f—socio-structural determinants
Germany Other EU Global Refugees Unemplo Dissabil
One 
action
Age −0.124 −0.182** −0.101 −0.181** −0.237** 0.013
Income 0.047 0.002 0.158 −0.054 0.111 0.084
Education 0.064 0.126 0.163* 0.086 0.057 0.030
Male −0.005 0.084 −0.199 0.037 0.199 −0.053
Migrant −0.034 0.259 0.169 0.115 0.086 0.008
Socialclass −0.004 −0.229** −0.025 −0.099 0.046 −0.001
Reldep 0.012 −0.140 0.031 0.148 −0.111 0.028
Living in 
Germany
0.094 0.230** 0.141* 0.137* 0.253** 0.164**
Friendsdiff −0.089 −0.060 0.000 0.002 −0.116 0.058
Live alone −0.052 −0.062 0.056 −0.192 −0.325 −0.190
East −0.222 0.073 −0.041 −0.209 0.159 0.109
_Cons −0.359** −1.239** −0.634** −0.967** −1.387** −0.197
Multiple 
actions
Age −0.018 −0.133 −0.125 −0.090 −0.067 0.140
Income 0.028 0.068 0.208 0.126 0.010 −0.152
Education 0.275** 0.200* 0.408** 0.209** 0.211* 0.317**
Male −0.121 0.101 −0.403** −0.218 0.258 −0.116
Migrant −0.012 0.279 0.467* 0.349 0.475* 0.033
Socialclass −0.082 −0.139 −0.048 −0.120 −0.093 −0.175*
Reldep −0.026 −0.084 0.004 0.029 −0.322** −0.047
Living in 
Germany
−0.002 0.076 0.140 0.077 0.094 0.091
Friendsdiff 0.145* 0.091 0.125 0.178** −0.055 0.138*
Live alone 0.140 0.075 0.336 0.403* −0.203 −0.380*
East −0.413* −0.037 −0.296 −0.579* −0.494 −0.439*
_Cons −0.548** −1.768** −1.273** −1.543** −2.046** −0.574**
N 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500
Pseudo-R2 0.0153 0.0202 0.0287 0.0269 0.0279 0.0190
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
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pointing to cultural and moral resources as grounds for civil society 
mobilization. In turn, the already limited effects of socio-structural 
determinants are weakened. For example, the living conditions in 
Germany are now only a significant factor for solidarity with unemployed 
and European solidarity, having friends from different countries is not 
significant anymore and so on. Only the effect of relative deprivation5 on 
Table 3.5 Multinominal regression models 3a–3f—cultural-ideational determinants
Germany Other EU Global Refugees Unemplo Dissabil
One 
action
Age −0.128 −0.168* −0.134 −0.186* −0.259** −0.030
Income 0.053 0.022 0.217* −0.000 0.048 0.115
Education 0.004 0.114 0.127 0.034 0.002 −0.025
Male 0.161 0.085 −0.236 0.030 0.176 −0.035
Migrant −0.056 0.256 0.100 0.044 −0.070 −0.154
Socialclass −0.088 −0.235* −0.021 −0.108 −0.046 0.007
Reldep −0.144 −0.237* −0.132 −0.114 −0.248* −0.134
Living in 
DE
0.026 0.225** 0.143 0.065 0.184* 0.054
Friendsdiff −0.069 −0.170 0.036 −0.012 −0.089 −0.003
Live alone −0.018 −0.033 0.032 −0.210 −0.415 −0.186
East −0.153 0.110 −0.135 −0.100 0.178 0.099
Attached 
DE
−0.143 −0.229* −0.116 −0.185 −0.147 0.043
Attached 
city
0.156 0.025 0.112 −0.073 0.041 −0.209
Attached 
reg
0.074 0.170 −0.044 0.056 0.140 0.175
Attached 
EU
0.085 0.269** 0.237* 0.376** 0.284** 0.157
Attached 
hu
0.081 0.015 0.006 −0.137 −0.047 0.150
Social trust 0.196* 0.232** 0.217** 0.261** 0.304** 0.223**
Religiosity 0.199** 0.300** 0.117 0.265** 0.170* 0.172*
Identity −0.017 −0.030 0.092 0.026 0.035 0.079
Left self −0.091 −0.094 −0.145 −0.084 −0.158 0.041
Demsat 0.011 −0.099 −0.056 −0.017 −0.080 −0.012
Multicult 0.104 0.032 −0.055 0.377** −0.150 0.118
Populism 0.041 −0.022 0.070 0.097 0.293** 0.177*
Xeno_econ 0.039 0.095 0.040 0.057 0.066 0.016
Xeno_cult 0.044 −0.063 0.243* 0.316* 0.172 −0.002
_Cons −1.624** −2.680** −1.399** −1.565** −2.579** −0.864
(continued)
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Germany Other EU Global Refugees Unemplo Dissabil
Multiple 
actions
Age −0.080 −0.165 −0.165 −0.118 −0.128 0.085
Income 0.118 0.157 0.334** 0.359** 0.052 −0.030
Education 0.193* 0.119 0.313** 0.129 0.184 0.258**
Male 0.036 0.183 −0.413* −0.139 0.312 −0.030
Migrant −0.122 0.121 0.206 0.161 0.244 −0.237
Socialclass −0.068 −0.091 0.056 −0.054 −0.113 −0.160
Reldep −0.209* −0.365** −0.164 −0.259* −0.457** −0.173
Living in 
DE
−0.040 0.052 0.105 0.010 0.017 −0.003
Friendsdiff 0.113 0.029 0.184* 0.162 −0.041 0.101
Live alone 0.169 0.040 0.161 0.365 −0.146 −0.393
East −0.272 0.147 −0.122 −0.274 −0.355 −0.252
Attached 
DE
−0.096 −0.189 −0.168 −0.253* −0.205 −0.083
Attached 
city
0.104 −0.149 −0.139 −0.058 −0.220 −0.058
Attached 
reg
−0.024 0.120 0.010 −0.018 0.089 0.008
Attached 
EU
0.094 0.071 0.255* −0.014 0.252 0.028
Attached 
hu
0.169 0.25 0.188 0.025 0.020 0.271*
Social trust 0.183* 0.354** 0.239* 0.265* −0.013 0.081
Religiosity 0.348** 0.339** 0.384** 0.576** 0.332** 0.363**
Identity 0.050 0.077 0.048 0.007 0.168 0.103
Right self −0.264** −0.114 −0.103 −0.346** −0.089 −0.088
Demsat −0.107 −0.066 −0.235* 0.215 −0.057 0.028
Multicult −0.008 0.133 0.198 0.366* −0.046 0.137
Populism 0.061 0.049 0.087 0.127 0.246* 0.262**
Xeno_econ 0.220 0.335* 0.353* 0.265 0.464** 0.232
Xeno_cul 0.159 0.137 0.135 0.398* −0.046 −0.019
_Cons −1.653** −2.866** −2.149** −1.771** −2.413** −1.358*
N 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265
Pseudo-R2 0.0528 0.0789 0.0849 0.1397 0.0709 0.0548
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Table 3.5 (continued)
solidarity with unemployed is strengthened. If people think they are bet-
ter off, they are considerably less likely to engage in multiple actions on 
behalf of the unemployed. But this effect, too, is not significant for one-
action activists.
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Motifs and Beliefs Explaining Solidarity Actions?
So far, there are only a few variables that seem to be relevant across dimen-
sions. Above all, religiosity and social trust increase the likelihood of peo-
ple engaging in solidarity actions but also, to some degree, higher levels 
of education and younger age. Beyond that, there are factors that show 
significance for specific dimensions, but the patterns are hard to identify. 
For this reason, we engage in further analyses that include variables that 
could be relevant per field. In particular, we will focus on issue-specific 
motifs and beliefs that may increase the likelihood of respondents to have 
been engaged in solidarity actions on behalf of refugees, unemployed, 
disabled people and citizens in other European countries.6 Moreover, we 
will now switch the mode of presentation and describe the results for the 
issue fields separately and with comparisons of different models per issue 
field in order to focus more directly on the explanatory power of individ-
ual variables. As the second to last rows of the subsequent tables show, for 
the following models we used only those cases in our survey that would 
remain in the least inclusive model (missing in individual variables lead to 
the exclusion of a case) in order to ensure proper comparison across the 
models.
Table 3.6 presents the results for solidarity actions at the European 
level. We included four items that asked for the motivation to grant finan-
cial help to other European countries and that aim to measure reciprocity 
and deservingness as determining factors for this specific type of solidarity. 
In other words, we wanted to test whether redistributive attitudes are con-
nected to individual solidarity activities. Surprisingly, none of these have a 
significant effect on actual solidarity activities of people on the micro level. 
This could be explained by the fact that people actually differentiate 
between financial aid and redistribution on the macro level and within the 
EU on the one hand and solidarity actions on behalf of other people living 
in these other European countries on the micro level on the other hand. 
What seems to impact European solidarity activities is the agreement on 
the policy suggestion to “pool funds to help EU countries” (M = 2.82, see 
Appendix). If respondents agree to this statement, they are more likely to 
engage. However, this effect is not significant for those acting in multiple 
ways if we control for all other variables introduced above. In the con-
trolled model, the feeling that Germany benefits from its membership in 
the EU (68% of our respondents believe so, see Appendix) becomes sig-
nificant. In sum, solidarity actions increase only slightly if people agree on 
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Table 3.6 Multinominal regression models for European level solidarity
Model 4c Model 5c
One action Multiple action One action Multiple action
Age 0.836** 0.829** −0.136* −0.202**
Income 1.092 1.008 0.0586 0.112
Education 1.158* 1.189* 0.102 0.111
Male 0.966 1.110 0.0402 0.194
Migrant 1.166 1.405 0.168 0.199
EUhelpmotiv_1 0.990 1.363 −0.0966 0.269
EUhelpmotiv_2 0.851 0.957 −0.164 −0.157
EUhelpmotiv_3 0.918 1.099 −0.0833 0.108
EUhelpmotiv_4 0.869 0.893 −0.0185 0.198
EUaid 0.956 1.398*** −0.0648 0.124
EUdebt 1.371*** 1.220* 0.216** 0.0877
EU benefits D 0.836 0.797 −0.291 −0.424*
Socialclass −0.204** −0.0390
Reldep −0.200* −0.368***
Living in DE 0.232*** 0.0216
Friendsdiff −0.163 0.0596
Live alone 0.0304 −0.0423
East 0.148 0.168
Attached DE −0.161 −0.204
Attached city 0.0250 −0.0800
Attached reg 0.144 0.115
Attached EU 0.244** 0.141










Constant 0.426*** 0.188*** −2.183*** −2.923***
N 1144 1144 1144 1144
Pseudo-R2 0.0304 0.0304 0.0828 0.0828
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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political steps for (fiscal and financial) integration; the two topics—finan-
cial transfers on the macro level and solidarity with people on the micro 
level—seem to be rather disentangled from each other. This could be 
explained by considering the harsh preconditions that are tied to the 
“help” for countries in difficulties. This reading is supported by the con-
tinued importance of religiosity, social trust but also deprivation as well as 
the negative impact of economic xenophobia.
In recent years, the influx of large numbers of refugees has challenged 
German civil society. People organized to help newcomers in many places. 
Table 3.7 presents two models for this issue field of solidarity action. The 
feeling of attachment to refugees (M = 2.74, see Appendix) seems to play 
an important role explaining why people are active on their behalf. Again, 
we can connect this with the importance of religiosity and social trust that 
increase solidarity activity towards refugees. Education increases only mul-
tiple engagements; income correlates positively in the full model (last col-
umn). Moreover, satisfaction with the way the government deals with 
refugees (M = 3.32, see Appendix) increases activity, as do beliefs that it is 
Germany’s moral responsibility to accept refugees (M = 3.35) and that the 
government should be supporting them financially (M  =  3.16). 
Interestingly xenophobia does not correlate negatively in a significant way 
with refugee solidarity, perhaps some people still help even though they do 
not see refugees as enriching the country (culturally or economically), 
and, vice versa, people may see immigration as a good thing but do not 
bother to support refugees. This is also why we see the positive correlation 
of populism as a sign for dissatisfaction with politics (but not with the 
decision to help the refugees!) rather than anti-democratic sentiment (we 
may speak of left-wing populism in this case). Moreover, agreeing with the 
European response to the refugee crisis (M = 3.80) is only significant in 
one model. Given the controversies on the European level on how to deal 
with refugees, it comes as no surprise that most respondents to our survey 
were dissatisfied (on a scale from 0 to 10). In the case of solidarity activi-
ties supporting refugees, we can conclude to see a clearer picture of why 
people engage. This is probably due to the fact of the heightened atten-
tion the topic had in the months before the survey was conducted.
Table 3.8 presents the results of our regressions with solidarity towards 
unemployed people as the dependent variable. Again, we seem to get a 
much better picture if we include variables measuring motivations and 
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Table 3.7 Multinominal regression models for solidarity with refugees
Model 4d Model 5d
One action Multiple action One action Multiple action
Age 0.881 0.870 −0.0948 −0.134
Income 1.040 1.142 −0.0306 0.289**
Education 1.092 1.284*** 0.0508 0.211**
Male 1.071 0.836 −0.00677 −0.165
Migrant 1.225 1.694** 0.0772 0.252
Attached refu 1.465*** 1.813*** 0.399*** 0.678***
Satgov_refu 1.269*** 1.093 0.243** 0.104
Fair_refu 1.199 1.792*** 0.198 0.576***
Fair_mig 1.152 0.993 0.114 −0.0554
Refugeesupp 1.107 1.118 0.129 0.140
Refugeemoral 0.906 1.093 −0.122 −0.0733
Refugeecrisis 1.370*** 1.038 0.312*** −0.00918
Syrian refugees 0.860 0.812 −0.0856 −0.106
Inclusivity 1.045 1.041 0.00293 −0.0467
Socialclass −0.147 −0.0922
Reldep −0.102 −0.224*
Living in DE 0.0296 0.0171
Friendsdiff 0.00440 0.166*
Live alone −0.241 0.272
East −0.171 −0.253
Attached DE −0.144 −0.193
Attached city −0.116 −0.140
Attached reg 0.0994 0.0774
Attached EU 0.300*** −0.0525










Cons 0.312*** 0.143*** −0.983* −1.287*
N 1236 1236 1236 1236
Pseudo-R2 0.144 0.144 0.1870 0.1870
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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beliefs. Above the ideational-cultural items already included in previous 
analysis, in particular deprivation, social trust and religiosity, attachment 
to unemployed (M = 2.93, see Appendix) has a very clear impact on peo-
ple choosing to act in solidarity as well as dissatisfaction with the govern-
ment’s policies on unemployment (M = 4.93). Solidarity activity on behalf 
Table 3.8 Multinominal regression models for solidarity with unemployed people
Model 4e Model 5e
One action Multiple action One action Multiple action
Age 0.791*** 0.887 −0.234*** −0.148
Income 1.102 1.074 0.0579 0.103
Education 1.065 1.278*** 0.0260 0.193*
Male 1.191 1.327 0.115 0.293
Migrant 0.937 1.507* −0.0770 0.252
Attached unemp 1.666*** 1.469*** 0.483*** 0.352***
Satgov_unemp 1.042 0.739*** 0.0836 −0.333***
Fairsocietey_jobs 0.910 0.960 −0.0806 −0.00152
Inclusivityunemp 1.020 1.255** −0.0314 0.173
Socialclass −0.0553 −0.154
Reldep −0.217** −0.382***
Living in DE 0.117 0.0265
Friendsdiff −0.0531 −0.0257
Live alone −0.429** −0.167
East 0.192 −0.325
Attached DE −0.131 −0.199
Attached city 0.0173 −0.243
Attached reg 0.163 0.101
Attached EU 0.277** 0.282**










Constant 0.244*** 0.119*** −2.445*** −2.361***
N 1261 1261 1261 1261
Pseudo-R2 0.0503 0.0503 0.0958 0.0958
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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of this group can thus be observed more likely when people identify with 
the unemployed and feel that they are treated unfairly (see also the positive 
effect of populism and deprivation). To some extent this explains the posi-
tive correlation of economic xenophobia, but not cultural xenophobia. 
The populism index we used includes statements like “Politicians in the 
parliament need to follow the will of the people” and “Political differences 
between the elite and the people are larger than among people” (see 
Appendix) and thus expresses discontent with the political system (not 
necessarily right-wing populism).
Finally, Table 3.9 summarizes the results of two models calculated to 
explain variance regarding solidarity actions on behalf of people with dis-
abilities. Education stays a relevant factor in explaining solidarity actions 
on behalf of disabled. Beyond the already reported variables, we find again 
the feeling of attachment to the specific group (M = 3.40, see Appendix) 
to be important in explaining solidarity activity. The belief, a fair society 
should include people with disabilities (M = 4.24), is relevant for people 
active in multiple ways. Overall and in comparison to the other issue fields 
investigated so far, we confirm that solidarity with disabled people is less 
contentious. For example, only 2.4% of respondents saw it as “not at all” 
or “not very” important that people with disabilities are included in public 
life. Similarly, the attachment (reported mean) is higher than with refugees 
and the unemployed. Thus, in comparison, questions on refugees and 
their rights were answered more diversely. Also in regards to correlating 
variables, solidarity with disabled is closer to solidarity with unemployed 
than to solidarity with refugees.
conclusIon
Our investigation set out to describe the frequency of solidarity activities 
in Germany, investigate socio-economic and cultural-ideational 
 determinants and, last but not least, test for issue-specific motifs and 
political beliefs. First, we compared the relative frequencies of solidarity 
activities. We found solidarity to depend on geographic proximity, as the 
way and frequency of people engaging varies across spatial levels, and also 
to depend on issue fields: solidarity activity with disabled people is more 
common than activism on behalf of other groups, and, at the moment, 
the needs of refugees are addressed more often than those of the unem-
ployed through these type of political actions. This suggests that solidarity 
at the individual level is not universalistic but rather particularistic. 
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Moreover, our results indicate that solidarity depends not only on spatial 
proximity but also on social proximity.
Second, while we did not find clear socio-economic patterns that held 
across levels and issue fields, it seems as if the not-engaged are of diverse 
Table 3.9 Multinominal regression models for solidarity with people with 
disabilities
Model 4f Model 5f
One action Multiple action One action Multiple action
Age 0.901 0.935 −0.0947 −0.0608
Income_D 1.137* 1.103 0.129 −0.00681
Education 1.026 1.377*** 0.00221 0.297***
Male 0.974 0.975 −0.0447 −0.0159
Migrant 0.940 1.127 −0.154 −0.142
Attached disab 1.525*** 1.848*** 0.430*** 0.710***
Satgov disab 1.098 0.906 0.0363 −0.139
Fairsocietey_disa 1.021 1.191* 0.0298 0.189*
Inclusivity disab 1.028 1.091 0.0111 0.0636
Socialclass −0.00779 −0.197*
Reldep −0.156* −0.178
Living in DE 0.0242 −0.00897
Friendsdiff 0.00641 0.0925
Live alone −0.166 −0.391*
East 0.0872 −0.218
Attached DE 0.0408 −0.0577
Attached city −0.274** −0.134
Attached reg 0.188* 0.00900
Attached EU 0.188* 0.0799










Constant 0.879 0.438*** −0.577 −1.034*
Observations 1235 1235 1235 1235
Pseudo-R2 0.0458 0.0458 0.0838 0.0838
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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age, the one-action activists across levels and issues are often of younger 
age and the multiple activists are older. In addition, higher education 
seems to increase solidarity activity at least in some respects. Furthermore, 
across issue fields, higher social trust and religiosity seem to provide peo-
ple with the motivation and (ideational) resources to engage on the behalf 
of others. Beyond that, our findings point to issue-specific explanations. 
For example, we found relative deprivation to increase the support of 
unemployed people and higher attachment with Europe as well as lower 
attachment with Germany to increase solidarity with people in other 
European countries.
Thus, in the third step, we sought to confirm this interpretation by 
including extra variables for models designed specifically for each specific 
issue fields, namely, support of other people in Europe, refugees, unem-
ployed and people with disabilities. We confirmed that indeed attachment 
to specific groups also increased solidarity activity on behalf of them. In 
this respect, our findings corroborate the idea that solidarity is not a uni-
versalist inclination directed to any human being regardless of his or her 
affiliation or background. Instead, acting in solidarity is rather linked to 
specific groups to which one feels particularly close or attached. Moreover, 
attachment to different groups differs: it is highest towards disabled peo-
ple and lowest, comparing our three issue fields, towards refugees (see 
means in Appendix). In this respect, feelings of social proximity to and 
empathy with certain target groups are important prerequisites for solidar-
ity engagement in support of others.
Furthermore, satisfaction with government policies on specific issues 
might increase or decrease solidarity. For unemployment, people who are 
dissatisfied with the government are more likely to help those who are 
unemployed. This further supports our observation that social proximity 
and empathy help to mobilize support of particular groups because we can 
assume that people who express discontent with the government’s unem-
ployment policies have directly or indirectly (by observation) experienced 
the impact of these policies themselves and can thus identify with the situ-
ation of the unemployed. As for the issue of refugee policies, we observe 
the opposite relationship. Those who feel empathy with refugees would 
tend to be those who agree with the German “welcome policy” and also 
to be the type of individuals who would engage in actions to help refu-
gees. In summary, our analysis has shown how, at least for the case of 
Germany, across the issue fields that social proximity and empathy with 
certain groups encourage solidarity behaviours.
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notes
1. Further information is available at the project website www.transsol.eu.
2. The results were very clear for all analyses conducted. Still, in addition to the 
principal factor analysis, we also conducted principal component analyses as 
well as iterated principal factor analyses but did not find any hints for another 
factor.
3. Nota bene: we did not ask people how often they engaged in the activities. 
We instead combine the different activities, arguing that engaging in mul-
tiple activities equals higher solidarity. This does not mean that one cannot 
be involved deeply in one activity expressing solidarity in this way. We 
account for this in the following analyses by including the one-action activ-
ists as an extra group.
4. Regressions for single items did not produce clearer patterns.
5. A lower score marks lower self-placement (and thus higher deprivation); a 
higher score means people feel better off.
6. Since solidarity actions on behalf of people in Germany and on behalf of 
people in non-European countries are more difficult to isolate, we exclude 
them from the following analysis.
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CHAPTER 4
Pulling Together or Pulling Apart? Solidarity 
in the Post-Crisis UK
Tom Montgomery, Simone Baglioni, Olga Biosca, 
and Maria Grasso
IntroductIon
The importance of solidarity can hardly be underestimated in contempo-
rary Britain. The UK has weathered the financial crisis, witnessed the 
impact of austerity in public services and local economies, and experienced 
a highly divisive European referendum which has not only polarised British 
society and transformed the political landscape but also reconfigured rela-
tions with European neighbours and reopened internal divisions regard-
ing the constitutional future of the UK (Temple and Grasso 2017). In this 
context, this chapter seeks to uncover the reality of solidarity in British 
society by analysing data from a novel survey data set examining various 
aspects of solidarity—including its correlate political behaviours in support 
of various beneficiary groups residing within and outside one’s country. 
Our aim is to analyse the various dimensions of solidarity as well as which 
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factors lead to its political behavioural practice. In what follows, we analyse 
which groups in society are the most solidaristic and which groups can rely 
on others’ solidarity the most. First, however we analyse the relevant lit-
erature that has addressed these theoretical questions in the past.
The concept of solidarity has been long established in social science and 
has been the subject of key works (Durkheim 1893) including those 
focused on the UK context (Thompson 1963). While the introduction to 
this volume has offered a conceptual discussion, this chapter focuses on 
examining the practical behavioural manifestations of solidarity under-
stood as a range of actions that people deploy in support of potentially 
vulnerable groups and individuals, namely, the disabled, the unemployed, 
and migrants and refugees. Our focus on solidarity in terms of practiced 
forms of active engagement in favour of vulnerable groups has political 
connotations. This is because such activities imply either claims in support 
of these groups in relation to civil or human rights and social policy enti-
tlements vis-à-vis the state or because they challenge negligence or refusal 
to support such rights and entitlements that have been promised through 
policy but still lack actual enforcement.
Furthermore, the political connotations of our conceptualization of 
solidarity are related to two highly contentious issues: (a) how to fund the 
enforcement of rights and (b) whether the same level of access to the 
implementation of rights should be granted on an equal basis to all those 
in need. In other words, our understanding of solidarity implies answering 
politically relevant questions such as should the costs of implementing 
rights be equally shared among members of the community or should 
those directly benefiting from implementation bear the costs? And if the 
costs should be pooled from general taxation—as happens in most Western 
European welfare states—should public funds provide universal support 
equally across groups in need, or should solidarity be made conditional 
upon meeting given criteria?
These are fundamental questions at the heart of democratic debate 
today. The ultimate contemporary relevance of these questions today fur-
ther illustrates how solidarity lies at the heart of a contentious domain, 
given that individuals and groups have different and sometimes opposing 
opinions about whether we should and to what extent help others in need. 
Indeed this question lies at the very heart of the fundamental ideological 
debate between left and right which has been at core of democratic politics 
at least since the French Revolution. Whereas the post-war social 
 democratic consensus was characterised by strong support for universalist 
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welfare states across Western Europe, the neo-liberal break of the late 
1970s challenged the idea that society should provide safety nets to help 
vulnerable groups and insisted on the principles of self-interested market 
competition as incentivising individuals to contribute towards society 
(English et al. 2016; Grasso et al. 2017; Temple et al. 2016). Other than 
ideological factors, earlier studies have also suggested that the willingness 
of people to express solidarity with others is mediated by several other 
important factors, some of which pertain to perceived characteristics of 
those being helped and their ascribed deservingness, while others are 
linked to the characteristics of those providing help or with the socio-
economic and political characteristics of the contexts where people live.
Among those factors considered to be influential for the willingness of 
people to help others are the perceptions of:
 1. the degree of control those in need have over their own ‘neediness’ 
(the less responsible for their situation they are perceived to be, the 
more inclined are people to help);
 2. their level of need (people with greater needs are seen as more 
deserving);
 3. their identity (cultural proximity facilitates deservingness);
 4. their attitude (conforming to ‘standards’ fosters solidarity), and
 5. reciprocity (people that have ‘earned’ support through their contri-
bution to the community and its pool of funds in earlier periods are 
more deserving of being helped). (van Oorschot 2006: 26)
Moreover, earlier studies have also argued that a disposition towards soli-
darity depends upon individual characteristics such as age, level of educa-
tion, socio-economic position and political-ideological orientation, as 
well as levels of life satisfaction (Dunn et al. 2014; Grasso 2013, 2016). 
These studies had shown that the solidarity of older, less well-educated, 
less well- off, less-satisfied, and more right-wing individuals is more con-
ditional on the beneficiaries meeting precise criteria with in particular the 
perceived degree of control that beneficiaries have over their needs as well 
their identity being the most powerful ‘conditionality’ drivers (ibid.). The 
reasons behind such a high degree of conditionality among older, less 
well- educated, less well-off, less-satisfied, and more right-wing people 
have been shown to cluster around two main factors: personal interests 
and ideology. People that feel themselves to be in a relatively more inse-
cure social position consider the solidarity provided to those in need as 
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providing competition for their own needs, thus diminishing their sup-
port for solidarity. Other aspects preventing solidarity from developing or 
making it more conditional are linked to ideas people have of ‘otherness’ 
such as, for example, a negative attitude towards migrants preventing soli-
darity for asylum seekers or refugees and more generally a lack of trust in 
others and narrow views of social embeddedness (inhibiting wider social 
solidarity) (van Oorschot 2006).
Nevertheless, research reveals that the willingness of people to help 
others is also influenced by the type of country they live in: welfare regimes 
play a crucial role in institutionalising solidarity and are relevant in foster-
ing or mitigating social solidarity. For example, residual welfare regimes 
tend to increase conditionality as fewer resources are available to meet a 
range of needs, and also national policies and policy discourses should be 
considered since one would imagine a national policy environment sup-
porting solidaristic attitudes will mitigate claims for conditionality among 
its citizens, while a general policy discourse emphasising prejudices against 
those in need would create the opposite—a more greatly conditional atti-
tude (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; van Oorschot and Arts 2005).
To summarise this discussion, solidarity implies a dynamic, interactive 
process of constant renegotiation of social citizenship boundaries, which is 
per se in essence a political phenomenon. In this chapter we are interested 
in understanding how people living in the UK are part of this process, the 
extent to which solidaristic activities are practised, whether solidarity activ-
ities are germane to a conditionality approach, and also if solidarity is prac-
tised at different levels between people living in the various geographic 
areas of the country, and finally whether such differences could be 
explained by taking into consideration both individual characteristics and 
local contexts. The chapter unfolds as follows. We next present our 
hypotheses and then move on to illustrate data and methods, and finally 
we discuss our results and their wider implications.
HypotHeses
Building on the extant literature, we explore solidarity through the prism 
of five main hypotheses related to either the individual or contextual levels 
of analysis. Starting with the latter, we focus on the role that national poli-
cies and discourses play in generating solidaristic (or anti-solidaristic) atti-
tudes and hypothesise that solidarity will be unevenly distributed across 
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the constituent nations of the UK. We expect that it will be more vibrant 
in those areas which have a tradition of progressive and solidaristic 
approaches to social issues and where the effects of the Conservative-led 
government anti-statist, neo-liberal policies have been mitigated by 
devolved authorities with a different policy orientation (viz. Northern 
Ireland and Scotland). Secondly, we also hypothesise that in such different 
contexts, we will find a varying degree of conditionality attached to soli-
darity: thus we will have a lower degree of conditionality in the more 
progressive and ‘policy solidaristic’ constituent nations (Northern Ireland 
and Scotland) than in others (England and Wales).
To understand why we hypothesise that solidarity can diverge across 
the constituent nations of the UK requires an appreciation of the historical 
context and the political cultures which have developed in devolved 
nations. Firstly, in terms of Scotland, we can see that there is a long- 
standing argument in the literature on the development of ‘policy auton-
omy’ (Midwinter et  al. 1991) or indeed a distinctive political culture 
(Kellas 1989). The debate regarding a distinctively Scottish political cul-
ture and its extent is ongoing and to some extent has been integrated into 
the seemingly unresolved question of the future of Scotland in the UK 
following the ‘No’ vote which took place in the 2014 Scottish indepen-
dence referendum (Torrance 2013; Macwhirter 2014) and the rise of the 
SNP as the dominant force in Scottish politics (Johns and Mitchell 2016). 
Another dimension to that debate is whether or not the Scottish socio- 
political context can be considered more egalitarian than its counterparts 
in England (Mooney and Poole 2004).
Northern Ireland can also be seen to have a distinctive political context 
where the divisions between the nationalist and unionist communities 
continue to be a fault line through society. Nevertheless, following the 
common experience of ‘the Troubles’ which saw a great loss of life over a 
period of 30 years, the peace process (Mallie and McKittrick 1996) 
cemented by the Good Friday Agreement (Tonge 2000; Bew 2007) has 
developed alongside an emphasis on equality (McCrudden 1998) between 
the previously conflicting communities and the centrality of consociation-
alism (McGarry and O’Leary 2004) in overcoming divisions (Lijphart 
2012). Therefore, to some extent we can hypothesise that the prolifera-
tion of discourses, legislation, and indeed the very governance of Northern 
Ireland (Tonge 2002) may contribute towards the construction of a more 
fertile environment for solidarity to be practised.
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Considering the individual level, following earlier studies, we hypoth-
esise that younger, more educated, more socially connected people 
(Giugni and Grasso 2015; Grasso and Giugni 2016) and people with a 
higher level of satisfaction with their overall life will be more likely to take 
action in favour of disabled people, the unemployed, migrants and refu-
gees. In addition to these considerations, we are also controlling for the 
exposure of individuals to specific media discourses building from research 
that has identified newspaper readership as a factor which shapes attitudes 
towards each of our three vulnerable groups (Golding and Middleton 
1982; Greenslade 2005; Briant et al. 2011). Consistent with this litera-
ture, we hypothesise that reading more right-wing and prejudicial newspa-
pers (e.g. tabloids) will likely be associated with lower inclination to 
solidarity in comparison to progressive newspaper readership. Moreover, 
building upon the findings of earlier studies that ‘identity sharing’ is a fac-
tor facilitating solidarity, we also control for direct exposure to vulnerabil-
ity and hypothesise that those who are more directly exposed to 
vulnerability through being in one of our vulnerable categories (disabled, 
unemployed, migrants, or refugees) will likely be more solidaristic than 
those who are not. In the following section, we briefly present our data 
set, variables, and methods.
data
This chapter uses cross-sectional data from an original survey, described in 
greater detail in the introduction of this book conducted in the context of 
the TransSOL European collaborative project in the winter months of 
2016/2017 to examine solidarity at the individual level in eight European 
countries. Information was gathered on citizens’ solidarity practices, atti-
tudes and behaviours, as well as on socio-demographic characteristics, 
political attitudes, and cultural orientations. In this study, we use the 
UK-based sample with age, gender, region, and education quotas matched 
for nationally representative statistics of 2083 UK-based survey respon-
dents. Survey weights were included in all analyses.
The variables used for this analysis are presented in Table  4.1 and 
further details of the original survey questions and any relevant recod-
ings are provided in Appendix. The dependent variables of solidarity 
practices used indicate if respondents have supported, in the last 
12  months, the rights of particular people/groups through various 
forms of political actions including more contentious as well as more 
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conventional types: attended a march, protest, or demonstration; 
donated money; donated time; bought or refused to buy products; 
engaged as passive member of an organisation (pay cheque member-
ship); engaged as an active member of an organisation (volunteering in 
an organisation). A further question asked was if respondents partici-
pated in any of the above actions: through a process of recoding, binary 
variables were created that took the value of one if respondents reported 
participating in any of these solidarity actions and zero if they said oth-
erwise. These binary variables resulted in six dependent variables for this 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. dev. Obs.
Supported rights of people/groups in own country 38.4 0.49 2083
Supported rights of people/groups in other countries within 
the EU
18.9 0.39 2083
Supported rights of people/groups outside Europe 25.4 0.44 2083
Supported the rights of refugees/asylum seekers 21.7 0.41 2083
Supported the rights of the unemployed 18.8 0.39 2083
Supported disability rights 34.6 0.48 2083
Age 47.32 16.58 2083
Female 51.3 0.50 2083
Higher education 29.9 0.47 2083
Intermediate education 33.8 0.47 2083
Unemployed 5.1 0.22 2083
Disabled 17.3 0.38 2044
Born in UK 90.2 0.30 2083
Daily Mail 21.2 0.41 2083
The Sun 12.2 0.33 2083
The Times 9.5 0.29 2083
The Guardian 10.6 0.31 2083
Daily Mirror 8.0 0.27 2083
Other newspapers 15.4 0.36 2083
Met friends at least once a month 73.9 0.44 2083
Life satisfaction 6.45 2.15 2032
Scotland 8.5 0.28 2083
Wales 4.8 0.21 2083
Northern Ireland 2.8 0.16 2083
Note: Age is measured in years. Life satisfaction is measured by a 10-point Likert-style response scale 
where a higher number represents higher life satisfaction. The remainder of the variables are percentages. 
Base category for education variable is lower education. Base category for newspaper variable is ‘Not 
reading any newspaper regularly (3+ days a week).’ Base category for constituent country variable is 
England
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analysis indicating if individuals said they had been involved in any of the 
listed political activities (1) in support of the rights of people/groups in 
one’s own country, (2) in support of the rights of people/groups in 
other countries within the EU, (3) in support of the rights of people/
groups outside Europe, (4) in support of the rights of refugees/asylum 
seekers, (5) in support of the rights of unemployed people, and finally 
(6) in support of the rights of disabled persons.
GeoGrapHIes of solIdarIty: fIndInGs 
from tHe constItuent natIons and reGIons 
of tHe uK
Our analysis begins by considering if the data supports our hypothesis con-
cerning the expectation of diverse degrees of solidarity between the con-
stituent nations of the UK.  We do so by comparing answers to three 
questions which asked respondents whether, in the last 12 months, they 
had engaged in various political actions in support of the rights of people 
living in the UK, living in Europe, and those living outside of Europe. 
Findings in Table 4.2 reveal supportive evidence for our hypothesis about 
divergent patterns of solidarity across the UK constituent nations: although 
with small margins, our respondents from Scotland and Northern Ireland 
report stronger solidarity than people living in England or Wales. This is 
true not only of solidarity activities undertaken for UK-based beneficiaries 
but also with respect to beneficiaries based elsewhere. With the caveat of 
their being small numbers in our sub-UK level sample—which are however 
Table 4.2 Solidarity practices in different geographical areas by constituent 
country in the UK
Country N Supported rights in 
own country (%)




England 1761 38.0 18.7 25.1
Scotland 177 44.7* 20.9 29.6
Wales 97 38.2 14.5 20.8
Northern 
Ireland
48 31.2 25.1 27.0
Total UK 2083 38.4 18.9 25.4
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. For definition of the variables, see Table 4.1
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representative of the different demographic weights of the UK constituent 
nations—our findings provide a unique contribution to the debate on 
divergence between the constituent nations of the UK by focusing on 
practices of solidarity, and our results do suggest that there is indeed a 
divergence between these contexts within the UK.
Our findings also reveal the uneven distribution of solidarity practices 
in terms of the groups towards which support is directed (still holding 
across the constituent nations of the UK). Contrary to our hypothesis, in 
fact, the vibrancy of solidarity practices is not equal across people in need: 
some groups appear more ‘deserving’ of help than others. Our results 
indicate that for the most part, the practice of solidarity is aimed at pro-
tecting the rights of those within the UK. Further, longitudinal research 
could reveal if this inward-looking tendency is a constant within British 
society or whether these feelings have intensified towards UK beneficia-
ries following the financial crisis and the ensuing austerity measures. 
Regardless, our analysis shows that the focus is primarily on practising 
solidarity within the UK. In turn, this may be reflecting a narrowing of 
the scope of solidarity during periods of financial downturn and the 
retrenchment of public services, or alternatively this trend could predate 
the current crisis. Indeed, we can see that in terms of transnational soli-
darity, practices are more geared towards supporting those who are out-
side of Europe rather than our European neighbours. We can speculate 
that the issue of prioritising deservingness may have a role to play here. 
In other words, those engaged in solidarity practices may consider that 
those outside of Europe require the most assistance. We can further spec-
ulate that this may be driven by responses to emergencies such as the 
Syrian refugee crisis.
Still concerning the hypothesis about the existence of a ‘solidarity lad-
der’ where different categories of people and groups occupy different 
positions, our findings appear to confirm earlier studies (van Oorschot 
2000, 2006). Table 4.3 reveals an uneven distribution of solidarity across 
the three vulnerable groups: people with disabilities, unemployed people, 
and migrants/refugees. The group which attracts the greatest degree of 
solidarity are people with disabilities. In fact, disabled people are the group 
with the greatest degree of solidaristic support across all four constituent 
nations of the UK. However, again we also find an uneven distribution 
with the highest levels of solidarity to be found in Northern Ireland and 
Scotland.
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Our findings that solidarity is more targeted towards people with dis-
abilities may indicate that in the UK this group is deemed the most deserv-
ing out of our three vulnerable groups, although this heavier distribution 
of solidarity towards disabled people deserves a more nuanced analysis. 
For example, we can speculate that this could be driven by a more pater-
nalistic attitude towards people with disabilities. The perception of people 
with disabilities as being somehow helpless or indeed tragic figures who 
require support from others has been strongly opposed by disability cam-
paigners who since the 1970s in the UK have sought to contrast those 
narratives of disabled people as victims. This is illustrated, for example, 
through those social movements and activists who adopt the ‘social model 
of disability’ which understands the challenges faced by people with dis-
abilities as being constructed by a ‘disabling society’ and rejects deserving-
ness but instead demands equal treatment as citizens (Oliver et al. 2012). 
Therefore, although our findings make for positive reading in terms of the 
solidarity targeted towards people with disabilities, our analysis requires a 
much more cautious approach and fine-grained understanding of the per-
ceptions of disabled people which may be driving this solidarity especially 
when considered alongside the solidarity professed for the other vulnera-
ble groups.
Our findings outlined in Table 4.3 reveal that the group with the next 
highest share of solidarity practices are refugees and that these practices 
are again unevenly distributed across the constituent nations of the 
UK. We can see how the support for refugees is highest in Northern 
Ireland and Scotland with a visible gap between them and England and 
Wales. From previous research, we can see that there has been, for a 
Table 4.3 Solidarity practices with vulnerable groups (refugees, unemployed, 
disabled) by constituent country in the UK
Country N Support refugees (%) Support unemployed (%) Support disabled (%)
England 1761 20.8* 18.0** 33.2***
Scotland 177 28.6* 27.5*** 44.9***
Wales 97 18.5 16.5 33.9
Northern 
Ireland
48 30.9* 18.7 48.0**
Total UK 2083 22.7 18.8 34.6
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. For definition of the variables, see Table 4.1
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considerable time, a proliferation of negative policy discourses aimed at 
those seeking refuge and asylum in the UK and indeed at migrants more 
generally (Sales 2002; Statham and Geddes 2006; Squire 2008). Our 
findings confirm that there is certainly a section of the population which 
stands in stark contrast to the ‘racist public’ thesis, and their practices 
point towards a current of solidarity suggested by extant research (Squire 
2011). Nevertheless, there has been, across governments of different 
political orientations, a drive towards policies which are far more focused 
on border control than solidarity when it comes to refugees arriving in 
the UK (Squire 2016). Given that immigration and asylum policy is 
reserved to Westminster control and there are few avenues for devolved 
administrations to pursue alternative approaches, this perhaps only leaves 
space for rhetorical divergence.
Moreover, our findings reveal that among our three groups, it is unem-
ployed people in the UK who are supported by the lowest number of soli-
darity participation practices. Any analysis of why the unemployed are the 
least supported group should be caveated by the fact that most support 
for the unemployed in the UK has traditionally been delivered by the 
welfare state through support with basic subsistence such as Jobseeker’s 
Allowance (JSA) and with the cost of rent through Housing Benefit (HB). 
It is, however, worth noting that both of these benefits have been at the 
centre of a welfare reform agenda pursued in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government 
elected in 2010 and articulated through their policy document Welfare in 
the Twenty- First Century which highlighted concerns of a ‘culture of 
worklessness’ in the UK. Moreover, ever since the break with the post-war 
consensus initiated by Margaret Thatcher and followed through by both 
Conservative and New Labour prime ministers, support for unemployed 
people has been under attack with those out of work increasingly charac-
terised as lazy and as undeserving of public support. Rather than unem-
ployment being understood as a social, political, and structural problem 
emerging from the limits of capitalist production, it has now been fully 
recast as an individual- level problem resulting from the deficient person-
alities of certain people. Indeed, such policies reflected this ideological 
process of transformation of poverty and unemployment from market fail-
ure to personal failure (Wiggan 2012). Indeed this has been shown as a 
consistently strong trope in austerity Britain, even impervious to contrary 
evidence (MacDonald et al. 2014a, b), and offers some context as to why 
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the unemployed are the group viewed as least deserving among the three 
vulnerable groups we have focused upon here.
Our findings in Table 4.3 also reveal that there is variation in solidarity 
practices towards the unemployed across the UK, with a much greater 
distribution of solidarity evident in Scotland than anywhere else in the 
UK. These findings in Scotland support our hypothesis of policy diver-
gence across the constituent nations across the UK and add weight to the 
argument that Scotland has a more social democratic outlook which in 
turn may lead to a greater degree of solidarity with those out of work, 
particularly given the common experience of deindustrialization in high- 
density population centres such as in the Central Belt. Nevertheless, we 
should be cautious in our approach to understanding this greater tendency 
towards solidarity practices in Scotland as extant research suggests an 
alignment between Scotland and England in social attitudes in terms of 
what are the causes of unemployment (Sinclair et al. 2009).
Therefore, to summarise the key results from this section, our findings 
reveal, as shown in both Tables 4.2 and 4.3, the existence of a hierarchy of 
solidarity in the UK. Firstly, British people express more solidarity towards 
those living in the UK (Table  4.2), and this confirms earlier research 
pointing towards the role that ‘identity’ plays in issues of deservingness. 
Indeed, people have been shown to be more inclined to adopt a solidaris-
tic attitude towards those that are perceived as more similar or sharing 
identity-related features with them. Considering variations across the vul-
nerable groups, solidarity towards the unemployed is the least strong of 
the three and may suggest that policy discourses and media narratives 
which have stigmatised the unemployed may be cutting through to British 
society. Moreover, it could be that the British public in general views 
unemployed people as the most responsible for their condition compared 
to people with disabilities and refugees/asylum seekers. In the middle of 
this hierarchy are refugees, who we may have expected to be the primary 
target for solidarity activities among our three groups, not only because of 
the sense of urgency regarding the Syrian refugee crisis but also because 
our earlier findings suggested that transnational forms of solidarity are 
more geared towards those outside of Europe.
The group at the apex of our hierarchy, namely, the disabled, can be 
understood to occupy that position for two main reasons. On the one 
hand, it may be that they have been a group more visible in terms of the 
impact of austerity upon them, not only through the reassessments of 
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eligibility for welfare support such as Employment and Support Allowance1 
(ESA) but also policies such as the ‘bedroom tax’.2 On the other hand, the 
high degree of solidarity directed towards people with disabilities could be 
understood as being reflective of long-standing stereotypes seeing them as 
victims of their illness rather than equal citizens who have been at the 
sharp end of austerity measures. Therefore, the ‘hierarchy of solidarity’, 
found in our results and illustrated in Fig. 4.1 serves to remind us of the 
uneven distribution of solidarity towards vulnerable groups and it requires 
a more careful understanding of the factors which may be driving solidar-
ity such as the continued attempts by the UK government since the onset 
of the crisis and the ensuing austerity measures to distinguish between 
deserving and undeserving groups.
results for tHe IndIvIdual-level varIables
As we shall discover, our findings suggest that although the hierarchy of 
solidarity outlined earlier may provide a broad understanding of the dis-
tribution of solidarity across each group, a more nuanced analysis reveals 
the fluidity of these hierarchies when considering a range of different 
variables. In order to test our hypotheses, we used a logit model 
(Table 4.4) to analyse the relationship between our dependent variables 
of solidarity practice across different geographies (inside the UK, outside 
the UK but inside the EU, and outside the EU) and vulnerabilities (refu-
gee/asylum seekers, the unemployed, and the disabled) and a number of 
independent variables relevant to our underlying hypotheses. As discussed 




Fig. 4.1 The hierarchy 
of solidarity in the UK
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Table 4.4 Solidarity practices to support the rights in different areas and groups
Inside 
the UK









Age −0.03 −0.08*** −0.06*** −0.11*** −0.08*** −0.04*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age squared 0.00 0.00* 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female −0.18* −0.14 −0.24** 0.04 −0.44*** −0.13
(0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10)
Education (ref.: low education)
  Intermediate 
education
0.09 0.05 0.12 0.25 0.09 0.07
(0.12) (0.17) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.12)
  Higher 
education
0.32** 0.33* 0.69*** 0.74*** 0.35** 0.23*
(0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13)
Unemployed 0.10 0.45 0.23 0.38 0.21 0.32
(0.25) (0.28) (0.27) (0.29) (0.30) (0.25)
Disabled 0.55*** 0.31* 0.47*** 0.34** 0.54*** 0.84***
(0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13)
Born in UK −0.10 −0.43** −0.62*** −0.14 −0.20 −0.35**
(0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.20) (0.17)
Newspaper readership
  Daily Mail 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.27* 0.29**
(0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.12)
  The Sun 0.23 0.56*** 0.43*** 0.44** 0.69*** 0.53***
(0.15) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.15)
  The Times 0.67*** 1.00*** 0.73*** 0.92*** 1.11*** 0.78***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
  The Guardian 1.09*** 0.95*** 0.91*** 1.10*** 0.60*** 0.45***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16)
  Daily Mirror 0.37** 0.41* 0.43** 0.66*** 0.62*** 0.36*
(0.18) (0.22) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19)
Other 
newspapers
0.10 −0.14 −0.02 −0.27 −0.09 −0.25*
(0.14) (0.19) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.14)
Met friends 
once month
0.40*** 0.25 0.23* 0.25* 0.25 0.31***
(0.12) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.12)
Life satisfaction 0.06*** 0.03 0.04 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.08***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Region (ref.: England)
  Scotland 0.33* 0.28 0.31* 0.56*** 0.73*** 0.60***
(0.17) (0.22) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.17)
  Wales 0.13 −0.04 −0.07 0.05 0.16 0.22
(0.23) (0.32) (0.27) (0.29) (0.30) (0.23)
(continued)
T. MONTGOMERY ET AL.
 87
variables (e.g. age, education), but we also look at the significance of 
being born in the UK, which we regard as an important variable given the 
importance that identity issues have on solidarity and deservingness, as 
discussed earlier. We also examine variables encompassing the vulnerabil-
ity of the respondent (e.g. disability or unemployment) to gauge if expo-
sure to such vulnerability at a time of crisis and austerity has an effect on 
the practice of solidarity by these groups; social embeddedness has also 
been a long- standing focus of literature on solidarity (van Oorschot 2006) 
as well as on political participation (Putnam 2001; Maloney et al. 2000; 
Hall 1999). Life satisfaction is a variable deployed to reveal whether prac-
tices of solidarity are the purview of those who feel happy with their qual-
ity of life; as anticipated in the hypotheses, we will also control for how 
readership of different types of newspapers influence solidarity attitudes 
(we hypothesise that readers of more conservative and populist-oriented 
newspapers will be less inclined towards solidarity); and as per one of our 
key hypotheses, we look at the residency of the respondent (e.g. living in 
Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland) to identify divergences in the practice 
of solidarity across the constituent nations of the UK where devolution 
has empowered assemblies and parliaments. The results from the regres-
sions we conducted are set out below.
When analysing our individual-level variables, our hypothesis was 
that the practice of solidarity would depend on a range of factors, 
including a higher level of education. Our education hypothesis builds 
upon established research on solidarity but also on political participa-













  Northern 
Ireland
−0.30 0.42 0.02 0.65* 0.01 0.52*
(0.34) (0.39) (0.37) (0.36) (0.42) (0.32)
Constant −0.76 0.48 −0.02 −0.28 −0.51 −0.63
(0.50) (0.63) (0.56) (0.59) (0.62) (0.51)
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.07
N 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996
Notes: Coefficients of the logit model are shown. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p  <  0.01, 
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. For definition of the variables, see Table 4.1
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resources for an individual to become engaged in societal and political 
issues (Verba et  al. 1995). Furthermore, we hypothesised that those 
with a higher level of education had more material resources to engage 
in solidarity. When examining our findings in Table 4.4, we can see that 
our hypothesis is confirmed by a significant and positive relationship 
between being disposed towards actions of solidarity and being in higher 
education. Consequently, we find confirmation of our hypothesis that 
those with higher education are better resourced to engage in practices 
of solidarity than those with fewer resources (Grasso 2017).
A classic socio-demographic variable—age—presents us with interest-
ing results confirming our hypothesis. What can be seen in Table 4.4 is 
that age is negative and significantly associated with solidarity with each of 
the vulnerable groups as well as each geographic area with the sole excep-
tion of those inside the UK. Therefore the younger you are in the UK, the 
more predisposed you are towards engaging in practices of solidarity. The 
implications of these findings can be seen to some extent in the vote which 
took place in the 2016 EU referendum for the UK to leave the EU, where 
older voters were more predisposed towards voting leave (Hobolt 2016). 
Nevertheless, our findings suggest that the negative relationship between 
solidarity and age extends to anyone who is ‘other’ than within the 
UK. These findings also shed some light on how policies which are restric-
tive towards refugees, austerity policies affecting the disabled, and policies 
characterised by sanctions and compulsion towards the unemployed can 
be sustained given the higher propensity for older people to turn out at 
elections in the UK and reinforce the urgency for more young people to 
become politically engaged before any change in direction could take 
place (Gardiner 2016).
Our findings regarding social embeddedness support our hypothesis 
that the practice of solidarity depends on exposure to social networks and 
social interaction. In this case, social embeddedness is defined as ‘meeting 
socially with friends during the last month’ and, as we can see in Table 4.4, 
is positively and significantly associated, from a geographic perspective, 
with offering solidarity to those within the UK and those outside the EU 
as well as a similar relationship in terms of solidarity with refugees and the 
disabled. The importance of social capital in building social cohesion is 
well established in the literature (Putnam 2001; Li et al. 2005), and our 
findings in the UK resonate with these works. In terms of implications for 
policymaking, another of our findings may be acutely relevant towards 
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understanding how to develop solidarity in the UK. Given the significant 
association between higher life satisfaction and solidarity with others 
within the UK, as well as each of our vulnerable groups, suggests that poli-
cies geared towards individual well-being may have a positive impact in 
terms of engendering solidarity in the UK.
When considering our results in terms of gender, what we can see in 
Table 4.4 is the negative and significant relationship between being female 
and practising solidarity, specifically with groups within the UK and those 
outside the EU as well as there being a similar relationship with solidarity 
and the unemployed. Further still, more qualitative research may unpack 
the specificities of the gender dimension of solidarity (or in this case non- 
solidarity). Extant research suggests that women have been at the fore-
front of the austerity cuts and as a consequence may have few resources, in 
either money or time, to divert to solidarity practices (O’Hara 2014). In 
addition to this, it is important to note that despite steps closer towards 
equality, women continue to perform many of the caregiving tasks across 
UK households, not only in terms of looking after children but also caring 
for sick or disabled members of the family, which research suggests has an 
impact on retaining employment (Carmichael et al. 2008).
One hypothesis underpinning our analysis of the practice of solidarity 
is the exposure to information and, despite the rise of online media, 
newspaper readers continue to be courted by policymakers in the UK 
and thus retain an important place in shaping and reflecting policy dis-
courses and the political agenda. Firstly, we discover a positive and sig-
nificant relationship between reading The Times, The Guardian, or the 
Daily Mirror and practices of solidarity in comparison to not reading any 
newspapers. However, Table 4.4 presents a result falsifying our hypoth-
esis regarding the influence of tabloid readership on the lack of solidarity: 
there is a positive and significant association between reading The Sun 
and the practice of solidarity with each vulnerable group, except for those 
within the UK. Moreover, reading the Daily Mail is positively associated 
with solidarity towards the unemployed and the disabled. These results 
are surprising given the conservative leaning history of both publica-
tions; consequently, there is perhaps some scope to consider that although 
content of course matters, our findings suggest the difference between 
 reading and not reading a newspaper appears to be the key determinant 
in mobilising solidarity in the UK. Given the migration of much political 
debate in recent years from the analogue world of newspapers to the 
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digital world of social media, with research indicating that even newspa-
pers themselves are utilising social media as a resource for political news 
gathering (Broersma and Graham 2012), we can speculate, as an avenue 
for further research, that it is through online media that we may find 
associations between specific media preferences and asymmetric distribu-
tions of solidarity towards vulnerable groups.
Concerning our hypothesis of direct exposure or experience of vulner-
ability, in Table 4.4 we see that that the disabled are positively and signifi-
cantly associated with solidarity practices across each of the geographic 
areas and all other vulnerable groups. The exposure of disabled people to 
multidimensional forms of discrimination and inequalities may provide a 
cross-societal insight into the hardships suffered by different groups 
(EHRC 2017). We can speculate that the importance of rights-based dis-
courses among disabled people’s organisations and in a similar way with 
disability charities in the UK may create the conditions for intersectional-
ity between the disabled and other groups seeking rights, protection, and 
indeed solidarity. Moreover, the ‘social model of disability’ (Oliver et al. 
2012) embraced by a number of disabled people’s organisations has fre-
quently recognised injustices and inequalities in society which impact 
upon groups other than the disabled. Subsequently, our findings regard-
ing the disposition of the disabled towards supporting other groups may 
open an avenue to consider an alternative explanation as to why the dis-
abled are viewed as most deserving, as outlined earlier in this chapter, but 
instead of paternalistic attitudes through a sense of reciprocity. This may 
seem a less convincing argument for explaining attitudes towards the dis-
abled in the UK, but our findings require us to consider it in the scope of 
our interpretation.
Still on the individual-level characteristics, Table  4.4 confirms our 
hypothesis about level of satisfaction with life as a factor being positively 
related with solidarity: the happier about her/his life conditions a person 
is, the more she/he will likely be ready to support less fortunate people 
and vice versa (Borgonovi 2008). Therefore, life satisfaction acts as a pro- 
altruism factor that discourages people from considering those in need as 
potential competitors for services and state support.
Looking at the other findings of our regressions in Table 4.4, we can 
see that the divergences of solidarity between the different constituent 
nations in the UK outlined earlier in this chapter are confirmed by our 
regressions. Our results indicate that living in Scotland, in comparison to 
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living in England, is positively and significantly associated with expressing 
greater solidarity with others within the UK and those living outside the 
EU. Moreover, we can see that living in Scotland compared to England is 
also positively and significantly associated with solidarity towards each of 
our three vulnerable groups. Furthermore, our results indicate that living 
in Northern Ireland in comparison to England also renders a significant 
and positive association with undertaking solidarity practices towards refu-
gees and the disabled. Therefore, our regressions do provide further evi-
dence of a significant divergence in the disposition of individuals to engage 
in practices of solidarity. Consequently, we can hypothesise that these 
divergences will stay in place should devolved administrations remain sen-
sitive to the support evident within their constituent nations and have the 
potential to grow wider should policies and discourses at the Westminster 
level increasingly contrast with these solidaristic dispositions and become 
more antagonistic towards vulnerable groups. As Keating (2003) points 
out, the use of values can be central in the construction of identity, and he 
argues that territorial solidarity was more effective in confronting 
Thatcherism than class solidarity. Therefore, should a post-Brexit Britain 
continue to travel down a road of welfare retrenchment and discourses 
distinguishing between the deserving and undeserving, there may be irre-
versible constitutional consequences for the UK. This is particularly rele-
vant for Scotland where research has indicated the potential for social 
policy divergence to open opportunities to reconfigure solidarity and 
shared values around a (Scottish) national identity of ‘difference’ rather 
than the solidarity of a retrenched British welfare state (McEwen 2002) 
and where the Scottish government has, post-Brexit, called for a second 
referendum on independence.
Finally, we need to consider another finding relating to the role of 
identity in solidarity. In fact, being born in the UK is another variable 
which yields the type of findings which have strong implications for 
the composition of solidarity in the UK. As we can see in Table 4.4, 
there is a significant and negative relationship between those individu-
als who are born in the UK and solidarity with those groups from 
outside the UK, whether in the EU or not. Such findings suggest that 
solidarity among those who are British born tends to be inward look-
ing and that policies towards refugees that emphasise border control 
rather than welcoming asylum do have a constituency in the UK. Thus, 
our findings perhaps represent the other side of the coin when we are 
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considering those initiatives which are geared towards offering sanctu-
ary to those seeking asylum. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly however, 
among that same group—those born in the UK—there is also a signifi-
cant and negative association with solidarity with the disabled. This 
stands in sharp contrast to the hierarchy of solidarity we set out earlier 
in this chapter, but we can speculate that those born in the UK may be 
more likely to view support for the disabled as the remit of the welfare 
state. If this is the explanation, then it is concerning because as auster-
ity measures have affected the benefits which disabled people have 
been entitled to, public services have also come under budgetary pres-
sures and, as a consequence, there is the potential for the hardship 
experienced by disabled people to be somewhat overlooked by those 
born in the UK who believe that the welfare state would act as a safety 
net, reinforced by the stigma experienced by disabled benefit claimants 
who retreat from social circles in order to avoid ‘revealing’ that they 
are claiming benefits (Garthwaite 2015). A further consideration based 
on our finding is that those who are not born in the UK may be more 
solidaristic towards the disabled and we can speculate that, particularly 
given the discourses of border control in the UK, those not born in the 
UK may empathise with others who are cast as ‘outsiders’ by discourses 
and policy.
conclusIons
In this chapter we have sought to uncover how solidarity, through active 
engagement in support of specific groups of people in need, is practised 
in contemporary Britain. What the analysis of our data reveals is that 
solidarity is unevenly distributed in terms of geography and the vulner-
abilities of different groups. Our findings resonate to some extent with 
existing research (van Oorschot 2006), suggesting deep-rooted patterns 
of deservingness and established hierarchies across Europe when consid-
ering solidarity with vulnerable groups such as the disabled, refugees, 
and the unemployed. As such, our findings offer a further contribution 
to this body of literature, but they also present a contemporary and 
novel insight into how solidarity is distributed across the constituent 
nations of the UK, where we have observed some divergence, but also 
how policies and discourses in post-crisis, post-Brexit Britain may be 
shaping attitudes towards the three vulnerable groups and thus play a 
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role in constructing the hierarchy of solidarity we have set out in Fig. 4.1. 
Nevertheless, when we factor in our independent variables, a more com-
plex picture emerges, one that does not disprove the existence of our 
hierarchy of solidarity but suggests that the hierarchy is less static than 
we may imagine and is made more malleable when we introduce our 
independent variables. The findings which then emerge point towards 
talking not only of hierarchies of solidarity but fluid hierarchies of soli-
darity which can change shape and reflect a more diverse distribution of 
solidarity than our initial findings suggest. This fluidity is underpinned 
by the asymmetric significance of our variables which reveal that access 
to information (through newspaper readership), exposure to vulnerabil-
ity (through disability), the experience of higher education, and the 
interaction with others through social networks are key determinants of 
solidarity in the UK. As a consequence, we can confirm our hypothesis 
that the distribution of solidarity is determined by the exposure of an 
individual to vulnerabilities similar to those experienced by those catego-
ries, to their degree of exposure to opportunities of socialisation and 
information sharing (social networks), as well as to their interest in soci-
etal and political issues.
In terms of the distribution of solidarity practices across the UK, our 
findings confirm our hypothesis of the existence of sub-national diver-
gences. Such divergences suggest a more nuanced understanding of the 
variegated impact of discourses of deservingness and their commensurate 
policies beyond traditional welfare regime analysis. This opens the possi-
bility for a renewed research agenda on regional and sub-national distinc-
tiveness across Europe in terms of social solidarity. Any divergences will be 
relevant to developing a more fine-grained analysis across each context, 
but perhaps such an approach, as we have outlined in this chapter, is cur-
rently most relevant in the UK where such divergences may prove critical 
in determining the constitutional future of the British state, particularly 
given our findings that solidarity is most evident in two constituent nations 
which voted to remain part of the EU: Scotland where there are renewed 
calls by the SNP for another independence referendum and Northern 
Ireland where Sinn Fein have called for a poll on a united Ireland. 
Therefore, understanding solidarity towards vulnerable groups offers an 
insight not only into the nature of solidarity in contemporary Britain but 
also provides an indication of the challenges faced by the UK government 
elected in June 2017.
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notes
1. This involved a national reassessment process that was piloted in 2010 and 
rolled out in 2011 with the objective of reassessing all claimants for ESA 
(formerly known as Incapacity Benefit) through a ‘Work Capability 
Assessment’ by Spring 2014 which resulted in 750,000 assessments being 
conducted in 2013 alone (see Baumberg et al. 2015).
2. A reduction applied to the Housing Benefit of social housing tenants (14% 
if they have one spare bedroom and 25% if they have two or more spare 
bedrooms) that disproportionately affected disabled people despite mea-
sures introduced (‘discretionary housing payments’) to mitigate the impact 
(See Gibb 2015; Wilcox 2014).
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CHAPTER 5




Poland is a country where the idea of solidarity is primarily associated with 
the “Solidarity” social movement which had a substantial influence on 
political change and democratization (Krzemiński 2010; Staniszkis 2010). 
However, while “Solidarity” as a movement and as a value was very impor-
tant in the times of the fall of the communist system, the subsequent 
transformation period is often perceived as a “defeat of Solidarity” (Ost 
2006), both in the institutional and attitudinal dimensions of public life. 
A significant literature points to low levels of social solidarity in Poland 
which is often linked to a relatively weak civic tradition and faint social 
capital, in particular trust (Giza et al. 2000; Czapiński 2006; Glin ́ski 2006; 
Szymczak 2008).
The mentioned bulk of literature and its findings refer to the societal 
and, foremostly, the civic aspect of social transformation in Poland shortly 
after the fall of communism. However, contemporary political and eco-
nomic changes both in Poland and other EU countries call for newer 
insights into the problems of solidarity in Poland. The economic crisis of 
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2008, the influx of refugees to Southern European countries and the 
 relocation policy of the EU, as well as political changes in Poland create a 
new context for solidarity attitudes and practices. Moreover, the conserva-
tive government of Law and Justice, which has been governing since 
2015, manifestly uses the rhetoric of solidarity limited exclusively to Polish 
compatriots, combined with little charity for people suffering in conflicts 
abroad. As Bartkowski (2014) shows, although deterioration of interna-
tional solidarity and rise of political egocentric attitudes are Europe-wide, 
they manifest in Poland intensively. His study provides evidence that soli-
darity within close family ties and within national polity has recently 
strengthened in Poland, on the contrary to transnational solidarity. Thus, 
both Polish specificity which encompasses traditionally low level of social 
trust (Domański 2009: 142–175), relatively weak social capital measured 
by density of civil society organizations and associations, and recent politi-
cal narratives pose significant tensions to solidarity nowadays. This refers 
in particular to transnational solidarity—the solidarity action with people 
living abroad.
In this chapter, adding to the literature on political solidarity (rather 
than to the dominant discussion on social solidarity within institutions of 
welfare state), we make an insight into three types of solidarity practices 
and we investigate their geographical scope. We show the frequency of 
protesting, donating time and donating money in order to support the 
rights of the three different groups of addressees: the compatriots, the peo-
ple in other EU member states and the people in countries outside the EU. We 
look at these aspects with the lens of three basic socio-demographic char-
acteristics: gender, age and education. Further, we also make an analytical 
insight into the area of relations between individuals’ social capital in 
Poland and these solidarity practices. Since Poland has been portrayed in 
scholarly literature as a country of low “civic” social capital and of strong 
familialistic bonds (Guasti 2016; Jakubowska and Kaniasty 2014; 
Czapin ́ski 2014), as well as a country focused on in-group solidarity 
(Glin ́ski 2006), we pose a question whether this specific post-communist 
legacy of social capital affects solidarity practices of Poles. In particular, we 
explore the role of bonding and bridging social capital in shaping solidar-
ity behaviors in general, specifically its impact on transnational solidarity 
action.
In the first section of this chapter, we present understanding of solidarity 
as individuals’ practice and discuss its linkages to the types of social capital 
in the context of a post-communist country. In the second section, the 
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operationalization of transnational solidarity and social capital is presented. 
The third section of the chapter provides the overview of solidarity practices 
in its mentioned forms, toward three basic groups of addressees. In the 
fourth section, we present results of the logistic regression analysis with the 
use of which we aim to explain how generalized and transnational solidarity 
are related to diverse aspects of social capital. We conclude in the last sec-
tion of the chapter emphasizing specific constellations of bonding and 
bridging social capital which contribute to solidarity practices in Poland.
Structural and normatIve SourceS of SolIdarIty 
actIon: the caSe of a PoSt-communISt country
Despite the variety of meanings attributed to solidarity—of moral value, 
societal ideal, individual attitude or collective behavior—researchers tend 
to agree that its core understanding refers to the type of action. For exam-
ple, Kolers (2012) notices that solidarity is fundamentally neither senti-
ment nor attitude but a type of action which is associative and teleological: 
it means working with others for common political aims. Given the multi-
dimensionality of solidarity and various traditions of its understanding, it 
is useful to provide an analytical definition of solidarity practice. According 
to Sangiovanni (2015), solidarity differs from other types of collective 
action in regard to five aspects. Firstly, A acts in solidarity with B when A 
and B share the goal to overcome some significant adversity, although no 
joint agency of A and B is obligatory. Secondly, both ways of A and B to 
achieve the goal mesh. Thirdly, a commitment of A and B to the goal is needed 
which means that if A is involved in activity only for financial reasons, it 
may not be acknowledged as solidarity practice. This criterion, however, 
does not exclude pragmatic concerns of solidarity. Fourthly, A and B are 
disposed to incur significant costs to realize the goal. This assumes that A’s 
action may not be meaningless to A to be recognized as a solidarity prac-
tice. And finally, features of action of A and B are not a common knowl-
edge, which undertakes that A and B may act “in parallel” not knowing 
about each other; A’s action is not conditioned upon what B does. 
Although Sangiovanni’s definition is coined for the sake of welfare state 
analysis, it seems that so defined solidarity practice may be applied to vari-
ous circumstances and may take a form of either robust solidarity (solidar-
ity with a group) or expressional solidarity (solidarity toward a group). The 
first one is perceived as moving people toward a collective action, as it is 
based on multidirectional relationships and includes joint interest, 
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 identification with a group and disposition to empathy. It is close to a 
notion of social solidarity (Bang 2015). The latter is founded on unidirec-
tional relationship and entails action toward distant others and resembles 
political solidarity which is rather connective than collectivist in its nature 
(Bang, ibid.). Taylor (2015) interprets this form of solidarity as coherent 
with Gould’s (2007) account of transnational solidarity meaning “sup-
portive relations we can come to develop with people at a distance” these 
relations being “aimed at supporting people in overcoming oppression” 
(Taylor 2015: 129).
Since solidarity as a practice needs to be understood and analyzed 
within a broader cultural, political and economic setting (Bartkowski 
2014; Lahusen 2016), in this chapter we locate solidarity action within 
specific meso-level social feature of the society, namely, social capital. In 
the subsequent section of the chapter, we propose a method of how to 
measure it. In general, we understand it as a set of social networks (or 
more broadly: social structures) and norms which may result in solidarity 
action(s). Thus, our account of social capital follows classical approaches 
which point to the role of its structural and normative components 
(Coleman 1988; Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002; Putnam 2002: 9). In 
theory, the structural component of social capital entails relations and 
individuals’ memberships in formal and informal social networks. The 
normative element of social capital includes values, beliefs and attitudes of 
a person, such as generalized trust, openness, a custom to act with others 
in a reciprocal manner, moral obligation to help the people in need, and 
so on. Both components may mutually reinforce—for example, the more 
various social contacts one has, the more she or he can be trusting others, 
and consequently the more prone to solidarity action he/she can be 
(Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002; Narayan and Cassidy 2001).
The reasons for employing social capital perspective in this chapter are, 
firstly, of theoretical manner and, secondly, related to scientific discourse 
about the communist heritage in Poland which is considered to be harm-
ful for social capital.
The theoretical connection between social capital and solidarity has 
already been acknowledged in the scientific literature1 (Portes 1998; 
Putnam 2000). As Lahusen (2016: 5) emphasizes, the analysis of  solidarity 
can benefit from studies on social capital, which converge on the convic-
tion that social capital is a necessary “glue” of social cohesion and thus 
essential for understanding the conditions and structures of solidarity. 
More specifically, from social capital scholarship, two stances emerge 
A. KUROWSKA AND M. THEISS
 107
which are relevant for research on solidarity. We label the first one as a 
thesis about the consequences of the level of social capital. According to this 
argument, the more dense and diverse the social networks of an individual 
are, as well as the more trusting a person is, the more prone he or she is to 
get involved in cooperative behavior (Coleman 1988) and—conse-
quently—in solidarity action.
The second stance may be labeled as a thesis on the consequences of the 
type of social capital. It assumes that the type of structural and normative 
elements of social capital affects individual’s propensity to engage in soli-
darity action. Two types of social capital are differentiated in this context. 
The so-called bonding or thick social capital is based on relatively homog-
enous relations with family and friends. It entails strong norms of mutual 
support and thus might be exclusive. It is claimed that, for example, closed 
self-help groups may be based on this type of social capital and due to the 
effects of this form of social capital is named by some authors an “inward- 
looking” social capital. Extreme form of this asset is close to traditional 
familialism (Banfield 1967; Portes 1998). On the other hand, the so-called 
bridging social capital, based on horizontal, crosscutting social networks 
and values of openness and generalized trust, positively contributes to 
social cooperation and public good at a systemic level (Putnam et al. 1994; 
Granovetter 1973).
When explaining causal mechanism which constitutes relation between 
social capital and solidarity action, a more general framework of its role in 
shaping political participation may be referred to. Following van 
Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013), three mechanisms arising from 
diverse components of social capital may be pointed to in this regard. 
Firstly, the structural element of social capital refers to whom people can 
reach in actions of political participation. For example, engaging time to 
support the rights of refugees living in the camp in one’s country may 
result from personal networks to volunteers already engaged in helping 
this group. Secondly, the relational component of social capital refers to 
informational, physical and emotional incentives toward solidarity action. 
Thus, the bigger and more diverse one’s personal network is, the more 
information one has about, for example, significant adversity that other 
people are experiencing, methods of action to engage in help, possibilities 
to pool resources for action. Finally, the cognitive element encompasses 
shared representations, interpretations, systems of meaning—it may lead to 
consciousness raising or shaping one’s political beliefs. This aspect of social 
embeddedness contributes to individuals’ beliefs about whose and which 
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rights may primarily need support and what kind of broader societal goals 
need to be achieved thanks to solidarity action.
Combining mentioned mechanisms with the type of social capital sug-
gests each of them, comprising specific structures and societal values, is a 
trigger of different forms of solidarity action. Thus, homogenous per-
sonal ties, including strong bonds to family members and friends, accom-
panied by norms of involvement in the issues of family and/or close 
community which constitute bonding social capital would rather result in 
solidarity with a group. On the contrary, a diversified social network, 
including one’s connections to people of different class, origins, both 
with disabilities and able-bodied, which provide knowledge about various 
forms of significant adversity which other people may experience would 
have a different effect. These structures and values representing Putnamian 
ideal would rather bring about solidarity toward a group, including trans-
national solidarity.
Clearly, the sketched framework serves only as a theoretical reference 
point. Empirical studies speak for much more nuanced relations between 
social structure, values and solidarity practices. They include, for example, 
Segall’s (2005) study challenging positive impact of political participation 
on solidarity or Bang’s (2004) claim to revise Putnamian approach of 
political participation being anchored in political virtues, since in everyday 
lives of contemporary citizens, “lighter” version of political engagement in 
building and running various governance networks comes to the fore. 
However, as noted, social capital perspective seems specifically relevant to 
research of solidarity in the Polish context. Both societal and academic 
debate about systematic transformation of Poland after the fall of com-
munism tends to emphasize the “social capital problem” in Poland (Giza 
et al. 2000). Namely, it has been argued that civic participation and gen-
eralized trust in Poland are very low although typical of post-communist 
country (see e.g. Guasti 2016; Jakubowska and Kaniasty 2014; Czapin ́ski 
2014). This stance has been recently challenged, though. Firstly, it is 
claimed that vibrant examples of social capital have been overlooked due 
to methodological Occidentalism of dominant civil society studies 
(Jacobsson and Korolczuk 2017; Tworzecki 2008). Secondly, it is empha-
sized that on the contrary to Putnamian model, church-related activism 
does not result in withdrawal from public engagement and depicts impor-
tant form of political participation in Poland (Z ̇ukowski and Theiss 2009). 
Thirdly, recent massive protests against populist and conservative turn in 
Polish public policy after Law and Justice came into power in 2015 prove 
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high potential of massive political mobilization in Poland (see Karolewski 
2016).
Thus, we follow “bonding” and “bridging” social capital distinction in 
a somewhat provocative manner, rather referring to debate which empha-
sizes high level of familialism (bonding social capital) in Poland than 
assuming that mentioned dichotomy may be regarded as justified social 
sciences category. Against this backdrop, our focus is to differentiate 
between the structures and social norms which are labeled as “bonding” 
social capital and the structures, actions and values referred as to “bridg-
ing” social capital. Our research questions focus on the impact of these 
two phenomena on solidarity behaviors both in general and specifically at 
transnational level. As noted, in particular we aim at explaining the rela-
tion between structures and values inherent in different types of social 
capital and different scopes of solidarity action. Central to our investiga-
tion are the questions: which social networks and values contribute to soli-
darity actions in general? But foremost—which contribute to solidarity 
with people abroad? Building on the presented literature, we hypothesize 
that (1) bonding social capital (based on family and friendship ties) has a 
negative impact on solidarity with addressees of international scope and 
(2) bridging social capital (generalized trust and civic engagement) has 
positive impact on solidarity behaviors, in particular in regard to behaviors 
with international scope of addressees.
meaSurIng IndIvIdual tranSnatIonal SolIdarIty: 
methodS and data
The sample used for our analysis consists of 2119 respondents from 
Poland, gathered in an international survey carried out within the frame-
work of TransSOL project (for more details about the survey—see the 
Introduction to this book). The basic socio-demographic characteristics of 
this group are provided in Table 5.1. The sample is representative for all 
age groups. Each age group consists of over 200 respondents, which 
exceeds 10 percent of the total population. The largest group consists of 
respondents aged between 55 and 64 years old, and the smallest group 
consists of the youngest group of adults below 25 years old. The educa-
tional structure of the Polish population of adults (people 18 years old and 
older) is also closely reflected in our sample. It is presented with the 
account of a very detailed set of categories. These categories are similar to 
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the ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) seven cat-
egories of education levels (UNESCO 1997).
According to the twofold goal of this chapter, its first section has a 
descriptive character and aims at presenting the frequency of three differ-
ent types of solidarity behaviors/practices toward three groups of address-
ees in detail, that is, among groups identified on the base of the distributions 
of three basic socio-demographic variables such as gender, age and 
 education. In order to present these frequencies, we use three responses 
for three questions from the TransSOL survey. All the questions were 
formulated similarly—“Have you ever done one of the following in order 
to support the rights of people/groups in …?”—but ended up referring to 
three different groups of addressees of the support, that is, people/groups 
in respondent’s own country, in other countries within the EU and in 
countries outside the EU. The responses which we conceptualize as three 




% in the weighted 
sample
Gender
  Female 1107 47.7
  Male 1012 52.3
Age groups
  18–24 221 10.4
  25–34 395 18.6
  35–44 402 19.0
  45–54 336 15.9
  55–64 514 24.2
  65 and older 252 11.9
Education
  Primary education or less 33 1.5
  Lower secondary education 42 2.0
  Vocational upper secondary education 432 20.4
  Post-secondary education with access to tertiary 1048 49.5
  Post-secondary-non-tertiary 172 8.1
  Short-cycle (3–4 years) tertiary education 40 1.9
  Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary education 111 5.2
  Master’s equivalent education 232 11.0
  Doctoral or equivalent level 9 0.4
Notes: Frequencies and percentages are calculated with the use of variable: weight_country. This applies 
to all the tables in this chapter
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different types of solidarity behaviors/practices were (a) attended a march, 
protest or demonstration, (b) donated money and (c) donated time.
The second section of this chapter explores the role of these socio- 
demographic determinants, as well as the role of two types of social capital 
based on close family and friendship ties (bonding social capital) and on 
civic-associational ties (bridging social capital), on the propensity of Poles 
to engage in mentioned solidarity practices. As a generalized solidarity 
behavior, we label any form of the three researched solidarity activities (i.e. 
protest activity, time donation and money donation) to support the rights 
of people in any location (in respondent’s country, other EU countries or 
in other countries outside the EU). In this section we also explore the 
impact of the same determinants for the propensity of solidaristic Poles 
(the subgroup that had engaged in any form of solidarity behavior) to 
engage specifically in transnational solidarity. As transnational solidarity, 
we understand the support either for people from other EU countries or 
(and) other countries outside EU. In order to achieve both aims, we esti-
mate two separate logistic regression models. The first model uses the full 
sample of Polish respondents, and the second model is run on the sub-
sample of Poles who engage in any form of solidarity behavior.
In order to operationalize the two types of social capital as explanatory 
variables, we use a series of questions included in TransSOL survey which 
we divide into two blocks, according to the type of social capital. In the 
group of indicators of “bonding social capital”, we include four indicators. 
Firstly, contacts with friends—a quasi-continuous variable, based on the 
survey question: “During the past month, how often have you met socially 
with friends not living in your household?” The answers included four 
frequencies to choose from: less than once this month (1); once or twice 
this month (2); every week (3); almost every day (4). Secondly, contacts 
with family—a binary variable based on the survey question: “Please say if 
each of the following do or do not apply to you: I have seen a family mem-
ber over the last six months (other than my parents or children)?” The 
answers included yes (1)/no (0) option only. Thirdly, formalized family 
ties—which was created on the base of marital status variable in the survey, 
from which we identified respondents who were married or in civil/legally 
registered union as being in a formalized relationship (1). And finally, 
receiving help in community—a quasi-continuous variable, based on the 
question: “In the past 12 months, how often did you get help such as get-
ting a lift with someone, help in looking after children, having shopping 
done, having something repaired at your house etc.?” The answers 
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included four frequencies to choose from: less than once this month (1); 
once or twice this month (2); every week (3); almost every day (4).
In the group of “bridging social capital”, we included five variables: 
membership in civil society organization(s) (any type of membership2 in any 
organization from the list provided in the TransSOL survey3). Secondly, a 
generalized trust level—a quasi-continuous variable which was based on 
the survey question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” to 
which the answers included an 11-point scale where 0 indicated an atti-
tude “You can’t be too careful” and 10 “Most people can be trusted”. 
Thirdly, political participation in the form of voting—a binary variable 
which was based on the question: “Did you vote in the national election 
October 25, 2015?” The answers included yes (1)/no (0) option only. 
Furthermore, we included—local attachment, which we understood as an 
aspect of local citizenship—a binary variable which was constructed on the 
base of the answers “very attached” to the question: “Please tell me how 
attached you fell to your country/city/town/village?” Finally we also 
added interest in politics—a binary variable which was created based on the 
survey question: “How interested, if at all, would you say you are in poli-
tics?” The answers included five options, from which we identified “very” 
and “quite” interested responses and coded them as “1”, and other 
answers, including don’t know option, we coded as “0”.
The Table 5.2 presents basic statistics for the main explanatory variables 
used in both models.
Table 5.2 Explanatory variables—frequencies, means and standard deviations
Ordinal (binary) variables Percent of values = 1
  Formalized family ties 59
  Contacts with family 77.7
  Membership in organizations 30.3
  Interest in politics 72.8
  Political participation 75.2
  Local attachment 62.3
Continuous variables Mean Standard deviation
  Contacts with friends 2.33 (0.87)
  Receiving help in community 1.51 (0.83)
  Generalized trust level 3.76 (2.72)
Notes: Means for binary variables indicate the percentage of respondents with variable value equal to 1
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SolIdarIty BehavIorS In Poland: three tyPeS 
of SuPPort for dIfferent grouPS of addreSSeeS 
accordIng to the geoPolItIcal ProxImIty
The frequency of solidarity behaviors in Poland varies significantly 
between types of activity and between geopolitical scopes of addressees. 
As shown in Table 5.3, 16.3 percent of Polish respondents report they 
have ever taken part in a march, protest or demonstration in order to 
support the rights of people in Poland.4 A slight overrepresentation of 
men in protest activity, but nothing statistically significant can be seen. 
Although some studies on political participation in Western societies 
prove protest behavior to be only form of political participation in which 
women are more active than men (Burns et al. 2001: 246), our finding 
is consistent with previous research, for example, by Doman ́ski (2009: 
227) who showed men are more likely to protest in Poland than women. 
Similarly to his study and the general pattern (e.g. Pattie et  al. 2004: 
85), the higher education level turned to coincide with more frequent 
experience of  participation in protest activities, ranging from 12.2 per-
cent among respondents who have completed vocational upper second-
ary education to 22.0 percent among those who have obtained a MA 
title. In regard to age groups, a U-shaped relationship is present: the 
youngest respondents (age 18–24  years), as well as the oldest (above 
65 years) subpopulation, reveal the highest rates of protest participation. 
This may be explained by co- occurrence of two features: typical for the 
EU higher propensity of younger generations to involve in protests, 
mainly due to higher tolerance level of youth and a higher level of mem-
bership in trade unions among the older generations, which act as a 
mobilization force for the members (Doman ́ski 2009; Z ̇uk and Z ̇uk 
2015). Moreover, since we have asked if respondent has ever taken part 
in protest activity, we can see a cumulative effect of political experiences 
among older generations.
The share of Poles who participate in protest activities to support the 
rights of people in other countries in the EU is only 6 percent (see 
Table  5.3), that is, by more than half smaller than the support for the 
compatriots. Gender, education and age composition of this group are 
similar to the group of those respondents who have stand for Poles’ rights. 
 SOLIDARITY PRACTICES IN POLAND AND THEIR SOCIAL CAPITAL… 
114 
A similar share (5.6 percent) of the Polish population has the experience 
of protesting with an aim to support the rights of people in other countries 
outside the EU. Although this share is only slightly lower than in the case 
of protests which are aimed to support other EU countries’ citizens, it 
needs to be noticed that only a limited overlap of both groups of protestors 
Table 5.3 Participation in march, protest or demonstration in order to support 
the rights of people: in respondent’s country, in other countries in the EU and in 
countries outside the EU




n % n % n %
Total 346 16.3 127 6 118 5.6
By gender
  Men 171 16.9 69 6.8 61 6
  Women 175 15.8 58 5.2 58 5.2
By education
  Primary education or less 0 0 0 0 2 6.9
  Lower secondary education 4 9.6 1 1.8 2 4.2
  Vocational upper secondary 
education
53 12.2 30 7 29 6.6
  Upper secondary with access 
to tertiary
180 17.2 55 5.3 47 4.5
  Post-secondary education 25 14.4 11 6.5 10 5.9
  Short-cycle (3–4 years) 
tertiary education
6 14.7 5 11.3 2 5.7
  Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary 
education
25 22.6 6 5.5 7 6.6
  Master’s equivalent education 51 22 19 18.1 19 8
  Doctoral or equivalent level 2 24.1 0 0 1 8
By age groups
  18–24 39 17.6 6 2.8 15 6.9
  25–34 68 17.2 27 7 32 8.2
  35–44 51 12.7 25 6.3 23 5.7
  45–54 47 13.9 14 4.2 17 5.8
  55–64 87 16.9 35 6.9 16 3.2
  65 and older 54 21.5 19 7.6 15 5.8
Notes: Frequencies and percent are waged according to the country wage
Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: attended a march, protest or demonstration] in order 
to support the rights of people/groups in your own country/in other countries within the EU/in other 
countries outside the EU?
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has been observed. 36.2 percent of Polish citizens who have attended the 
protests supporting EU citizens have also protested for rights of non- EU 
citizens.
Not surprisingly donating time in order to support others’ rights is a 
much more frequent solidarity action in Poland than protesting (see 
Table 5.4). As much as 24.1 percent of Polish society has devoted time to 
support the rights of some groups in the country. Given that other studies 
Table 5.4 Donating time in order to support the rights of people in respon-
dent’s country, in other countries in the EU and in countries outside the EU




n % n % n %
Total 511 24.1 266 12.5 241 11.4
By gender
  Men 244 24.1 128 12.7 109 10.8
  Women 267 24.2 137 12.4 131 11.9
By education
  Primary education or less 6 17.1 1 3.6 1 3.6
  Lower secondary education 12 27.3 3 7.8 4 9.6
  Vocational upper secondary 
education
83 19.1 67 15.5 50 11.6
  Upper secondary with access to 
tertiary
241 23 112 10.7 110 10.5
  Post-secondary education 47 27.4 21 12.3 15 8.5
  Short-cycle (3–4 years) tertiary 
education
8 20 4 9.5 6 14.7
  Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary 
education
34 30.9 16 14.2 11 10
  Master’s equivalent education 76 32.7 40 17.3 41 17.6
  Doctoral or equivalent level 5 55 2 16.4 3 31.2
By age groups
  18–24 65 29.7 34 15.3 31 14.1
  25–34 105 26.7 55 13.9 45 11.3
  35–44 70 17.5 42 10.5 38 9.6
  45–54 87 26 44 13.1 38 11.4
  55–64 119 23.1 63 12.2 59 11.4
  65 and older 64 25.5 28 11.1 29 11.7
Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: donate time] in order to support the rights of people/
groups in your own country/in other countries within the EU/in other countries outside the EU?
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on activism in Poland reveal that 20 percent of respondents claim to 
engage in unpaid work for some societal goals in the previous year 
(CBOS  2016:10), it seems that a narrow understanding of supporting 
rights of compatriots was present in our sample. A similar pattern in regard 
to education and age may be observed among those who donated time for 
compatriots as among those who were engaged in protests. The propen-
sity to donate time grows with educational level and follows a U-shaped 
relationship with age, as it was in case of protests.
Similarly to the mentioned protesting behavior, the share of Poles who 
donated their time to support others’ rights falls with the geographical 
scope of the addressees. 12.5 percent of Polish respondents report to have 
been engaged in donating time to support the rights of people in other 
countries of the EU. The same activity aimed at supporting people outside 
the EU has been reported by 11.4 percent of Polish respondents. It may 
be hypothesized that the younger subgroups are slightly more likely to be 
engaged in this type of solidarity behavior, although, as noted, the small 
numbers of cases do not allow us for far-reaching interpretations. 
According to other surveys conducted in Poland, 27 percent of Poles 
devotes some time in the year to services to people outside the family or 
for organizations, and 15 percent claims to engage in voluntary work 
(Czapiński 2015: 345). We can see that only a relatively small share of 
these activities is solidarity in our understanding—that is, supports rights 
of others.
Consistent with international studies in the field (e.g. Marien et  al. 
2010: 196) which prove donating money to be one of the most frequent 
political participation forms, it turned out to be the most frequent solidar-
ity behavior in our study. As presented in Table 5.5, 29.6 percent of Polish 
respondents reveal that they have donated money to support compatriots. 
Both higher education level and age improve the chances of being engaged 
in donating money. Financial support to the EU citizens living in other 
countries is, again, over twice less frequent; 13.2 percent of respondents 
have been active in this manner, whereas the educational and age composi-
tion of this group resembles similar to the previous one which might be 
explained by a significant overlap of these two groups. Over 61 percent of 
Poles who donate money to support other EU countries’ inhabitants also 
financially support Polish citizens.
It should be noticed that on the contrary to protest activities devoting 
one’s own time to support others, donating money to support people 
outside the EU is more widespread in Polish society than financial help to 
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EU inhabitants. Eighteen percent of the respondents claim they have 
donated money to support other people not living in the EU. Only 39.9 
percent of them also financially support EU inhabitants. As in the case of 
other mentioned types of financial help, also in case of extra-EU financial 
support, higher education and age (with exception of people aged more 
than 65 years) coincide with more frequent solidarity behavior.
To sum up, out of the researched political acts of solidarity, the most 
frequent is donating money to support the rights of other people. Secondly, 
Table 5.5 Donating money in order to support the rights of people in respon-
dent’s country, in other countries in the EU and in countries outside the EU




n % n % n %
Total 627 29.6 280 13.2 381 18
By gender
  Men 283 28 133 13.1 188 18.6
  Women 345 31.1 147 13.2 193 17.4
By education
  Primary education or less 3 10.1 1 3.5 2 6.4
  Lower secondary education 10 24.3 4 9.7 7 16.9
  Vocational upper secondary 
education
109 25.2 53 12.2 75 17.3
  Upper secondary with access to 
tertiary
329 31.4 146 13.9 195 18.6
  Post-secondary education 51 29.9 23 13.2 27 15.9
  Short-cycle (3–4 years) tertiary 
education
13 32.7 8 19.2 8 20.6
  Long-cycle (4+ years) tertiary 
education
28 25.1 12 11.1 20 18
  Master’s equivalent education 79 34 31 13.5 43 18.5
  Doctoral or equivalent level 5 55.9 2 16.7 4 39.5
By age groups
  18–24 39 17.5 15 6.8 30 13.7
  25–34 103 26 34 8.5 43 11
  35–44 100 24.8 44 10.8 56 13.9
  45–54 111 33 56 16.5 67 20
  55–64 187 36.5 95 18.4 120 23.4
  65 and older 88 35.1 37 14.8 65 25.6
Qs: Have you ever done one of the following [item: donate money] in order to support the rights of 
people/groups in your own country/in other countries within the EU/in other countries outside the EU?
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engaging one’s own time is practiced. If our respondent is seen by us as 
being solidarity with some geographical group, it most probably means 
she or he donates money and/or time to support others’ rights. It is much 
less likely that he or she has participated in the protests with a similar goal. 
It should be noticed that in the case of some researched activities, we have 
observed particular patterns of engagement across subpopulations. In 
regard to gender, we see men are involved in protests and money dona-
tion, whereas women are rather engaging their own time (e.g. as volun-
teers). With regard to age groups, transnational solidarity in the form of 
protesting is more frequent in the group of people aged 25–34, whereas 
the older generation (55–64  years) rather donates money. Educational 
attainment, as in any time of political activity, is positively correlated with 
engagement in all three solidarity practices.
Table 5.6 shows the frequency of generalized solidarity behaviors (i.e. 
any form from the three analyzed solidarity practices) toward different 
combinations of addressees. Almost 40 percent of Polish respondents 
declared having no experience of participation in solidarity practices, no 
matter the geopolitical scope of the addressees. The remaining 60.3 per-
cent of respondents—which, as specified earlier, undertake generalized 
solidarity practices (solidaristic respondents)—can be divided into two 
groups. The first group (21.3 percent of all respondents, i.e. 35.3 percent 
of the “solidaristic respondents”) includes respondents who were solidar-
istic in supporting the rights of compatriots only. The second group (39 
percent of all respondents, i.e. 64.7 percent of the “solidaristic respon-
dents”) participated (also) in solidarity action in order to support the 
rights of people in other countries. Table 5.6 provides information on the 
Table 5.6 Solidarity practices in Poland with different scopes of beneficiaries
Frequency % of all 
respondents
No solidarity practice at any level 842 39.7
Solidarity practices, including 1277 60.3
  Solidarity action(s) only at the country level 450 21.3
  Solidarity actions at the country and EU level 147 6.9
  Solidarity actions at the country and outside EU level 185 8.7
  Solidarity actions at all levels 292 13.8
  Solidarity action(s) only at the supranational level  
(EU or outside EU)
63 3
Notes: Frequencies and percent are waged according to the country wage
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more detailed subgroups. For example, almost 14 percent of all respon-
dents reported being engaged in at least one supportive practice at all 
geopolitical levels.
The findings on differences in geographical scope of solidarity action 
are consistent with earlier study of Bartkowski (2014) who argues that 
after economic crisis of 2008, solidarity attitudes toward neighbors and 
compatriots have grown and that, however, readiness to help people living 
abroad and in particular outside the EU has fallen, widening the gap 
between in-group and out-group solidarity. The mentioned study, how-
ever, refers to attitudes, whereas our investigation is focused on factual 
solidarity behaviors. Although only 2.4 percent of Poles declare “they are 
concerned about the Europeans to a very high extent” and 12.4 confirm 
“they are concerned to some extent” (years 2005–2009 data based on 
EVS and WVS surveys), our research shows that 36 percent of Poles has 
participated in some activity to support the rights of people living in the 
EU. As further discussed in the last section of this chapter, we may hypoth-
esize that even for some respondents who are not necessarily concerned 
about the EU as a polity and its members, there are other incentives to 
support specific rights of citizens living in other EU countries.
BondIng and BrIdgIng SocIal caPItal and theIr 
ImPact on (tranSnatIonal) SolIdarIty BehavIor
Table 5.7 presents the results of the estimated logistic regressions. As 
expected, we find diverging results for both models, the one for propen-
sity to engage in solidarity practices among general population and the 
other for propensity to engage particularly in transnational solidarity 
among the subgroup of “solidaristic” Poles. On the one hand, we find that 
such bridging capital indicators as membership in organizations and gen-
eralized trust level positively impact both the propensity to engage in soli-
darity practices in general and toward transnational solidarity action 
among the “solidaristic” Poles. Polish respondents who declared to be 
members of at least one civic organization had over four times higher pro-
pensity to engage in any solidarity practice than Poles not being members 
of any organization. Furthermore, solidaristic Poles, who declared to be 
members of civic organization(s), had again almost two times higher pro-
pensity to engage in transnational solidarity practices than the rest of the 
“solidaristic” Poles.
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On the other hand, we find that local attachment (to the country or to 
the city/town of the respondent) proves to be negatively correlated only 
with transnational type of solidarity practice. The impact of local attach-
ment on solidarity behavior in general is positive, although in our analysis 
this relationship does not prove to be statistically significant. Furthermore, 
we find that electoral participation as well as interest in politics positively 
and significantly impact involvement in solidarity practices in general.
People who declared they are quite or very interested in politics have, 
on average, nearly 60 percent higher propensity to declare being involved 
in any form of solidarity behavior. People who declared that they partici-
pated in the last parliamentary elections in Poland (in 2015) were 55 
percent more likely to be involved in such activity. These aspects of 
bridging social capital do not prove to have significant impact on pro-
pensity to engage in transnational solidarity practices among “solidaris-
tic” Poles.
Table 5.7 Logistic regression results (expβ) for the model of general solidarity 
and model of transnational solidarity
General solidarity Transnational solidarity
Model 1 Model 2
Socio-demographic factors
  Gender (ref. male) 1.09 1.02
  Age 1 1.01**
  Education 1.06* 1.03
  Income 1.02 0.94**
Bonding social capital
  Formalized family ties (1) 0.95 1.12
  Contacts with family 1.09 1.08
  Contacts with friends 1.19*** 0.96
  Receiving help in community 0.98 1.52
Bridging social capital
  Membership in organizations (1) 4.57*** 1.97***
  Generalized trust level 1.04* 1.06**
  Voting (1) 1.55*** 0.96
  Local attachment (1) 1.07 0.79*
  Interest in politics (1) 1.59*** 0.88
Constant 0.17*** 0.95
N 1818 1138
Notes: The level of significance are described by number of stars: ***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, *p ≤ 0.1
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Most of the indicators of bonding social capital did not prove to have 
significant impact on solidarity behaviors. However, the frequency in con-
tact with friends proved to be positively related to the engagement in soli-
darity behaviors in general. Its impact on the propensity of “solidaristic” 
Poles to engage in transnational solidarity practices was found to be nega-
tive, although this effect was not statistically significant in our model.
Both models also point at the insignificant role of gender in solidarity 
behaviors. Men are as likely as women to undertake solidarity actions and 
among these participate in actions with a transnational scope. The positive 
impact of age was found to be statistically significant only in model for 
transnational solidarity and positive education only for model for general 
solidarity (although the differences in the impact between both models 
were very small). Finally, income showed significant and negative impact 
only for transnational solidarity practices among “solidaristic” Poles.
IndIvIdual tranSnatIonal SolIdarIty: 
Beyond BrIdgIng-BondIng dIvIde? dIScuSSIon 
and concluSIon
Our findings provide evidence that partially supports our hypotheses on 
the relationships between social capital and solidarity practices outlined in 
the theoretical section. Firstly, we have observed that such element of 
bonding social capital, as frequent contacts with friends, positively affects 
general solidarity. Following van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013), 
we may interpret that the structural, relational and cognitive elements of 
social capital—based on contacts with friends—enhance individuals’ pro-
pensity to take action aimed at supporting someone’s rights. Thus, radical 
assumptions about the role of family ties (Putnam et al. 1994) and their 
impact on solidarity have not been confirmed in our study. We have not 
observed any negative impact of strong family bonds on involvement in 
solidarity action.
Secondly, a strong, positive impact of bridging social capital on solidar-
ity practices, both in general and in regard to people living abroad, has 
been confirmed. Such aspects of social capital increase likelihood of 
engagement in any solidarity action, as membership in civil society organi-
zation, high level of generalized trust and attitudes of engagement in pub-
lic issues which manifest in declared interest in politics and participation in 
elections. Membership in civil society organizations and trusting unknown 
others turn out to positively affect transnational solidarity action, too.
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Thus, our analysis confirms that both types of solidarity practices result 
from social embeddedness of a person. However, we can clearly see that 
the linkages between two types of social capital and two types of solidarity 
practices are nuanced and that specific pattern of causal relation emerges. 
Namely, it seems that classic Putnamian (Putnam et  al. 1994) ideal of 
social capital is at least partly a bedrock for generalized solidarity practice, 
which according to our conceptualization encompasses also robust soli-
darity (solidarity in a group). Moreover, apart from such social norms as 
interest in politics and voting, it is also high education level which contrib-
utes to this type of solidarity. All these triggers taken together, it can be 
seen that general solidarity action in Poland stems from a relatively “elit-
ist” social resources. This is consistent with previous studies on civil activ-
ism in Poland which was described as dispersed and confined within 
societal structures hardly accessible for broader citizenry (Kościański 
2016: 236). However, transnational solidarity practice turned out to be 
embedded in different types of social capital. Surprisingly, these are rela-
tively older and less affluent Poles who are not interested in politics, but 
trusting others and strongly attached to locality, who are more likely to get 
involved in transnational solidarity action.
Relating our findings to the above-mentioned discussion about the 
unfavorable communist legacy of Polish civic practices (Guasti 2016; 
Jakubowska and Kaniasty 2014; Czapiński 2014), even if we assume that 
familialism and low interest in public sphere are a part of this heritage, it 
turns out to be a less dismantling transnational solidarity action than one 
may thought. As noted—spending time with family does not have a nega-
tive effect on solidarity action, whereas spending time with friends has 
only a positive effect. Moreover, we can see that transnational solidarity 
cannot be explained in terms of low interest in public issues or scarcity of 
financial assets and thus may be hardly seen as a result of civic virtues being 
destroyed by communism. It rather seems that a specific pattern based on 
combination of high trust, refraining from politics and glocal perspective 
on others’ rights comes into the fore.
Thus, we may hypothesize that this type of civic activism is relatively 
immune to contemporary political narratives of Poland which suggest the 
need protect itself from “foreign values”. Paradoxically, a tradition of act-
ing out of the state’s structures or even against them, practised during 
communist time in Poland, may be the heritage which some “transnation-
ally solidaristic” Poles may refer to. This mechanism is supported by recent 
studies which prove that contemporary anti-Law and Justice demonstra-
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tions (Karolewski 2016) and transnational solidarity action of civil society 
organizations (Chimiak 2016) follow tradition of “Solidarity” values and 
its civil resistance action. Hence, in times when solidarity might be endan-
gered “from above”, the heritage of civic action form communist time 
may be a source to refer to when getting involved in solidarity action 
“from below”.
aPPendIx
Variables in the models Recoding from original variables
Continuous variables
  Age age—no recoding needed
  Education education—no recoding needed
  Income income—no recoding needed (999 = missing 
values)
  Contacts with friends metfriends—no recoding needed
  Receiving help in community help—no recoding needed
  Generalized trust level socialtrust—999 = 5; else was copied
Ordinal variables
  Gender (ref. male) gender—no recoding needed
  Formalized family ties mamarsts—3 and 6 recoded as 1; else = 0
  Contacts with family deprivepices_8—no recoding needed
  Interest in politics polint—3 and 4 recoded to 1; else = 0
  Keeping informed about public 
issues
news_12—no recoding needed
  Voting votenat_PL—3 recorded as 1; else = 0
  Local attachment attachcountry_city—4 recoded as 1; else 0
noteS
1. It needs to be noticed that in significant part of relevant literature, the rela-
tion between social capital and solidarity is conceptualized in a different way 
than in this chapter. Solidarity is commonly understood only as specific atti-
tude which leads to cooperation (social capital) (Portes 1998). This is also a 
result of frequent conceptualization of solidarity as a moral value and not a 
practice.
2. Active (belong and volunteer/unpaid work for) or passive (belong to only).
3. The list included such organizations as political party, trade union, labor 
union, human/development rights organization, civil rights/liberties orga-
nization, environment/anti-nuclear organization, peace/anti-war organiza-
tion, occupy/anti-austerity organization, anti-capitalist, anti-globalization 
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organization, anti-racist/migrant rights organization, disability rights orga-
nization, unemployment organization and refugees or asylum seekers 
organization.
4. According to 2014 ESS data, the percentage of people who report they have 
taken part in lawful public demonstration equals 2.8 in Poland. The response 
to TransSOL survey question—There are different ways of trying to improve 
things or help prevent things from going wrong. When have you LAST done the 
following?—Attended a demonstration, march or rally (item: 12 months)—
equals 11.7 percent. Due to a generally low level of participation in demon-
strations in Poland (Doman ́ski 2009), we have decided to include in the 
analysis a question on long-term individual protest experiences.
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CHAPTER 6




This chapter explores the social and political dimensions of solidarity in 
Italy, measuring solidarity practices in their various aspects and explaining 
them with reference to core socio-demographic and attitudinal factors. 
Understanding the spread and the triggers of solidarity practices in the 
Italian context is a goal that deserves scholars’ attention due to the various 
crises that have affected the country since 2008. Indeed, the global finan-
cial crisis and the austerity measures which followed have resulted in dras-
tic cuts to public services, heavy job losses, and reduced incomes. The 
impact of the crisis on the most vulnerable sectors of society, such as peo-
ple with disabilities, was particularly tough. In this regard, the most evi-
dent and tangible outcome of the crisis was the cut in the “National Fund 
for the Non-Self-Sufficient”. Reduced by 75% due to budget cuts in 2011, 
the Fund was not financed at all in 2012. While governmental action has 
focused on fiscal containment and consequent public service retrench-
ment, societal needs have not only intensified (as the number of people in 
need has increased) but also diversified (due to socio-demographic changes 
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and global socio-economic processes). Within the gap of a few years, the 
refugee crisis overlapped with the economic crisis, strongly affecting a 
country positioned at the centre of several migration routes in the 
Mediterranean Sea. According to UNHCR estimates, from January until 
December 2014, the total number of sea arrivals reached 170,000, almost 
one-third of whom were rescued by the operations “Mare Nostrum”1 
and/or “Frontex’s Triton”. A new record was registered in 2016, when 
the total number of sea arrivals reached 181,000: an 18% increase com-
pared with 2015 (154,000). Several thousands of people perished at sea. 
Solely in 2016, the number of people who lost their lives was 5022. Finally, 
2016 data also highlight Italy’s record for the number of landings in the 
Mediterranean: half of more than 361 thousand migrants arriving by sea 
into Europe landed on the Italian coast, 48% of the landings occurred in 
Greece (174,000 arrivals), while 8826 migrants landed in Spain. The 
increased inflow of refugees from Syria and other regions affected by wars 
and the inability of the EU institutions and its member states to establish 
a coordinated asylum policy and mechanisms of admission and integration 
have raised the concerns that solidarity between EU member states is 
severely at risk.
In such a difficult landscape, solidarity is under pressure. Indeed, the 
economic and refugee crisis are international challenges that call for joint 
action and mutual solidarity at the supra-national level. Yet, economic 
hardships, social inequalities, and lack of collaboration between national 
governments on the migration issue can increase nationalist sentiments 
and populist reactions, as shown by the success of populist parties, the 
Brexit vote, and the mobilisation of Eurosceptic and xenophobic protests 
across Europe. All this has raised further concerns about not only the 
weakening of solidarity between member state governments but also the 
deterioration of solidarity at the level of the European citizenry, especially 
in a country like Italy that faced multiple crises and therefore can be con-
sidered a relevant case study to explain factors which inhibit and/or 
strengthen solidarity actions. Unmet needs can take two main paths: dis-
enchantment and resentment, deliberately exploited by political entrepre-
neurs, and resilience and social ingenuity, deployed through a range of 
civil society organisations, social movements, and social innovations. Do 
these paths mirror the current situation in Italy? How strongly is solidarity 
rooted at the individual level, both in terms of attitudes and practices, and 
how much are Italians engaged in solidarity-related activities? Is solidarity 
limited to specific target groups, or do we detect also a universalist or 
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cosmopolitan philanthropy dimension? And which factors seem to trigger 
(or inhibit) solidarity practices? Public debate continues to address these 
solidarity issues, but we have had very little empirical evidence on which 
to draw to inform this debate to date. We are in need of empirical evidence 
in order to answer these research questions. This chapter makes this pos-
sible by drawing on data generated from an online individual survey con-
ducted in November–December of 2016 (2087 cases for Italy).
The ultimate goal of this study is to enlarge and deepen knowledge on 
solidarity in Italy by providing new data and analyses on solidarity prac-
tices with respect to three target groups which have been particularly 
affected by the crises (the disabled, the unemployed, and refugees) and to 
explain such solidarity actions with reference to social traits of the respon-
dents, their beliefs, and their political preferences. Previous research has 
not addressed these issues in any systematic manner, contrasting facts and 
observations have been taken into account, but a review of previous stud-
ies is important to comprehend the phenomenon under investigation by 
detecting relevant dimensions and aspects and by stressing explanatory 
factors that might affect solidarity practices.
First, previous research is conceptually important to start with a defini-
tion of “solidarity”. In this regard, we agree with a strong strand of 
research that defines solidarity as the preparedness to share one’s own 
resources with others (Stjernø 2012, p. 2). This definition emphasises the 
importance of attitudes and dispositions, which have received much atten-
tion in the social sciences. In fact, most surveys are primarily interested in 
measuring the readiness of citizens to share some of their resources with 
others. Moreover, survey-based studies measure solidarity by the citizens’ 
approval of redistributional policies and, thus, by the readiness to allocate 
some of their taxes or contributions to the needy (Svallfors 1997; Fong 
2001; Amat and Wibbels 2009; Rehm et al. 2012). Nonetheless, this focus 
on redistributional preferences is not without problems. Taxes and contri-
butions to social security programmes are compulsory, and, therefore, 
support for social policies might not automatically bring up the readiness 
to commit individually in support for others. Furthermore, social psychol-
ogy has stressed how attitudes and dispositions are not equivalent to actual 
practices (Blumer 1955; Festinger 1964; Ajzen and Fishbein 2005). 
Through our own survey, we aimed more explicitly to measure reported 
solidarity activities in order to get a more reliable picture about the extent 
to which Italian citizens are committed to supporting others, conceiving 
solidarity as practices of help or support towards others in struggle or in 
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need, be that by personal contributions or by active support of activities of 
others, within informal and/or institutionalised communities.
Second, scholars have tended to privilege the charitable dimension of 
solidarity by focusing on the (financial) help to the needy. While this aspect 
is significant, it does not consider the political dimension of solidarity. In 
fact, people reveal solidarity with other needy persons when participating 
in collective actions (e.g. political protests, public claims making, lobby-
ing, communication campaigns) that aims to improve the situation of 
these groups by mobilising public support, lobbying stakeholders, and/or 
changing public policies on their behalf (Giugni and Passy 2001).
Finally, previous studies are an important source of inspiration in order 
to identify factors that can influence solidarity practices. First, scholars 
have highlighted the importance of socio-demographic factors and social 
traits (e.g. age, gender, education, social class) for grasping the conditions, 
structures, and dynamics of solidarity (Hechter 1988). Some studies (Neill 
and Gidengil 2006; Valentova 2016) have shown that voluntary engage-
ment tends to replicate the public/private divide by focusing especially on 
male-dominated and “public” activities. It has been revealed that younger 
and older citizens are more active in social movements, because of differ-
ent levels of “biographical availability” in the life course (Beyerlein and 
Bergstrand 2013). Furthermore, different levels of commitment in soli-
darity actions can be patterned by citizens’ differentiation in terms of per-
sonal resources and skills, such as income and education, by the 
respondents’ social status and affiliation to social class (Verba et al. 1978; 
Cainzos and Voces 2010).
Second, education and subjective class position are also a measure of 
social centrality, usually linked to social capital, and previous research has 
shown that social capital measures are particularly important for our topic 
(Putnam et  al. 2003; Jenkins 1983; Bourdieu 1986). In particular, we 
wish to highlight the role of interpersonal trust, informal networks, and 
social relations. The assumption is that social capital is the necessary “glue” 
of social cohesion (Chan et al. 2006; Jeannotte 2000; Delhey 2007), and 
it is tightly associated with values such as trust in others and with fre-
quency of social connections. Several studies have shown that trust in oth-
ers is associated with a wide range of positive outcomes in areas such as 
personal wellbeing (Helliwell and Wang 2010), crime rates, and even 
mortality rates (Lochner et al. 2003). Also, social trust can determine how 
much people in a society are willing to cooperate with one another, thus 
fostering solidarity actions. Similarly, having a good frequency of social 
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connections fosters higher levels of life satisfaction and happiness (Lelkes 
2010) but can also give people access to a wider range of possible support 
in times of need, producing positive outcomes at a community level 
(Halpern 2005).
Third, research on political behaviour in general, and on social move-
ment and protest participation in particular, can help to answer the ques-
tion of whether solidarity is determined by political factors. Indeed, we 
aim to identify the interrelation between political orientations on the one 
side and solidarity practices on the other. In this regard, studies agree on 
the fact that solidarity is also highly patterned by political preferences and 
ideological orientations (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Amat and 
Wibbels 2009; Likki and Staerklé 2014). Among political factors, it is also 
important to consider political involvement in terms of interest in politics 
and party attachment because they are often associated with civic engage-
ment (Scrivens and Smith 2013). The latter is another element that can 
help individuals to develop their skills and social values (such as trust in 
others), and, consequently, it can foster solidarity (Putnam et al. 1994).
Finally, we want to explore the role of ideational and cognitive factors, 
too. In particular, scholars have shown the importance of charitable dispo-
sitions linked to religiosity (Abela 2004; Stegmueller et  al. 2012; 
Lichterman 2015) to explain different levels of solidarity. At the same 
time, we need to take into account that solidarity is attached not only to 
abstract universal communities—that is, humankind according to Arendt’s 
political theory (Arendt 1972)—but also to specific reference groups. In 
particular, specific acts of solidarity seem to be conditional and thus tied to 
specific issues and target groups. In this regard, previous research has 
shown that perceptions of reciprocity, conditionality, and deservingness 
can play an important role as regards solidarity among the public (Oorschot 
2000, 2006).
Based on these insights, the research is grounded on the hypotheses 
that social capital, political factors, religiosity, and perceptions of deserv-
ingness influence solidarity practices. In particular, we argue that there 
could be a distinction between triggers of solidarity towards specific target 
groups and triggers of solidarity in general. As regards the latter, we 
hypothesise that regardless of the target group, (a) the more an individual 
is socially embedded and trustworthy of others (the more her/his social 
capital), the more she/he will support people in need; (b) the more reli-
gious one is, the more she/he supports others in a “charitable” esprit; (c) 
the more a person perceives a group to be deserving of support, the more 
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she/he will be disposed towards solidarity with that group. As regards 
group-specific triggers of solidarity, the refugee crisis has arisen innumer-
able initiatives not only to provide immediate help for refugees (e.g. cloth-
ing, food, shelter, language courses) but also to rally for migrant and 
refugee rights, sharing a universalistic and unconditioned notion of soli-
darity. The increasing inability of Italian authorities to handle the inflow of 
migrants and the growing mobilisation of populist, right-wing, and in part 
xenophobic groups boosted conflicts about the correct policies for the 
Italian government to pursue. Because of these conflicts, solidarity towards 
refugees became a contested issue. In this regard, scholars (Mudde 2011) 
have stressed how migrants-related issues are divisive issues that are 
strongly politicised by right-wing populist parties in order to gain votes 
(e.g. the Northern League in Italy). Consequently, solidarity towards ref-
ugees apparently has become a contentious field that separates people with 
different political orientations. Unemployment is another sector that can 
be characterised by a certain degree of contentiousness (Baglioni 2010). 
The economic crisis and the resulting austerity measures have mobilised 
Italian trade unions and social movements in defence of the interests and 
rights of people in economic difficulties, including the unemployed. 
Disabled persons’ organisations mobilised against cuts, too. However, 
most disability organisations in Italy are composed of disabled people 
and/or their families and have tended to represent fragmented subsets of 
people with disabilities (Schianchi 2014), without clear ideological- 
political connotations.
On the basis of all these, we hypothesise that:
 1. political factors do not matter for solidarity towards the disabled, 
whereas they matter for solidarity towards refugees and the 
unemployed;
 2. the more an individual is involved in politics and characterised in 
terms of leftist political orientations and libertarian values, the more 
she/he will support refugees;
 3. the more an individual conceives solidarity in universalistic terms 
without perceptions of reciprocity and conditionality, the more she/
he will support refugees.
In order to test these research hypotheses, the following variables will 
be included in the analysis: socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, 
education, income, social class) and social traits (social capital measures), 
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political factors (interest in politics, party attachment, self-placement on 
the left-right dimension, libertarian vs. authoritarian values, voting inten-
tions), and religiosity and social beliefs (evaluations on deservingness, reci-
procity, conditionality). The chapter will first provide a general picture of 
a variety of solidarity practices in Italy with respect to our target groups 
(the disabled, the unemployed, and the refugees), looking at the interrela-
tions between attitudes and behaviours in order to comparatively assess the 
specificities of each target group. Secondly, through multivariate regres-
sion models, it will provide pertinent explanation to investigate the (differ-
ent) determinants of solidarity activities among the three target groups. 
Findings show that the most important factors fostering solidarity prac-
tices in Italy are social capital, religiosity, cognitive political involvement, 
and perceptions of deservingness. There are also group-specific triggers of 
solidarity: political factors play a more important role for support towards 
the unemployed and (especially) refugees compared to support for the 
disabled; solidarity towards refugees is clearly an unconditioned form of 
solidarity.
ItalIans and solIdarIty: an overall PIcture
Answering the research questions we presented in the introduction and 
testing our hypotheses require outlining the profiles of Italians engaged in 
solidarity with our specific target groups (the refugees, the unemployed, 
and the people with disabilities), taking into account their socio- 
demographic characteristics, social traits, political attitudes, ideologies and 
voting intentions, social beliefs, and cultural orientations. Prior to this 
discussion, we need to contextualise solidarity practices in the general pic-
ture of solidarity in Italy through the analysis of the dependent variables of 
the study: reported solidarity practices towards refugees, the unemployed, 
and people with disabilities. Our survey includes a battery of questions 
that allow comparing levels of solidarity with various reference groups and 
painting a differentiated picture of diverse practices (donating time or 
money, passive and active membership, buying products, protest participa-
tion) that help to mirror both the philanthropic and political dimension of 
solidarity (see Table 6.1).
The results show that around half of respondents have been engaged in 
solidarity activities involving people with disabilities (including donating 
money or time, protesting, and engaging in voluntary associations), 
whereas 35.5% engage in solidarity activities with the unemployed and 
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27.6% with refugees.2 The disability field is the most “crowded” field in 
terms of solidarity engagement. If we look at the different types of solidar-
ity practices, political protest-oriented activities are carried out especially 
in favour of the unemployed (11.6%), whereas the other two fields seem 
to be less contentious. Conversely, charity behaviour definitely character-
ises solidarity actions towards the disabled: 26.5% donate money (com-
pared to 11% of those who donate money for refugees or the unemployed), 
and 13.7% donate time. Similar patterns can be found regarding the active 
involvement in volunteering, with around 6% volunteering in favour of 
refugees or the unemployed and 8% in favour of people with disabilities. 
Regarding solidarity towards refugees, after donating money, the most 
frequent activity (8.1%) is a relatively more political one, that is, buying or 
refusing to buy products in favour of refugees.
Looking at solidarity practices oriented to people/groups in Italy and 
abroad (see Table 6.2) makes the picture more interesting.
Table 6.1 Type of reported solidarity activities in favour of three target groups 
(in %)
Refugees Unemployed Disabled
Attended a march, protest, or demonstration 5.8 11.6 8.4
Donating money 11.0 11.3 26.5
Donating time 7.5 9.0 13.7
Bought or refused to buy products in support to the 
goals
8.1 11.1 14.5
Engaged as passive member of an organisation 3.5 4.9 6.1
Engaged as active member of an organisation 5.6 6.2 8.3
Total 27.6 35.5 49.4
N 576 741 1030
Table 6.15 in Appendix presents the original wording of the survey’s questions used for all tables in this 
chapter
Italy
In your country 46.7
In a country in the EU 31.7
Outside the EU 32.8
Total N 2087
At least one of the following actions was named: 
protest, donate money or time, bought or boy-
cotted goods, passive or active membership
Table 6.2 Reported solidarity 
activities in order to support the 
rights of people/groups in 
different contexts (in %)
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Table 6.3 Importance of 
development aid from the EU to 
assist certain countries outside the 
EU in their fight against poverty 
and in support of their 
development (in %)
Italy







Table 6.4 Evaluations of solidarity-based public policies (in %)
Italy
Importance of eliminating big inequalities in 
income between citizens
Not at all important 1.4















Around half of the Italian sample reports having been engaged in soli-
darity activities for people in their country, whereas Italian citizens are less 
inclined to support European and transnational solidarity. One-third of 
respondents have engaged in activities in support of the rights of people in 
other EU countries or outside the EU.
Moving to describe the attitude towards helping people in developing 
countries, data show that a strong majority of respondents in Italy sup-
ports the attempts of the EU to help countries outside Europe in fighting 
poverty and promoting development, with 72% supporting and only 11% 
opposing these measures (see Table 6.3).
Finally, it is interesting to look at public support of redistributive poli-
cies and of fiscal solidarity among EU member states (see Table  6.4), 
which have been taken as a measure for “vertical solidarity” (Alesina and 
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Giuliano 2011), and thus for the readiness of people to finance and 
endorse public programmes sharing wealth with the needy. It can be 
argued that people with redistributional preferences might be more likely 
involved in solidarity practices. Italian citizens strongly support solidarity- 
based (redistributive) public policies with 81% considering the reduction 
of big income inequalities as an important goal. In other words, the tradi-
tional European social model is definitely not questioned by our inter-
viewees. Italians are inclined also to support solidarity-based policies 
among EU member states, even if to a lesser extent. A large majority sup-
ports fiscal solidarity measures towards countries with public debts (65% 
vs. 16%), with 18% undecided respondents, probably because Italy has the 
second largest public debt in the EU. Therefore, this might be also a self- 
interested solidarity attitude.
Against this general picture, we focus the analysis on the relationships 
between solidarity actions and the aforementioned set of individual 
 characteristics: (1) socio-demographics and social traits, (2) political atti-
tudes and behaviours, and (3) social beliefs and religiosity.
Solidarity Actions, Socio-demographic Characteristics, and Social 
Traits
Regarding basic socio-demographic characteristics (see Table  6.5), we 
can observe a difference in terms of age between support for refugees and 
the unemployed (where there is an over-representation of the youngest 
age groups—18–35 years old—with respect to the sample’s average) on 
the one hand and support for the disabled on the other hand (where the 
distribution of age groups is substantially in line with the average). 
Regarding gender, most people engaged in solidarity activities (in all 
fields) are male, whereas in the whole sample most respondents are 
female. This result confirms findings of some studies, which unveil that 
voluntary engagement tends to replicate the public/private divide by 
centring on male- dominated activities (Neill and Gidengil 2006; 
Valentova 2016). The male over-representation is accentuated within the 
unemployment field (54.3%), while the disability field is the most gender 
balanced (50.7% male).
Considering educational attainment, in all the fields, almost half of 
respondents have a low education level. Nonetheless, higher level of 
education makes it more likely that people show solidarity. This is true 
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especially in solidarity activities concerning refugees and the unemployed. 
Indeed, the percentage of respondents with higher education is around 
18% among people supporting refugees (vs. 12.3% of the total population) 
and around 16% among people supporting the unemployed.
Table 6.6 reports solidarity actions towards target groups by monthly 
income level (in euro) and subjective social class. Respondents with the 
highest income level (3781 euro or more per month) are over-repre-
sented among people supporting refugees with respect to the average 
(9% vs. 6%), whereas respondents with the lowest income level 
(0–1305 euro) are under-represented (24% vs. 28%). This pattern is less 
pronounced in the unemployment and disability fields. Quite interesting 
patterns emerge if we take “social centrality” into examination, as mea-
sured by perceived class belonging. Results confirm the specificity of soli-
darity activities in favour of refugees. Among people supporting refugees, 
the lower class and, above all, the working class are under-represented 
compared to the total population, whereas the upper middle class is 
over-represented.









Age 18–24 years 9.2 8.2 6.6 7.2
25–34 years 18.4 17.0 13.2 14.3
35–44 years 18.3 19.8 17.2 17.6
45–54 years 14.7 17.6 18.6 18.9
55–64 years 22.5 22.0 24.6 23.7
65 years and older 17.0 15.6 19.8 18.3
Total 100 100 100 100
N 576 741 1030 2087
Gender Male 51.7 54.3 50.7 48.0
Female 48.3 45.8 49.3 52.0
Total 100 100 100 100
N 576 741 1030 2087
Education Higher education 17.6 15.8 13.7 12.3
Intermediate 
education
33.4 34.9 36.6 35.2
Lower education 49.1 49.3 49.7 52.5
Total 100 100 100 100
N 576 741 1030 2087
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Finally, our survey includes some specific questions regarding social 
capital framework. According to the framework adopted by the OECD 
(Scrivens and Smith 2013), there are several dimensions of social capital. 
We focus here just on two aspects: social trust and personal relationships. 
The first refers to the measure based on the standard question: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need 
to be very careful in dealing with people?” Trust is measured on a scale of 
0 (minimum trust) to 10 (maximum trust). In order to make cross- 
tabulations more readable, we have recoded this variable by considering 
values between 0 and 4 as absence of trust in others, 5 as neutral position, 
and, finally, those between 6 and 10 as trust in others.
The second aspect of social capital refers to the “structure and nature of 
people’s personal networks” (Scrivens and Smith 2013, p. 21) and is con-
cerned with whom people know and what they do to establish and maintain 
Table 6.6 Solidarity actions towards target groups by income level and subjec-








Income 0–1305 euro 24.0 27.4 25.5 28.1
1306–1920 
euro
27.7 25.6 24.6 26.2
1921–2665 
euro
21.7 24.6 24.6 22.9
2666–3780 
euro
17.5 15.4 17.7 16.6
3781 euro or 
more
9.1 7.0 7.6 6.2
Total 100 100 100 100
N 522 677 922 1803
Subjective social 
class
Upper class 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
Upper middle 
class
7.9 5.4 5.8 4.3
Middle class 42.1 40.4 42.0 40.4
Lower middle 
class
28.9 28.5 28.7 27.2
Working class 10.6 13.4 12.4 15.9
Lower class 9.2 11.2 10.0 11.5
Other class 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.5
Total 100 100 100 100
N 562 730 1008 2016
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their personal relationships. Meeting socially with friends at least once a 
week is a well-established measure of this phenomenon (e.g. European 
Social Survey).
Results seem to confirm the relevance of social capital for solidarity 
actions (see Table 6.7). As for solidarity actions towards all target groups, 
people who trust others are clearly over-represented compared to the total 
population. Indeed, on average 29% of the sample trust in others, whereas 
this percentage increases at 35% among people supporting the disabled, at 
36% among people supporting the unemployed, and at 43% among people 
supporting refugees. In the latter case, more people trust in others than do 
not trust in others. It follows that solidarity towards foreigners is strongly 
associated with a generalised trust in human beings.
A similar pattern is depicted by the second measure of social capital 
related to the frequency of social connections. Among people engaging in 
solidarity activities in favour of all target groups, those meeting socially 
with friends at least every week are strongly over-represented compared to 
the total population, whereas those who meet less than once a month are 
strongly under-represented (especially among those supporting refugees 
and unemployed).








Social trust People cannot 
be trusted
38.8 46.3 46.7 51.2
Neutral 18.3 18.1 18.6 20.0
People can be 
trusted
42.8 35.6 34.7 28.8
Total 100 100 100 100
N 570 736 1021 2041
Frequency of 
meetings with friends
Less than once 
this month
22.1 23.5 27.3 33.3
Once or twice 
this month
35.4 36.9 36.1 34.4
Every week 35.1 32.7 30.6 26.9
Almost every 
day
7.5 6.9 6.0 5.4
Total 100 100 100 100
N 576 741 1030 2087
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Solidarity Actions and Political Factors
Previously, we mentioned that solidarity has not only a philanthropic 
dimension but also a political one. Therefore, it is important to look at the 
relationship between solidarity actions and politics, in particular looking at 
respondents’ attitudes towards politics, their self-placement along the left- 
right spectrum and along the libertarian-authoritarian dimension, and 
their voting intentions.
The respondents’ attitudes towards politics are derived from their inter-
est in politics and party attachment (see Table 6.8). The level of cognitive 
political involvement of respondents can be measured on a four-point scale 
by their interest in politics. On average, those that are very or somewhat 
interested in politics are 64%. This percentage remarkably increases among 
people who are engaged in solidarity practices: 74% as for refugees, 75% as 
for the unemployed, and 70% as for the disabled. Another measure of 
involvement in politics is the psychological feeling of attachment towards 
a party, which is also an important explanatory variable of voting behaviour 
(Campbell et al. 1960). Results strengthen what we have previously seen: 
political involvement seems to be associated with engagement in solidarity 
actions. Indeed, on average those who say they are close to a party are 76%. 
Among people engaging in solidarity actions, this percentage increases, 
ranging from 81% within the disability field to 85.5% within the unemploy-
ment field. Research has stressed the linkage between cognitive involve-
ment in politics and political participation. For instance, low levels of 
cognitive engagement in politics and the withdrawal from political parties 










Not at all interested 6.0 6.4 7.0 11.5
Not very interested 20.0 18.4 22.7 24.5
Quite interested 46.8 47.9 45.8 43.7
Very interested 27.2 27.2 24.6 20.3
Total 100 100 100 100
N 565 730 1011 2024
Party 
attachment
No party 15.7 14.5 19.0 23.9
Close to a party 84.3 85.5 81.0 76.1
Total 100 100 100 100
N 537 690 967 1911
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are important factors explaining young people’s lower involvement in 
institutional (and non-institutional) political participation (García-Albacete 
2014). Political interest is also an important explanatory factor of young 
people’s voting behaviour (Maggini 2016). Our data show that political 
involvement is also associated with civic engagement through solidarity 
activities. This is not surprising, given that civic engagement refers to 
“actions and behaviours that can be seen as contributing positively to the 
collective life of a community or society” (Scrivens and Smith 2013, p. 28), 
including activities such as political participation.
At this point, what about the relationship between political self- 
placement on the left-right scale and solidarity actions in favour of differ-
ent target groups? The political self-placement of respondents has been 
measured from 0 to 10, with the value of 0 corresponding to the far left 
and the value of 10 corresponding to the far right. Consequently, we have 
considered values between 0 and 4 as “centre left”, 5 as “centre”, those 
between 7 and 10 as “centre right”, and, finally, missing values as “not 
self-placed” (see Table 6.9). These data show that the ideological charac-
ter of people supporting the disabled is very similar to the total popula-
tion’s. There is a substantial equilibrium between centre-left and 
centre-right people. Conversely, centre-left people are over-represented 
among people supporting the unemployed (37% vs. 33% of the whole 
sample) and, especially, among people supporting refugees (41% vs. 33%). 
Table 6.9 Solidarity actions towards target groups by left-right self-placement 










Centre left 40.7 37.0 35.5 33.4
Centre 17.9 16.3 17.0 15.6
Centre right 31.1 34.1 34.4 33.0
Not 
self-placed
10.4 12.6 13.0 18.0
Total 100 100 100 100
N 576 741 1030 2087
Libertarian- 
authoritarian index
Authoritarian 34.1 39.5 41.1 42.1
Neutral 25.3 22.6 23.9 22.3
Libertarian 40.6 37.9 35.0 35.7
Total 100 100 100 100
N 490 626 871 1726
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This confirms our hypothesis that disability is not a divisive issue in politi-
cal terms, whereas solidarity engagement in the other two fields is more 
related to political-ideological elements. Once again, the field of refugees 
is singled out for its specificity: here, centre-left people are by far the larg-
est category. Finally, it is worth noting that people not self-placed on the 
left-right scale are under-represented in all fields, signalling again the posi-
tive linkage between political involvement and civic engagement in soli-
darity actions.
Table 6.9 shows the relationship between the libertarian-authoritarian 
index and solidarity actions, too. Electoral studies have highlighted that 
new political issues linked to the libertarian-authoritarian dimension have 
become salient for voters (Thomassen 2005), besides the traditional lines 
of political contestation (left-right and religion). In our survey, there are 
several questions connected to a broader libertarian-authoritarian divide, 
as confirmed by a factor analysis.3 Consequently, we created an additive 
index linked to a unique factor component. This index is an indicator of 
libertarian values, and we recoded it classifying values between 0 and 4.4 
as “authoritarian”, values between 4.6 and 5.4 as “neutral”, and values 
between 5.6 and 10 as “libertarian”. Findings confirm that disability is not 
a divisive issue in political terms, whereas solidarity engagement in the 
unemployment field and, above all, in the refugees field is more related to 
political values. Indeed, in the latter field people with libertarian values are 
by far the largest category, whereas within the whole sample people with 
authoritarian values are the largest category.
Focusing on voting behaviour (see Table  6.10) confirms previous 
analysis: a difference between centre-left and right-wing parties’ voters 
emerges only among people carrying out solidarity activities in favour of 
refugees. Indeed, people who vote for centre-left parties (Democratic 
Party and radical left parties) are over-represented compared to the total 
population, whereas right-wing voters of Northern League are under-
represented. This is in line with our expectation. Regarding the Five Star 
Movement, its voters are over-represented among people engaging in 
solidarity actions. According to several studies, indeed, the Five Star 
Movement is a web-populist party (Corbetta and Gualmini 2013) appeal-
ing for direct democracy and cross-cutting the traditional left-right 
dimension (Maggini 2014; Tronconi 2015). This also means that among 
its voters there are people with left-wing values (pro-refugees) as well as 
right-wing people (anti-migration). The Five Star Movement is the most 
over-represented among people supporting the unemployed. This is 
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consistent with the over-representation of this party among the unem-
ployed, especially young people. Radical left parties are also over-repre-
sented in this field, but centre- right voters are in line with the average. 
Conversely, Democratic Party voters are under-represented. Thus, in the 
unemployment field, there is not a clear distinction in terms of left and 
right but a more contingent distinction between voters of opposition 
parties and voters of the main governing party.4 Finally, there is no sig-
nificant pattern in terms of voting choices regarding solidarity actions 
towards the disabled.
Solidarity Actions, Social Beliefs, and Religiosity
In order to provide a complete picture of people engaged in solidarity, it 
is necessary to also take into account respondents’ social beliefs and 
religiosity.
Conditionality and deservingness can play an important role regard-
ing solidarity among the public (Oorschot 2000, 2006). Previously we 
have seen that a large majority of Italians support fiscal solidarity mea-
sures towards countries with big public debts. Table 6.11 presents the 
reasons for fiscal solidarity: 52% of respondents subscribe the idea of reci-
procity and deservingness. According to these views, solidarity within 
the EU is an exchange relation of giving and receiving help; moreover, 
groups receiving help need to show that they are worth being helped. 








Italian left (SI/SEL) 3.0 3.3 2.9 2.3
Democratic Party 20.6 16.8 19.1 18.0
Five Star Movement 26.7 30.8 26.2 23.9
Popular area 3.1 2.6 2.2 1.3
Forward Italy 6.4 6.3 6.5 5.9
Northern League 8.3 10.1 10.6 10.6
Brothers of Italy 3.5 4.1 3.5 3.2
Communist Refoundation Party 2.9 2.9 1.8 1.5
Other party 4.4 3.6 3.7 3.2
Do not know 21.1 19.6 23.6 30.2
Total 100 100 100 100
N 576 741 1030 2087
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This vision is shared by people engaging in solidarity actions, with no 
substantial differences among target groups. Only a minority of 20% 
claims that it is a moral duty to help other member states in need. 
Noticeably, this unconditioned form of solidarity is more widespread 
among people involved in solidarity activities, especially among those 
helping refugees (27%).
As shown in Table  6.11, this conditionality is confirmed regarding 
migrants. Only a minority of 8% is in favour of granting migrants access to 
social benefits and services immediately on arrival. This is a lower share 
compared to those who would never grant migrants access to social ben-
efits and services (12%). Hence, access is conditional on two aspects: they 
should have worked and paid taxes (38%) and they should become citizens 
of the country (36%). A minority (6.5%) is more generous, granting 
migrants access more easily after one year staying in Italy (having worked 
or not). Conditionality decreases among Italians involved in solidarity 
activities, especially those active in the field of refugees (as it was predict-
able). In fact, among people supporting refugees, 28% show the most 
generous attitudes compared to 14.2% among the total population (22% 
among people supporting the unemployed and 18% among those helping 
the disabled). Symmetrically, those who say “never” are under-represented 
in all fields. In addition, among people supporting refugees, those who 
claim the requisite of citizenship are around 10 percentage points below 
average. Noteworthy, the largest category remains “after have worked and 
paid taxes for one year”, even in the pro-refugees solidarity field (40%). To 
sum up, according to our interviewees, solidarity definitely entails 
 entitlements and mutual obligations; this conditioned solidarity prevails 
even among those helping people who are not part of the national com-
munity as refugees.
In our survey, we asked respondents to name the specific group they 
would choose for charity donation among the following ones: unem-
ployed people, people with disabilities, migrants, refugees/asylum seekers, 
and children. We can consider this variable as a proxy for deservingness, 
arguing that people are more likely to choose as preferred group for  charity 
donation the group they consider more deserving of help. Results show 
(see Table 6.11) that children are by far the most preferred group for char-
ity donation (49%), followed by the disabled (24%) and the unemployed 
(21%). For Italian citizens, refugees and migrants are definitely the groups 
less deserving (4% and 2%, respectively). Of course, these percentages 
increase among those supporting refugees, but, even in this case, the 
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children, the disabled, and the unemployed are by far more deserving than 
migrants and refugees. Looking at people supporting the disabled and the 
unemployed, a stronger correlation emerges between the type of solidarity 
field and the preferred group for donation, even if children are still the 
most preferred group. Again, these data confirm that groups receiving 
help need to be perceived as worth being helped. In this regard, foreigners 
deserve to be helped to the extent that they become part of the national 
community, at least through work and paying taxes.
Table 6.11 Solidarity actions towards target groups by social beliefs: reciprocity, 








Reason to state for 
financial help for EU 
countries in trouble
It is our moral duty 
to help other 
member states that 
are in need
26.8 24.5 23.4 20.2
Total N 576 741 1030 2087
EU member states 
should help each 
other; every country 
may require help 
someday
50.6 52.0 54.3 51.8
Total N 576 741 1030 2087
Conditionality: when 
should migrants obtain 




13.3 10.2 8.5 7.7
After living one year 
(worked or not)
14.9 11.5 9.7 6.5
After worked and 
paid taxes one year
40.3 39.3 41.0 38.3
After citizenship 26.5 31.2 33.5 35.7
Never 5.0 7.8 7.2 11.8
Total 100 100 100 100
N 576 741 1030 2087
Preferred charity 
group for donation
Unemployed 20.5 25.8 18.7 20.9
People with 
disabilities
22.5 23.3 27.4 23.8
Migrants 6.2 4.5 3.5 2.4
Refugees 8.1 5.0 4.9 3.8
Children 42.6 41.4 45.5 49.1
Total 100 100 100 100
N 543 708 979 1898
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Finally, the profile of solidarity actions towards target groups can vary 
according to cultural orientations like religiosity5 (see Table  6.12). 
Findings show that among Italians involved in solidarity activities, reli-
gious people are definitely over-represented compared to the average, 
being in all fields around 57%.
To sum up, solidarity towards refugees shows some specificities com-
pared to solidarity towards other groups: it is more dependent on personal 
skills, resources, and social status, selfless, and linked to leftist/libertarian 
values.
exPlanatory Factors oF solIdarIty actIons 
towards the reFugees, the unemPloyed, 
and the dIsabled
This section outlines the results of a multivariate logistic regression analy-
sis. Reported solidarity activities in favour of each target group are the 
dependent variables. In other words, we have three dichotomous depen-
dent variables (for which 0 signifies “no action”, 1 “at least one action”) 
for each target group. The goal is to investigate the (different) determi-
nants of solidarity activities among the three target groups. Which factors 
tend to promote (or inhibit) solidarity at the individual level? Is there 
variance comparing the target groups?
Four models for each target group have been created to answer our 
research questions. The results of estimation for the first three models are 
presented in Table 6.13, which includes odds ratios (with standard errors) 
as well as goodness-of-fit statistics (AIC and BIC coefficients, pseudo-R- 
squared values of Nagelkerke). In logistic regression, the odds ratio com-
pares the odds of the outcome event (providing solidarity) one unit apart 
on the predictor. We have reported the selected independent variables6 by 
Table 6.12 Solidarity actions towards target groups by religiosity (in %)
Refugees support Unemployed support Disabled support Total
Religiosity Not religious 30.0 30.4 29.9 33.4
Neutral 12.4 12.9 13.2 13.0
Religious 57.6 56.8 57.0 53.6
Total 100 100 100 100
N 573 739 1024 2050
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Table 6.13 Estimated effects on solidarity actions towards different target 










Age 0.613 0.159 0.589* 0.138 2.397*** 0.544
Gender (female) 0.979 0.104 0.762** 0.074 0.909 0.085
Intermediate education 0.880 0.108 1.003 0.111 1.054 0.111
High education 1.424* 0.220 1.388* 0.202 1.173 0.170
Middle class 0.432*** 0.107 0.785 0.181 0.534** 0.126
Lower middle class 0.530* 0.136 0.955 0.228 0.611* 0.150
Working class 0.316*** 0.0899 0.758 0.197 0.413*** 0.108
Lower class 0.428** 0.126 0.999 0.268 0.523* 0.141
Other class 1.321 1.078 2.44 1.852 2.059 1.781
Social trust 6.508*** 1.438 2.196*** 0.429 2.399*** 0.439
Frequency of meeting with 
friends
2.428*** 0.444 2.317*** 0.390 2.247*** 0.378
Constant 0.344*** 0.106 0.499* 0.142 0.682 0.194
N 1982 1982 1982
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.036 0.035
AIC 2197.8 2530.4 2668.6
BIC 2264.9 2597.5 2735.7
Model B
Age 0.344*** 0.105 0.317*** 0.090 1.137 0.305
Gender (female) 1.008 0.126 0.786* 0.093 0.974 0.111
Intermediate education 0.761 0.108 0.892 0.119 0.983 0.124
High education 1.275 0.227 1.194 0.206 0.976 0.166
Middle class 0.428** 0.115 0.894 0.243 0.479** 0.136
Lower middle class 0.483** 0.134 1.063 0.300 0.493* 0.143
Working class 0.327*** 0.104 1.119 0.347 0.394** 0.124
Lower class 0.380** 0.128 1.017 0.333 0.486* 0.160
Other class 0.653 0.539 1.833 1.409 1.053 0.837
Political interest 2.290*** 0.531 2.924*** 0.654 2.489*** 0.522
Party attachment 1.793** 0.335 2.043*** 0.368 1.288 0.201
Left-right self-placement 0.570* 0.125 0.708 0.150 0.974 0.199
Libertarian-authoritarian index 2.835** 1.058 1.508 0.539 0.934 0.314
Constant 0.478 0.213 0.316** 0.139 1.096 0.458
N 1369 1369 1369
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.049 0.022
AIC 1616.4 1750.8 1864.5
BIC 1689.5 1823.9 1937.6
(continued)












Age 0.621 0.170 0.448** 0.109 1.840* 0.443
Gender (female) 0.951 0.108 0.741** 0.075 0.851 0.084
Intermediate education 0.921 0.119 1.083 0.125 1.056 0.118
High education 1.387 0.241 1.385* 0.219 1.106 0.173
Middle class 0.451** 0.117 0.836 0.204 0.576* 0.141
Lower middle class 0.486** 0.130 0.939 0.236 0.606* 0.153
Working class 0.316*** 0.095 0.848 0.233 0.431** 0.117
Lower class 0.384** 0.120 0.955 0.270 0.563* 0.158
Other class 1.808 1.212 3.147 2.168 2.814 2.200
Religiosity 1.906*** 0.364 2.093*** 0.359 1.989*** 0.328
EU help motive: moral duty 1.339* 0.180 1.229 0.149 1.2 0.147
EU help motive: reciprocity 0.822 0.093 0.87 0.090 1.037 0.103
Conditionality for migrants: 
after living in Italy for a year
1.720* 0.468 1.668* 0.430 2.345** 0.632
Conditionality for migrants: 
after having worked and paid 
taxes for a year
0.489*** 0.102 0.693 0.139 1.047 0.207
Conditionality for migrants: 
once obtaining citizenship
0.322*** 0.069 0.579** 0.119 0.767 0.153
Conditionality for migrants: 
never
0.137*** 0.043 0.378*** 0.098 0.441*** 0.109
Preferred charity group: the 
unemployed
1.169 0.168 1.825*** 0.238 0.927 0.117
Preferred charity group: the 
disabled
1.114 0.155 1.309* 0.164 1.682*** 0.210
Preferred charity group: 
migrants
5.374*** 1.972 3.215*** 1.084 2.453* 0.891
Preferred charity group: 
refugees/asylum seekers
3.284*** 1.027 1.618 0.445 1.772* 0.494
Constant 1.535 0.563 0.850 0.292 0.952 0.320
N 1841 1841 1841
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.063 0.057
AIC 1990.5 2327.7 2440.1




blocks: first, the socio-demographic variables and social capital measures; 
secondly, political factors (political interest, party attachment, left-right 
self-placement, libertarian-authoritarian index) controlled for socio- 
demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, social class); and 
thirdly, social beliefs (evaluations of reciprocity, conditionality, deserving-
ness) and religiosity, again controlled for socio-demographic characteris-
tics. Thus, it is possible to assess the contribution given by each group of 
variables to the model’s goodness of fit, compared across target groups. 
Finally, Table 6.14 presents results for the full model with all independent 
variables for each target group.
Let us start with the first model. The overall predictive power of model 
A is quite low, explaining 7% of variance as for support of refugees and 4% 
as for disabled and unemployed support. It means that socio-demographic 
variables and social traits do not explain sufficiently the solidarity-based 
behaviour of the respondents. Looking at the p values of the predictors, 
clearly social traits prevail over basic socio-demographics. Indeed, for each 
target group, measures of social capital (social trust and frequency of social 
connections with friends) are both very significant with p at 0.1%. 
Furthermore, these variables show the highest odds ratios: higher level of 
social trust and social connections increase the odds of engaging in soli-
darity actions.
Regarding subjective social class, some categories are very significant 
with p at 0.1%: working class as for refugees and the disabled support and 
middle class as for refugees support (whereas it is significant with p at 1% 
for disabled support).
Here, a first difference between target groups emerges: social class is 
not related to solidarity towards the unemployed, whereas it seems to be 
related to solidarity towards refugees and the disabled. In the latter 
instance, all the social class dummies (except the residual category of 
“other class”) are significant with respect to the reference category (upper/
upper middle class). Looking at the odds ratio, belonging to classes differ-
ent from the highest class decreases the odds of supporting refugees and 
the disabled.
Concerning socio-demographic characteristics, a high education level 
(with respect to the low level) increases the odds of supporting refugees and 
the unemployed (significant with p at 5%), whereas education does not mat-
ter in support for disability. Age is very significant (p at 0.1%) for disabled 
support and it is significant for unemployed support (p at 5%), but the direc-
tion of the effect is the opposite: ageing increases the odds of supporting the 
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Table 6.14 Estimated effects on solidarity actions towards different target 




SE Odds ratio SE Odds 
ratio
SE
Age 0.645 0.219 0.491* 0.153 2.034* 0.627
Gender (female) 1.242 0.175 0.872 0.112 1.078 0.133
Intermediate education 0.766 0.121 0.928 0.133 1.019 0.139
High education 1.175 0.248 1.079 0.202 0.883 0.167
Middle class 0.447* 0.143 1.049 0.306 0.544* 0.162
Lower middle class 0.589 0.194 1.397 0.423 0.627 0.192
Working class 0.492 0.182 1.763 0.590 0.555 0.184
Lower class 0.6 0.238 1.567 0.548 0.807 0.285
Other class 1.706 1.963 4.058 3.302 2.483 2.241
Social trust 3.567*** 1.054 1.543 0.399 1.773* 0.444
Frequency of meeting with 
friends
2.717*** 0.662 2.670*** 0.606 2.969*** 0.668
Political interest 1.900* 0.500 2.817*** 0.685 2.263*** 0.515
Party attachment 1.708* 0.377 1.833** 0.361 1.201 0.205
Left-right self-placement 0.854 0.218 0.887 0.206 1.237 0.278
Libertarian-authoritarian index 2.384* 1.039 1.507 0.616 1.023 0.397
Religiosity 2.207** 0.560 2.664*** 0.605 2.501*** 0.550
EU help motive: moral duty 1.355 0.221 1.32 0.194 1.156 0.168
Conditionality for migrants: 
after living in Italy for a year
1.518 0.497 1.68 0.521 2.432** 0.816
Conditionality for migrants: 
after having worked and paid 
taxes for a year
0.474** 0.118 0.664 0.162 1.054 0.264
Conditionality for migrants: 
once obtaining citizenship
0.303*** 0.079 0.518** 0.131 0.724 0.185
Conditionality for migrants: 
never
0.126*** 0.054 0.315*** 0.110 0.449* 0.145
Preferred charity group: the 
unemployed
1.379 0.241 2.115*** 0.342 1.092 0.167
Preferred charity group: the 
disabled
1.109 0.190 1.399* 0.217 1.843*** 0.284
Preferred charity group: 
migrants
5.070*** 2.282 3.936*** 1.638 2.742* 1.292
Preferred charity group: 
refugees/asylum seekers
3.303** 1.214 1.677 0.516 1.745 0.608




disabled and decreases the odds of supporting the unemployed. Finally, gen-
der is significant (p at 5%) only as for unemployed support: being male 
increases the odds of supporting the unemployed.
If we move to model B, the contribution of political factors (controlled 
for socio-demographics) to the model’s goodness of fit is low, with a clear 
difference between solidarity towards the disabled on the one hand and 
solidarity towards the other groups on the other. In fact, the model 
explains 6% and 5% of the variance as for refugees and unemployed sup-
port, respectively, and only 2% of variance as for the disabled. This con-
firms our hypothesis: solidarity towards the disabled is not related to 
political features, with the exception of the level of cognitive political 
involvement as measured by interest in politics, which is very significant 
and positively correlated with solidarity actions in favour of all target 
groups. The other measure of political involvement (party attachment) is 
very significant (p at 0.1%) for unemployed support and for refugees sup-
port (p at 1%). Finally, ideology in terms of left and right (p at 5%) and, 
above all, political values in terms of libertarian and authoritarian attitudes 
(p at 1%) are significant only regarding refugees support. The direction of 
the effect is in line with our expectations: moving to the right of the politi-
cal space decreases the odds of supporting refugees, whereas the latter is 
positively associated with libertarian values. This means that solidarity 
towards refugees is the most characterised in political terms. This confirms 
that migration is a politically divisive issue.
So far, social traits and political factors (considered as separate blocks) 
are not sufficient to explain the solidarity-based behaviour of the respon-
dents, and we have to move to Model C including social beliefs and religi-
osity, again controlled for socio-demographic characteristics. This model 





SE Odds ratio SE Odds 
ratio
SE
N 1299 1299 1299
Pseudo R2 0.179 0.122 0.09
AIC 1373.6 1569.5 1668.6
BIC 1508 1703.9 1803
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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of the variance is explained, compared to 6% for unemployed and disabled 
support. Looking at p values and odds ratios of predictors, we can notice 
similarities and differences between target groups as for explanatory factors 
of solidarity practices. Concerning similarities, it seems that religiosity is a 
good predictor of involvement in solidarity actions, regardless of the target 
group. Indeed, it is always very significant and odds ratios are high.
Regarding the reasons to support fiscal solidarity among EU member 
states, the dummy variable measuring reciprocity in help is not statistically 
significant, as well as the variable measuring an unconditioned form of soli-
darity (“it is our moral duty to help”), except for refugees support. In this 
latter instance, believing in an unconditioned form of solidarity towards EU 
countries in need increases the odds of supporting refugees (with p at 5%).
The fact that people supporting refugees have an unconditioned con-
ception of solidarity is confirmed when migrants’ entitlements to social 
benefits are taken into account: with respect to the reference category 
(granting access to social benefits and services immediately on arrival), 
both requisites of working/paying taxes and citizenship decrease in a sig-
nificant way the odds of supporting refugees. Conversely, such dummies 
are not statistically significant for unemployed and disabled support, 
except citizenship-related conditionality that decreases the odds of sup-
porting the unemployed with p at 1%. In addition, a tenuous form of 
conditionality (granting rights after living in Italy for a year) increases the 
odds of supporting of all target groups, especially the disabled (p at 1%). 
In this regard, a tenuous form of conditionality is a factor that somehow 
distinguishes solidarity with different target groups, but in general the 
absence of conditionality is a factor favouring practices of solidarity, and 
people against the integration of migrants are very unlikely to be engaged 
in solidarity actions, regardless of the target group (p at 0.1%).
Considering children as reference category, we notice that citing one of 
our target groups as the preferred charity group strongly increases the 
odds of supporting such a group. This occurs especially for the least pre-
ferred group by respondents, that is, migrants. Indeed, regardless of the 
target group, this dummy is always significant, and odds ratios are all very 
high. This means that a pro-migrants attitude helps solidarity actions in 
general. Finally, there is a difference between our target groups. Concerning 
support for refugees, deservingness plays a role only for migrants and refu-
gees dummies (with respect to children). Conversely, as for unemployed 
support, all dummies are significant (except refugees). As for disabled sup-




Finally, we have built a full model including all independent variables 
(except those that were not significant for any of the target groups) in 
order to see if previous results are confirmed when controlling for differ-
ent blocks of independent variables (see Table 6.14). This model provides 
better goodness-of-fit statistics compared to previous models: it explains 
18% of the variance for support of refugees, 12% for unemployed support, 
and 9% for disabled support. Furthermore, AIC and BIC coefficients are 
definitely lower (and thus better) compared to separated models.
The full model shows also some important differences compared to 
separated models. First, gender and education are no longer significant for 
any of the target groups. Therefore, basic socio-demographic  characteristics 
are not explanatory factors of solidarity practices, except for age in the 
unemployment and disability field. Ageing significantly increases the odds 
of supporting the disabled, whereas decreases the odds of supporting the 
unemployed (p at 5%). It has been shown that younger and older citizens 
are more active in social movements, according to different levels of “bio-
graphical availability” in the life course (Beyerlein and Bergstrand 2013).
Secondly, social class in the full model has lost predictive power. Only 
being middle class is significant (with p at 5%) for refugees and disabled 
support, with a negative effect compared to the reference category (upper/
upper middle class).
Thirdly, the variable that measures the absence of conditionality for fis-
cal solidarity among EU member states (“moral duty to help”) is no lon-
ger significant for refugees support.
In general, however, the full model confirms previous results regarding 
social capital, political interest, religiosity, conditionality, and deservingness.
First of all, for each target group, both measures of social capital (social 
trust and frequency of social connections with friends) are still significant, 
except social trust for unemployed support. Significance is always very 
high with p at 0.1%, except social trust for disabled support with p at 5%. 
Furthermore, these variables show high odds ratios: higher levels of social 
trust and social connections increase the odds of engaging in solidarity 
actions. This occurs in particular as regards social trust with respect to sup-
port for refugees and the frequency of social connections for disabled sup-
port: one unit increase in trust in others increases 3.6 times the odds of 
supporting refugees, and one unit increase in frequency of meeting with 
friends increases around three times the odds of supporting the disabled. 
Therefore, our first hypothesis is confirmed: the more an individual is 
socially embedded and trustworthy of others (the more her/his social 
capital), the more she/he will support people in need (regardless who are 
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these people in need). This is line with previous research that has shown 
the importance of social capital for solidarity (Putnam et al. 2003; Jenkins 
1983; Bourdieu 1986). Indeed, solidarity actions are positively linked to 
social capital because a high level of interpersonal trust fosters cooperation 
among individuals and a good frequency of social connections give people 
access to a wider range of possible support in times of need, producing 
positive outcomes at a community level (Halpern 2005).
Regarding political factors, the level of cognitive political involvement 
as measured by interest in politics is a significant variable fostering the 
odds of being involved in solidarity actions, regardless of the aided group 
(with high odds ratios between 1.9 and 2.8). The other measure of politi-
cal involvement (party attachment) is still significant for unemployed sup-
port (p at 1%) and for refugees support (p at 5%). This confirms our 
hypothesis that political factors are more related to solidarity towards the 
unemployed and refugees than to disabled support. Political involvement 
in terms of interest in politics and party attachment is often associated with 
civic engagement (Scrivens and Smith 2013). The latter is another ele-
ment that can help individuals to develop their skills and social values 
(such as trust in others), and, consequently, it can foster solidarity (Putnam 
et al. 1994).
Nevertheless, an important difference emerges when political factors 
are controlled for other blocks of independent variables. Indeed, as regards 
refugees support, the libertarian-authoritarian index is still significant, 
whereas the left-right self-placement is no longer significant compared to 
previous separated model for political variables (Model B). Ideological 
orientations in terms of left and right are not important predictors of soli-
darity practices in Italy for any of our target groups, contrary to our expec-
tations based on previous literature (Likki and Staerklé 2014). Conversely, 
according to our expectations, political values in terms of authoritarian 
and libertarian attitudes foster solidarity actions towards a specific target 
group like refugees. This confirms that migrants-related issues are divisive 
issues that are strongly politicised by right-wing populist parties like the 
Northern League in order to gain votes (Mudde 2011). Indeed, voters of 
these parties are often characterised by both authoritarian values on social 
issues and leftist orientations on economic issues. This also confirms that 
the libertarian-authoritarian dimension is something different from the 
traditional left-right dimension, bringing a new set of culture war issues 
onto the political agenda (Flanagan and Lee 2003). One of these new 
cultural issues is precisely the migration issue.
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As for traditional cultural orientations, it is conversely confirmed that 
religiosity is a very good predictor of involvement in solidarity actions, 
regardless of the target group. Indeed, it is always very significant (with p 
at 0.1% or at 1%), and odds ratios are high (between 2.2 and 2.7). 
Definitely, we can say that Italian religious people are more likely to be 
engaged in solidarity actions. This confirms our expectation based on 
scholarly writing (Abela 2004; Stegmueller et al. 2012; Lichterman 2015), 
which has shown the importance of religiosity to explain different levels of 
solidarity.
With regard to conditionality for migrants’ entitlements to social ben-
efits, previous results are generally confirmed: people against the integra-
tion of migrants are very unlikely to be engaged in solidarity actions, 
regardless of the target group, even if this occurs especially for actions in 
favour of refugees and unemployed people (p at 0.1%). Furthermore, both 
requisites of working/paying taxes and citizenship decrease in a significant 
way the odds of supporting refugees. Conversely, such dummies are not 
statistically significant for support of other target groups, except the req-
uisite of citizenship that also significantly decreases the odds of supporting 
unemployed people. Furthermore, this time a tenuous form of condition-
ality (granting rights after living in Italy for a year) increases only the odds 
of supporting the disabled. In this regard, we can say that in general the 
absence of conditionality is a factor favouring practices of solidarity, espe-
cially those towards refugees, whereas people involved in solidarity prac-
tices towards the disabled share a tenuous form of conditionality as regards 
migrants’ entitlements to social benefits. Our hypothesis is therefore con-
firmed: the more an individual conceive solidarity in universalistic terms 
without perceptions of reciprocity and conditionality, the more she/he 
will support refugees.
Regarding deservingness, once again, citing one of our target groups as 
the preferred charity group strongly increases the odds of supporting such 
a group. Thus, deservingness is definitely a factor fostering solidarity 
actions in favour of a specific group considered as worth receiving help 
(Oorshot 2000, 2006), confirming our expectation. Nevertheless, people 
engaged in solidarity actions are more likely to have positive dispositions 
not only towards the group they are supporting. This is true especially for 
people engaged in solidarity actions towards the unemployed: the odds of 
supporting the unemployed do not depend on a specific preferred charity 
group. Indeed, all dummies are significant, as previously seen in Model 
C.  Furthermore, once again, a pro-migrants attitude helps solidarity 
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actions in general (albeit to a lesser extent when support towards the dis-
abled is taken into consideration). In previous section, we showed that for 
Italian respondents, migrants are definitely the group less deserving of 
charity donations. Therefore, we can argue that people mentioning 
migrants as the preferred charity group are those who share universalistic 
conceptions of solidarity (i.e. solidarity towards the humankind, not 
towards a specific target group) and consequently are more likely to sup-
port needy people in general, regardless of their ethnic, social, or physical 
characteristics, as confirmed by our data.
conclusIons
This chapter aimed to deepen knowledge on solidarity in Italy by provid-
ing fresh empirical analyses on solidarity practices with respect to three 
target groups (the disabled, the unemployed, and refugees) and to explain 
such solidarity actions with reference to social traits of the respondents, 
their beliefs, and their political preferences. This study was needed for 
substantial and theoretical reasons. As regards the first aspect, solidarity is 
at the centre of the public debate in European societies, drawing the atten-
tion of the media, policy-makers, and ordinary citizens. Enduring conflicts 
among EU member states about financial solidarity with indebted states 
and a fair burden-sharing in regard to the high numbers of refugees, as 
well as the rise of xenophobic and populist parties in most European coun-
tries, unveil that solidarity is highly contested not only at interstate level 
but also among European citizens. In this regard, Italy is a relevant case 
study to explain factors which can strengthen (or inhibit) solidarity actions, 
because the country in the last years has faced two different crises: the 
global financial crisis of 2008 that hit hard on Southern European coun-
tries and the refugee crisis that since 2014 particularly affected a country 
positioned at the centre of several migration routes in the Mediterranean 
Sea. It is evident that in such a difficult landscape, solidarity is particularly 
under pressure. Hence, understanding factors that foster (or inhibit) soli-
darity actions towards vulnerable groups that have been strongly affected 
by different crises can help to shed new light on the most important trig-
gers of interpersonal solidarity in general (working even in contexts of 
crisis and welfare state retrenchment).
From a theoretical standpoint, previous research has provided a variety 
of insights, even though it was marked by a number of limitations. First, 
previous empirical research has privileged the attitudinal dimension of 
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solidarity, describing and explaining the disposition to help. Less attention 
has been paid to the explanation of solidarity practices. Second, much 
research has focused on public support of redistributive policies (Alesina 
and Giuliano 2011; Amat and Wibbels 2009; Fong 2001; Rehm 2009), 
but less knowledge was available in regard to interpersonal forms of soli-
darity. Furthermore, previous studies have not addressed solidarity-related 
issues in a systematic manner, focusing only on specific explanatory fac-
tors: some have focused on social capital (Putnam et  al. 2003; Jenkins 
1983), others on social beliefs like perceptions of deservingness (Oorschot 
2000, 2006), others on religiosity (Abela 2004; Stegmueller et al. 2012; 
Lichterman 2015), others on political preferences (Likki and Staerklé 
2014), and so on. This study has permitted to fill this gap, providing a 
comprehensive explanation of social, political, and attitudinal triggers of 
solidarity practices towards specific groups of needy people.
Throughout the chapter, first we have provided a general picture of a 
variety of solidarity attitudes and practices in Italy in times of crises; sec-
ondly, we have investigated the (different) determinants of solidarity activ-
ities towards the three target groups.
The picture of the solidarity activities’ context shows that Italians are 
open to solidarity even in times of crises and this entails to some extent 
other Europeans and non-Europeans. Furthermore, Italian citizens sup-
port the typical redistributive policies of the European social model. 
Nevertheless, this social model remains strictly linked to the traditional 
nation state. Indeed, solidarity has a strong political element: it requires, 
in first instance, that the targets of solidarity are part of the (national) 
community in terms of citizenship. This citizenship, however, is not a 
purely formal status but requires shared rights and obligations. Indeed, 
our findings suggest that most citizens are sceptical about a universalistic 
and humanitarian conception of solidarity (i.e. solidarity towards human 
being as such) that entails unconditional solidarity. Overall, for most citi-
zens, solidarity is rights based and thus tied to the notion of citizenship, 
that is, delimited by legal entitlements and mutual obligations (such as 
receiving social benefits and paying taxes or contributions). Moreover, 
groups receiving help need to show that they are worth being helped.
Regarding target groups, the disability field is the most “crowded” field 
in terms of solidarity engagement, involving around half of respondents. If 
we look at the different types of solidarity practices, political protest- oriented 
activities are carried out especially in favour of the unemployed, whereas the 
other two fields seem to be less contentious, especially the disability field. 
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Indeed, charity behaviour definitely characterises solidarity actions towards 
the disabled. As regards solidarity towards refugees, after the charity behav-
iour of donating money, the most frequent activity is a relatively more politi-
cal one, that is, buying or refusing to buy products in support to the goals 
in favour of refugees. Furthermore, the descriptive analysis shows that soli-
darity towards refugees displays some specificities compared to solidarity 
towards other groups: it is more dependent on personal skills, resources, 
and social status, selfless, and linked to leftist/libertarian values.
As far as the explanatory analysis of the determinants of solidarity activi-
ties towards target groups is concerned, findings show that solidarity is a 
multifaceted phenomenon and its practices can be fostered by a variety of 
factors: social, political, attitudinal. Hence, focusing only on one kind of 
these factors would be quite limiting and not sufficient to understand the 
complexity of reasons underlying the individual choices to support others 
in need (or, conversely, to not support others). In addition, our analysis 
shows that there are not only general triggers of solidarity practices but 
also explanatory factors that are related to specific target groups. As regards 
similarities between target groups, the most important factors fostering 
solidarity practices in Italy are social capital, religiosity, cognitive political 
involvement, and deservingness. Our main hypotheses based on previous 
research have been confirmed: Italians are more likely involved in solidar-
ity activities (regardless of the target group) when they trust in others 
and/or have frequent social connections, are religious, and consider the 
group they are supporting as worth being helped. Another key lesson can 
be drawn from our analysis: cognitive political involvement measured by 
interest in politics is another important factor favouring solidarity activi-
ties, regardless of the target group. We can argue that this can be the sig-
nal, once again, of the importance of social embeddedness. Indeed, people 
interested in politics are usually individuals characterised by a high level of 
social resources and civic engagement (Scrivens and Smith 2013). The lat-
ter is another element that can help individuals to develop their social capi-
tal, and, consequently, it can foster solidarity (Putnam et al. 1994).
As regards group-specific triggers of solidarity, our hypothesis that politi-
cal factors play a more important role for refugees and unemployed support 
compared to disabled support has been confirmed. This finding can be 
explained by the fact that solidarity towards the disabled is not a contested 
issue in the Italian context and most of the people engaged in disability 
organisations are not motivated by ideological-political objectives but by 
philanthropic or personal reasons (for instance, many disability organisations 
in Italy are composed by people with disabilities and/or their families).
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Furthermore, as expected, libertarian values foster solidarity actions 
towards refugees. Nevertheless, contrary to our expectations, left-right 
ideology does not matter when controlled for other variables. This also 
confirms the specificity of the libertarian-authoritarian dimension com-
pared to the traditional left-right dimension and the importance of new 
cultural issues (e.g. migration) for contentious politics (Flanagan and Lee 
2003). This is particularly important for a country (Italy) that has faced in 
the last years both economic turmoil and refugee crisis: right-wing populist 
parties like Northern League (Mudde 2011) have mobilised more on the 
libertarian-authoritarian dimension than on the economic left-right divide 
in order to gain votes among the lower classes by using migrants as scape-
goating of their fears and economic distress. Therefore, solidarity towards 
refugees entails political commitment to libertarian values as opposed to 
authoritarian stances. The fact that solidarity with the unemployed does 
not separate people with different political orientations in terms of left and 
right, conversely, can be explained by the over- representation of the Five 
Star Movement voters among people supporting the unemployed. 
According to several studies, indeed, the Five Star Movement is a web-
populist party (Corbetta and Gualmini 2013) that cross-cuts the traditional 
left-right dimension (Maggini 2014; Tronconi 2015).
Finally, another key finding emerges from what has been said so far: soli-
darity towards refugees shows more specific explanatory factors compared to 
support for other disadvantaged groups. It is more bounded by political 
orientations, as above mentioned, and at the same time is clearly an uncon-
ditioned form of solidarity. Indeed, it is closely tied to social beliefs like 
absence of conditionality as regards granting migrants the entitlements to 
social benefits and services. Conversely, people supporting the disabled are 
more likely to agree with a tenuous form of conditionality as for migrants’ 
access to social benefits. According to our respondents, refugees and 
migrants, among our target groups, are those less deserving of charity dona-
tions, whereas the disabled is the most preferred group. Consequently, we 
can argue that solidarity towards refugees entails a more selfless and univer-
salistic conception of solidarity compared to solidarity towards disadvantaged 
groups (e.g. the disabled) that are considered by the majority of society as 
worth being helped. In other words, support for refugees can be considered 
as a specific aspect of solidarity with human beings as such. It should be 
added that, according to our data, people against the integration of migrants 
are very unlikely to be engaged in solidarity actions, regardless of the field, 
and people who mention migrants as preferred charity group for donation 
are more likely to carry out solidarity activities in favour of all target groups.
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notes
1. The initiative was unilaterally launched and financed by the Italian govern-
ment in October 2013 and ended in December 2014 to rescue migrants in 
the Mediterranean.
2. Weights have been used for all analyses.
3. In particular, we have run a principal component factor (PCF) analysis 
including variables measuring respondents’ opinions on 0–10 agreement 
scales linked to several values-related issues: on “women career” versus 
“children care”, on “freedom of abortion” versus “prohibition of abor-
tion”, on “child adoption for homosexuals” versus “prohibiting child adop-
tion”, on “tougher sentences to fight crime” versus “tougher sentences 
bring nothing”, on “parenting authority” versus “child independent judge-
ment”. We detected just one statically significant dimension. Factor loadings 
were particularly high (between 0.85 and 0.93) for all items and the reli-
ability scale was very high (alpha test 0.93). Hence, relying on the five 
above-mentioned items, it is possible to build an additive index of libertarian 
values.
4. The Democratic Party is in government with minor allies since 2013.
5. This variable measures how religious the respondent is on a scale from 0 to 
10, where 0 stands for “not at all religious” and 10 for “very religious”. This 
variable has been recoded in order to make cross-tabulations more readable 
by classifying values between 0 and 4 as “not religious”, 5 as “neutral”, and 
values between 6 and 10 as “religious”.
6. In order to select independent variables, we have looked at the bivariate 
Pearson’s correlations between variables introduced in the previous section 
for cross-tabulations. According to the strength of the associations (Cohen 
1988), we have excluded some variables (e.g. income level, voting choices) 
in order to avoid items picking up on the same covariance component. 
Finally, before running logistic regression models, independent variables 
have been normalised trough rescaling.
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CHAPTER 7




Forced displacement hit a record high in 2015 (UNHCR 2016). 
Worldwide, 65.3 million individuals—including refugees, internally dis-
placed people and asylum seekers—were forcibly displaced1 due to per-
secution, conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations. 
Over four million people have been displaced by the conflict in Syria, 
while we have seen rapid increase in refugees/asylum seekers from 
African countries affected by war and violence. Consequently, European 
countries have struggled to cope with the influx of people and how to 
deal with resettling them (UNHCR 2016).
According to FRONTEX,2 the main migratory routes into Europe 
through the Mediterranean include the Western Mediterranean route to 
Spain, the Central Mediterranean route to Italy and the Eastern 
Mediterranean route to Greece. By the beginning of 2015, the main 
gateway to Europe was through the Central Mediterranean route; how-
ever, by the end of 2015, the total number of registered arrivals of 
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refugees/asylum seekers in Greece reached the record figure of 821,000. 
The bulk of the flow was directed towards the Greek islands bordering 
Turkey (IOM 2015).3 The large-scale arrival of refugees/asylum seekers 
and the resulting transformation of the migrant landscape in the country 
have challenged Greeks to cope with a dual crisis: the current refugee 
crisis as well as the economic depression which has severely affected the 
country over the last six years.
While the European response has been characterized by confusion and 
lack of universal policy (Tramountanis 2017) and traditional donors 
delayed funding, thousands of ordinary people have joined efforts to pro-
vide services and support to refugees/asylum seekers arriving to Greek 
shores. The role of volunteers in responding to the refugee crisis has been 
remarkable. Volunteers have provided a plethora of solidarity activities 
including food supplies, collecting and sorting clothes, providing medical 
aid, legal and financial support, rescuing people from the sea, cooking, 
setting up laundries, building shelters and so on (Evangelinidis 2016; 
Gkionakis 2016; Latimir 2016). Several media reports emphasize that 
despite the acute economic crisis, volunteers in Greece have stepped into 
covering for the gap left by the Greek state and EU leaders to support for 
refugees’ humanitarian needs.4,5
Previous research has consistently underpinned the lower levels of vol-
unteering in Greece (e.g. European Commission 2007, 2010, 2011) 
along with a weaker civil society (Mouzelis 1995; Lyrintzis 2002) com-
pared to other European countries. Despite such arguments, other schol-
ars emphasize that there is a vibrant, informal, non-institutionalized and 
often non-registered Greek civil society sector which does not fall into the 
normative definitions (Karamichas 2007; Rozakou 2011). This informal 
civil society usually tends to be distant from the state and primarily aims to 
protect vested interests in specific local areas or volunteer to help people 
in need (Sotiropoulos 2004).
The main rationale of the chapter is to explore volunteering for refu-
gees/asylum seekers which is defined in the present study as active 
membership in an organization (volunteering in an organization) to 
support the rights of refugees/asylum seekers in Greece. Greece 
becomes an interesting case of investigating volunteering for the spe-
cific vulnerable group as in the context of the recent refugee crisis the 
country has experienced an unprecedented influx of refugees/asylum 
seekers entering its territory en route to wealthier countries. Moreover, 
S. KALOGERAKI
 171
as shown in Table  7.1, volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers is 
higher in Greece (8.1%) compared to other countries participating in 
TransSOL project. However, despite its higher prevalence cross-
nationally, in Greece fewer individuals volunteer for refugees/asylum 
seekers than for other vulnerable groups such as the unemployed 
(9.3%) and disabled (10.3%).
Although past international research has produced numerous and 
valuable insights into volunteering, the domain of volunteering specifi-
cally for refugees/asylum seekers has been little explored. Exceptions 
involve Erickson’s study (Erickson 2012) in Fargo, North Dakota, 
during 2007–2008, which investigates how volunteers embrace and 
contest hegemonic forms of “worthy” citizenship. A study conducted 
in Hungary shows that the current refugee crisis has a strong mobiliz-
ing effect for almost 3% of the Hungarian population; some volunteers 
have altruistic motivations, whilst others are mainly driven as a response 
to the political situation (Toth and Kertesz 2016). In Germany, recent 
empirical evidence underpins that since 2015 volunteering for refu-
gees/asylum seekers has become a widespread phenomenon with thou-
sands of people donating money and distributing food, medicines, 
clothing and other essentials (Karakayali and Kleist 2015, 2016; Rose 
2016).
The recent explosion of refugees/asylum seekers fleeing conflict and 
persecution and the pivotal role of volunteers to tackle the refugee crisis 
Table 7.1 Volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers, unemployed and disabled 
in countries participating to TransSOL project
Country Volunteering for refugees/





Denmark 93 (4.3) 122 (5.6) 126 (5.8)
France 61 (2.9) 71 (3.4) 107 (5.1)
Germany 129 (6.3) 101 (4.9) 155 (7.5)
Greece 166 (8.1) 192 (9.3) 212 (10.3)
Italy 117 (5.6) 129 (6.2) 173 (8.3)
Poland 58 (2.7) 98 (4.6) 189 (8.9)
Switzerland 105 (4.7) 100 (4.5) 157 (7.1)
United 
Kingdom
53 (2.5) 53 (2.6) 105 (5.1)
Notes: Data weighted
 VOLUNTEERING FOR REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN GREECE 
172 
has led to a drastic increase of scientific interest in the field. Although the 
other chapters in the book explore different forms of civic engagement, 
activism or “solidarity” practices to different vulnerable groups,6 the pres-
ent chapter focuses on volunteering specifically for refugees/asylum seek-
ers in Greece. Based on a hybrid approach which combines the sociological 
and political approaches to volunteering, the analysis is guided by the 
research question of “Who volunteers for refugees/asylum seekers in 
Greece?” The findings shed some light on our research question by por-
traying the profiles of volunteers helping refugees/asylum seekers arriving 
in the country.
theoretIcal Background and hypotheses
Volunteering embraces different functions and explanations in differ-
ent disciplines (Musick and Wilson 2008; Hustinx et  al. 2010). For 
instance, sociological approaches emphasize different forms of capital 
or resources, such as human, social and cultural capital in explaining 
volunteering (Wilson and Musick 1997a; Wilson 2000). Psychologists 
focus on key traits of personality such as extraversion, agreeableness 
and resilience that impact on individuals’ predisposition to volunteer 
(Bekkers 2005; Matsuba et  al. 2007). For political scientists, volun-
teering acts as a critical form of civic engagement and an expression of 
democratic values (Theiss- Morse and Hibbing 2005), underlying the 
critical impact of citizens’ political engagement on volunteering 
(Bekkers 2005). Economic scientists adopt a rational-based approach, 
viewing volunteering as a form of unpaid labour where volunteers 
undertake activity depending on the  consuming resources and the 
rewards they may gain (Wilson 2000; Musick and Wilson 2008; 
Hustinx et al. 2010; Wilson 2012).
The present paper adopts a hybrid approach. It explores the profiles of 
individuals volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers in Greece based on 
their demographic attributes, their human, social and cultural capital 
developed in sociological approaches and their political conventional and 
unconventional behaviours developed in political approaches.
Literature has shown that, generally, people with different demographic 
characteristics vary in their propensities to volunteer (Wilson 2000; 
Musick and Wilson 2008; Hustinx et al. 2010). With respect to gender, 
previous research shows different rates and patterns of volunteering 
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(Wilson 2012). Gaskin and Smith (1997) suggest there is no clear pattern 
of gender differences in volunteering across European countries. However, 
other scholars suggest that gender does make a difference in specific 
domains of volunteering, since women tend to have higher rates in infor-
mal volunteering activities associated with more caring tasks and lower 
rates in political activities (Thompson 1993; Schlozman et  al. 1994; 
Cnaan et al. 1996; Rochester et al. 2010). This pattern appears quite con-
sistent across different age groups and countries (Wuthnow 1995). 
Gender ideologies, as well as the gendered division of labour, partly 
explain why women tend to volunteer more in activities associated with 
caring tasks (Wilson 2000).
Age-related variables are also important in determining volunteering. 
Some scholars underpin that voluntary participation varies by age or life- 
cycle stage associated with the different adult roles (e.g. with work, fam-
ily obligations) taken throughout the life cycle (Wilson 2000; Musick 
and Wilson 2008; Smith and Wang 2016). The empirical evidence shows 
that volunteering is generally higher among middle-aged citizens com-
pared to the elderly and youth (Wymer 1998; Curtis et al. 2001; Pho 
2008). However, Wilson (2000) argues that high-risk volunteering 
activities primarily attract younger people compared to older people. 
Moreover, he suggests that different types of volunteering activities 
become more or less attractive in different life-cycle stages. For instance, 
younger citizens mainly volunteer in organizations related to self- and 
career-oriented activism, middle-aged volunteers primarily engage in 
community- oriented work, whereas older volunteers participate to “ser-
vice organizations, recreational clubs and agencies to help the elderly” 
(Wilson 2000, p. 227).
A plethora of scholars emphasize that, at least in advanced industrial 
societies, education is often the most consistent predictor of volunteering 
(Brady et  al. 1995; Nie et  al. 1996; Wilson 2000, 2012; Musick and 
Wilson 2008; Huang et al. 2009; Rochester et al. 2010; Van Ingen and 
Dekker 2011). The critical impact of education on volunteering is associ-
ated with the outcomes of educational processes that expose individuals to 
norms and values favourable to volunteering as well as to civic skills, 
advanced awareness of problems and stronger feelings of efficacy.
From a sociological perspective, individuals’ decision to volunteer is 
influenced by various types of resources or capital, such as human capital, 
cultural capital and social capital (Wilson and Musick 1997a; Wilson 
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and Musick 1998; Wilson 2000; Musick and Wilson 2008). Human capi-
tal primarily involves income, occupational class and employment status 
(Wilson and Musick 1997a; Wilson 2000). Most empirical evidence across 
different countries reports that low-income earners are less likely to volun-
teer than higher earners (Vaillancourt 1994; Freeman 1997; Hurley et al. 
2008). For instance, Pho (2008) explored volunteering in the United 
States from 2002 to 2005 and found that low- to medium-wage earners 
are less likely to volunteer than high-wage earners.
Whether or not someone is employed and the nature of their employ-
ment can influence volunteering in several ways. Employment is a prime 
determinant of social status, it provides opportunities to integrate into 
society and develop those adequate civic skills that increase the likelihood 
of volunteering. The relation between employment status and volunteer-
ing has been explored by various scholars, underlying that part-time 
employees are more likely to volunteer than either full-time employees or 
individuals who are not in the labour force (Johnson et al. 2004; Lasby 
2004; Low et  al. 2007; Hurley et  al. 2008; Einolf 2011). Meanwhile, 
unemployment status is usually associated with lower levels of volunteer-
ing (Pho 2008; Wilson 2012).
In Wilson’s (2000, p. 221) words: “As occupational status increases 
so does the likelihood of volunteering.” Occupational status has been 
shown to play a critical role in volunteering (Wilson and Musick 1997b; 
Hodgkinson 2003; Rotolo and Wilson 2007). For instance, Reed and 
Selbee (2001) found that individuals in Canada with jobs high in occu-
pational prestige, higher income and higher educational attainment are 
more likely to volunteer. Similarly, Rotolo and Wilson (2007) show 
that even after controlling for family traits, women with professional 
and managerial occupations exhibit greater tendencies to volunteer 
than women in lower occupational jobs. The association between vol-
unteering and high occupational prestige is related to the fact that top 
managers or professionals are more likely to be asked to volunteer as 
well as to be socially active as part of their job role (Wilson 2000; 
Wilson and Musick 1997b).
For Putnam (2000, p.  19), social capital refers to “social networks 
and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them”. 
The key resources that form “social capital” involve social networks or 
social ties, including friendship networks as well as trust in others, that 
is, elements which tend to foster collective action (Wilson and Musick 
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1997a). Much research has been conducted on social capital in recent 
years, in particular measured as individuals’ friendship networks, infor-
mal social interactions and social trust, as correlates of volunteering. For 
instance, Wilson and Musick (1997a) found a positive association 
between formal volunteering and informal social interactions measured 
as frequent conversations and meetings with friends and acquaintances. 
Brown and Ferris (2007) found that individuals’ associational networks, 
their trust in others and in their community are important determinants 
of giving and volunteering. Cross-national surveys underpin that social 
trust is positively associated with volunteering regardless of socio-eco-
nomic differences (Anheier and Kendall 2002). It should be noted that 
some scholars underline that social trust is associated with specific types 
of volunteering activities which primarily target to provide services to 
individuals in need. On the contrary, trusting people are “less likely to 
volunteer in activities that involve confrontation with authorities or 
working to change the system” (Musick and Wilson 2008, p. 46). In line 
with such arguments, Greenberg (2001) supports that politically ori-
ented volunteering associated with government-related activities, among 
others, is motivated by lack of social trust, whereas service-oriented vol-
unteering including non-governmental activism is motivated by trust in 
others.
In Wilson and Musick’s (1997a) integrated theory of volunteer 
work, religiosity is an indicator of cultural capital which is positively 
associated with formal volunteering. A cultural capital perspective pos-
its that religiosity provides an ethic of caring which reinforces the deci-
sion to volunteer (Wuthnow 2004). As most religions encourage 
altruistic values, highly religious individuals are more concerned with 
the welfare of others (Dillon et al. 2003); therefore their value prefer-
ences are more compatible with volunteering. Previous research under-
pins that more religious individuals are more likely to be involved in 
volunteering than their secular counterparts (Wilson and Janoski 1995; 
Becker and Dhingra 2001; Musick and Wilson 2008; McNamara and 
Gonzales 2011).
The political approach to volunteering highlights its role as a form of 
civic engagement and expression of democratic values. Putnam argues that 
“volunteering is part of the syndrome of good citizenship and political 
involvement” (Putnam 2000, p. 132). Different scholars report that vol-
unteers tend to be more politically active compared to non-volunteers 
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(Verba et al. 1995; Dekker and Van den Broek 1998; Hodgkinson 2003; 
Musick and Wilson 2008). The grounds of the association between volun-
teering and political engagement involve, among others, the opportunity 
to develop specific civic skills (such as the ability to organize a meeting), 
sharing information and fostering general trust (Verba et al. 1995; Stolle 
1998).
Hodgkinson (2003), in her study using EVS/WVS 1999–2002 data, 
found that volunteers are more likely to be politically engaged (in terms of 
discussing politics and signing petitions) than non-volunteers in the vast 
majority of the countries under study.7 Dekker and Van den Broek (1996), 
using data from five countries (the United States, Great Britain, West 
Germany, Italy and Mexico), found that active volunteers compared to 
passive volunteers8 are more likely to be politically engaged in conven-
tional and unconventional political acts (such as contributing time to 
political organizations, participation to protests/demonstrations, etc.).9 
Bekkers’ (2005) study in the Netherlands shows that individuals with a 
greater interest in politics and post-materialistic value orientations are 
more likely to be volunteers—also, voting preferences are important since 
non-voters are less likely to volunteer than voters who prefer leftist or 
Christian political parties. Similarly, Knoke (1990) found that active vol-
unteering goes along with being active in local politics, including among 
others, voting in local elections.
Drawing on the theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence dis-
cussed, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1 Individuals with specific demographic attributes, that is, 
women, middle-aged and higher educated individuals, are more likely to 
volunteer for refugees/asylum seekers.
Hypothesis 2 Individuals’ human capital in terms of higher income and 
occupational class is positively associated with volunteering for refugees/
asylum seekers. Moreover, part-time employees are more likely to volun-
teer than either full-time employees or individuals who are not in the 
labour force.
Hypothesis 3 Individuals’ social capital, in terms of social trust and infor-
mal social interactions with friends, is positively associated with volunteer-
ing for refugees/asylum seekers.
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Hypothesis 4 Individuals’ cultural capital, in terms of religiosity, is posi-
tively associated with volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers.
Hypothesis 5 Individuals’ political engagement in conventional and uncon-
ventional political behaviours is positively associated with volunteering for 
refugees/asylum seekers.
data and Methods
The analysis draws on an original dataset of n  =  2061 respondents 
(aged 18+) in Greece matched for age, gender, region and education 
level quotas to national population statistics. To explore the profiles of 
individuals volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers, specific items 
from the project’s questionnaire are used. The dependent variable, that 
is, volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers, is measured with one 
item asking respondents, among others,10 their active membership in 
an organization (volunteering in an organization) to support the rights 
of refugees/asylum seekers. The dichotomous variable is used to cap-
ture volunteering and non-volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers in 
Greece.
The independent variables involve a set of items capturing demo-
graphic characteristics, including gender, age and education, measures 
of human, cultural and social capital as well as individuals’ political 
behaviour.11 Age is measured with an ordinal scale including three 
broad age groups, that is, 18–34, 35–54 and over 55  years old. 
Educational attainment is measured with three responses capturing 
individuals with higher education (i.e. university and above), interme-
diate education (i.e. upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 
education) and lower education (i.e. less than primary and lower sec-
ondary education).
Human capital is measured with indicators capturing respondents’ 
income, employment status and occupational class. Income is mea-
sured with an item asking respondents for their household monthly net 
income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources. The 
recoded variable includes three responses measuring lower (i.e. less 
than 775 euro), middle (i.e. between 776 and 1425 euro) and higher 
income earners (i.e. more than 1426 euro). Respondents’ occupational 
class is measured with a recoded variable including three responses: 
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higher occupational class (professional/managerial workers), middle 
(clerical/sales or services/foreman or supervisor of other workers) and 
low (skilled/semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers) occupational 
class. Respondents’ employment status is measured with a recoded 
variable including four responses: full- time employee, part-time 
employee, other employment status (such as permanently sick or dis-
abled, retired, community or military service, doing housework, look-
ing after children or other persons) and unemployed.
Social capital is measured with indicators associated with respondents’ 
social trust and informal social interactions. The former is captured with one 
item measuring on a scale from 0 to 10 respondents’ level of trustfulness of 
people, where higher scores indicate higher levels of social trust. The inten-
sity of informal social interactions is measured with one item asking respon-
dents how often, in the past month, they met socially with friends not living 
in their household. The recoded variable is a dichotomous measure includ-
ing “Once or twice this month or less” and “Every week or almost every 
day”. The former captures respondents’ low intensity of informal social 
interactions and the latter high intensity of informal social interactions.
Cultural capital is measured with one item capturing religiosity. 
Specifically, respondents are asked to report on a scale from 0 to 10 how 
religious they are, with higher scores indicating stronger religiosity.
Political engagement is measured with items capturing involvement in 
conventional and unconventional political behaviours. The former is 
measured with a question asking respondents if they voted or not in the 
last Greek national election (on 20 September 2015). The recoded 
dichotomous variable captures respondents’ engagement or non-engage-
ment in conventional behaviours. Unconventional political behaviour is 
measured with an additive score based on responses on five items mea-
suring participation in the past 12 months in (a) signing petitions, (b) 
boycotting products for political/ethical/environmental reasons, (c) 
attending a demonstration, march or rally, (d) joining a strike and (e) 
joining an occupation, sit-in or blockade.12 In the composite index, 
higher scores indicate higher levels of respondents’ involvement in 
unconventional political behaviour.
The analysis uses exploratory and explanatory analyses to investigate 
volunteers’ profiles supporting refugees/asylum seekers in Greece. With 
respect to the former, the Chi-Square test of Independence and indepen-
dent sample t-test are used to determine associations and differences 
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between volunteers and non-volunteers in relation to the variables under 
study. Explanatory analysis involves the application of logistic regression 
to predict volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers (compared to non- 
volunteering) based on the variables measuring respondents’ demo-
graphic traits, human, social and cultural capital as well as political 
conventional and unconventional behaviours. The variables are entered 
into five blocks; the first includes items associated with demographics, 
the second with human capital, the third with social capital, the fourth 
with cultural capital and the last with political behaviours.
results
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 present Chi-Square test of Independence and inde-
pendent sample t-test results, respectively. As shown in Table 7.2, vol-
unteering is significantly associated with gender, age, occupational 
class, employment status and respondents’ informal interactions with 
friends. Specifically, more women (10.3%) than men (5.7%) volunteer 
for refugees/asylum seekers. A higher prevalence of volunteering is 
found for older age groups (i.e. more than 55 years old) (9.9%) and 
younger age groups (18–34  years old) (8.3%) compared to middle-
aged ones (6.2%). Moreover, individuals with higher education (14.1%) 
are more likely to volunteer for refugees/asylum seekers compared to 
individuals with intermediate (6.7%) or lower education (6.6%). With 
respect to income, middle-income earners (i.e. 776–1425 euro) have 
the highest prevalence of volunteering (9.2%), whereas low-income 
earners (i.e. less than 775 euro) the lowest one (5.9%). Volunteering is 
more popular among individuals of higher occupational class (i.e. in 
professional or managerial positions) (13.6%) than individuals of mid-
dle (7.9%) or lower occupational class (7.2%).
Part-time employees (10.2%) and individuals with other employment 
status (e.g. retired, housewives) (10.4%) have higher rates of volunteering 
compared to full-time employees (6.2%) or unemployed individuals 
(6.2%). Additionally, more frequent informal interactions with friends 
(9.5%) are positively associated with volunteering. Although volunteering 
is higher among individuals with specific conventional political behaviours 
such as voting (8.9%), the reported association is non-significant.
As shown in Table 7.3, the t-test analysis indicates significant differences 
in social trust and unconventional political behaviour between volunteers 
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and non-volunteers. Specifically, volunteers for refugees/asylum report 
higher scores in social trust (M = 4.62, SD = 2.75) and in unconventional 
political behaviour (M = 2.44, SD = 1.19) than non-volunteers. Moreover, 
the mean score of religiosity is lower among volunteers (M  =  5.46, 
SD  =  3.18) than non-volunteers (M  =  5.71, SD  =  3.10), however the 
reported difference is non-significant.
Table 7.2 Volunteers’/non-volunteers’ associations with specific demographic 











Gender Male 57 (5.7) 937 (94.3) 14,464 0.000
Female 110 (10.3) 957 (89.7)
Age groups 18–34 years old 40 (8.3) 441 (91.7) 7113 0.029
35–54 years old 50 (6.2) 752 (93.8)
More than 55 77(9.9) 702 (90.1)
Education Higher education 57 (14.1) 346 (85.9) 24,556 0.000
Intermediate 
education
49 (6.7) 684 (93.3)
Lower education 61 (6.6) 864 (93.4)
Income Low (less than 775) 39 (5.9) 617 (94.1) 5179 0.075
Middle (776–1425) 70 (9.2) 693 (90.8)
High (more than 
1426)
34 (7.9) 395 (92.1)
Occupational class Higher class 
(professional/
managerial)
66 (13.6) 418 (86.4) 14,346 0.001
Middle class 73 (7.9) 851 (92.1)
Lower class (manual 
workers)
21 (7.2) 272 (92.8)
Employment status Full-time 34 (6.2) 516 (93.8) 11,690 0.009
Part-time 22 (10.2) 194 (89.8)
Other 76 (10.4) 657 (89.6)




Once or twice this 
month or less
58 (6.3) 869 (93.7) 7351 0.007
Every week or 
almost everyday
108 (9.5) 1026 (90.5)
Conventional 
Political behaviour
No voting 22 (6.4) 323 (93.6) 2376 0.123




Table 7.4 presents the results from binary logistic regression models for 
predicting volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers in Greece. To test the 
hypothesis associated with demographic attributes (see Hypothesis 1), the 
first model includes gender, age and education, all of them significantly 
contribute on predicting volunteering. Volunteers, in line with our 
hypothesis, are more likely to be women. Similar results are reported in 
previous studies exploring volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers. For 
instance, research conducted in Germany shows that volunteers for refu-
gees are predominantly female (Karakayali and Kleist 2015, 2016). 
Likewise, in Erickson’s study (Erickson 2012), the majority of volunteers 
for refugees in Fargo are women.
The analysis shows that, that in line with our expectations and previous 
research (Wilson 2000, 2012; Musick and Wilson 2008; Rochester et al. 
2010; Van Ingen and Dekker 2011), educational attainment does play a 
critical role in volunteering as higher educated individuals in Greece are 
more likely to engage in volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers. 
Contradicting our hypothesis, volunteers are more likely to belong to 
younger age groups (i.e. 18–34-year-olds). Karakayali and Kleist’s (2015) 
study finds that volunteers for refugees are more likely to be either in their 
20s or over 60, indicating that past empirical evidence supporting that 
volunteering is more prevalent among middle-aged citizens (Wymer 1998; 
Curtis et al. 2001; Pho 2008) might not hold for the specific domain of 
volunteering.
To examine the hypothesis associated with human capital (see 
Hypothesis 2) income, occupational class and employment status are 




t-test 95% confidence interval 
of the difference
M SD M SD
Social trust 4.62 2.75 3.25 2.64 6.418*** 0.956 1.797
Religiosity 5.46 3.18 5.71 3.10 −1.003 −0.746 0.241
Unconventional political 
behaviour
2.44 1.19 1.84 1.00 4.672*** 0.344 0.851
M mean, SD std. deviation
+p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Data weighted
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Table 7.4 Binary logistic regression analysis of volunteering for refugees/asylum 
seekers in Greece
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included in the second model. The analysis shows that controlling for the 
demographic attributes under study, income and employment status do 
not significantly contribute on predicting volunteering. Only occupational 
class is associated with volunteering indicating that middle occupational 
class individuals are less likely to volunteer compared to those from the 
lowest occupational class (i.e. manual workers). Such findings contradict 
our hypothesis as well as previous research underlining that volunteering 
is more strongly supported among individuals with higher human capital, 
in terms of higher income and occupational class (Rotolo and Wilson 
2007; Hurley et al. 2008; Pho 2008).
To test the hypothesis associated with social capital (see Hypothesis 3), 
the indicators of social trust and informal social interactions with friends 
are included in the third model. In agreement with our hypothesis, social 
Table 7.4 (continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5









once—twice or less 
per month)
































Nagelkerke R2 0.098 0.145 0.183 0.183 0.251
Notes: The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure indicating the probability of volunteering (ref.: 
non-volunteering) for refugees/asylum seekers in Greece
Table presents logistic regression coefficients B with standard errors in parentheses
+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Data weighted
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capital and specifically social trust plays a critical role in volunteering since 
individuals’ social trust is positively associated with volunteering for refu-
gees/asylum seekers (Wilson and Musick 1997a; Brown and Ferries 
2007). Respondents’ intense informal social interactions (i.e. every week 
or almost every day) positively contribute to volunteering; however the 
reported association is significant at p < 0.10.
In the fourth model the indicator of cultural capital, that is, religiosity, 
is added. Contradicting our expectations (see Hypothesis 4), the analysis 
shows that religiosity is not associated with volunteering for refugees/
asylum seekers in Greece. Whilst non-significant, the negative sign of the 
religiosity coefficient provides some preliminary evidence of the negative 
association between religiosity and volunteering.
To examine the hypothesis associated with political behaviours (see 
Hypothesis 5), unconventional and conventional political behaviours are 
added in the final model. The former significantly contributes on predict-
ing volunteering, as unconventional political behaviour is associated with 
volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers (Verba et al. 1995; Dekker and 
Van den Broek 1998; Hodgkinson 2003; Bekkers 2005). Similar results 
are reported for the conventional political behaviour of voting; however, 
the reported association is non-significant.
conclusIons
Since 2015, the influx of refugees to Europe—primarily from North 
Africa in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and from the Middle East 
due to the civil war in Syria—has challenged Europe to tackle one of the 
largest movements of displaced people through European borders since 
World War II (UNHCR 2016). According to Eurostat (2016), in 2015 
a record number of over 1.2 million first-time asylum seekers registered 
in EU member-states. Almost one out of three first-time asylum seekers 
originate from Syria, while many are also Afghans and Iraqis.
In the context of the recent refugee crisis, Greece has been marked 
by a fast-paced transit of high numbers of refugees/asylum seekers 
entering its territory en route to Northern and Central Europe. The 
large-scale arrival of refugees/asylum seekers have challenged Greeks 
to cope with a twofold crisis: the economic crisis as well as the refugee 
crisis. Concerning the economic crisis, in the last six years Greece has 
faced the most acute recession in its modern history with devastating 
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socio-economic impacts on individuals’ lives echoed in record unem-
ployment and poverty rates (Matsaganis and Leventi 2014; OECD 
2014). Since 2015, the country has been strained by both economic 
depression and the massive migration inflows of hundreds of thousands 
of refugees/asylum seekers.
Despite economic hardship, volunteers have been instrumental in 
providing help (such as food supplies, medical aid, legal and financial 
support, etc.) to refugees/asylum seekers arriving on Greek shores—
simultaneously relieving the state of one of its core roles. Therefore, the 
government has come to partly rely on the contributions of volunteers 
in order to tackle the refugee crisis. As Evangelinidis (2016, p.  33) 
argues:
Where the state apparatus was absent, or its structures were insufficient, civil 
society organizations in many different forms (e.g. professional NGOs, vol-
unteers, ad hoc groups and collectives) tried to fill the gap. With the central 
government unable to properly provide for many of its citizens, let alone 
refugees or migrants, the humanitarian vacuum has often been filled with 
solidarity initiatives.
Based on a hybrid approach which combines the sociological and politi-
cal approaches to volunteering, the explorative analysis provides some pre-
liminary evidence of volunteers’ traits, most in line with past empirical 
research into volunteering. The explanatory analysis sheds some light on 
volunteers’ profiles who are primarily women, young, higher educated, 
individuals engaged in unconventional political acts and with higher level 
of social capital. However, contradicting our hypotheses and previous 
research, human and cultural resources are not associated with volunteer-
ing for refugees/asylum seekers in Greece.
The lack of association between human capital and volunteering 
may reflect the peculiarities of volunteering in Greece. Some scholars 
support that individuals with less human capital are more likely to 
engage in informal volunteering rather than formal volunteering 
(Williams 2002; Hustinx et al. 2010). As argued in the introduction of 
the chapter, whilst the official statistics show the low prevalence of 
formal volunteering in Greece compared to other European countries, 
some researchers underpin that there is a vibrant informal volunteering 
sector that has been triggered in different emergency periods 
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(Sotiropoulos 2004; Karamichas 2007; Rozakou 2011). We can assume 
that the main trend of volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers, as it 
has happened in the past in Greece (Sotiropoulos 2004; Karamichas 
2007; Rozakou 2011), has primarily followed the informal path, which 
is more common among individuals with lower human capital.
With respect to the lack of association between religiosity as an indi-
cator of cultural capital and volunteering, the finding might reflect spe-
cific shortcomings of the proxy applied. Scholars reporting strong 
correlations between religiosity and volunteering usually apply as prox-
ies religious practices such as frequency of church attendance and of 
religious prayer rather than subjective measures of religiosity and 
intensity of beliefs (Wilson and Musick 1997a; Musick and Wilson 
2008; van Tienen et al. 2011; Paxton et al. 2014). These practices are 
more likely to proffer values (such as self-sacrifice and compassion), 
which reinforce the decision to volunteer (Son and Wilson 2011).
In the study’s questionnaire, there are no available measures of such 
religious practices that would allow the refined measurement of religi-
osity. Additional limitations of the study involve its cross-sectional 
design where causal imputation is difficult. Hence, we are unable to 
determine the direction of specific causal relationships examined, for 
example, between cultural capital, social capital and/or political 
engagement measures and volunteering. It should be noted that con-
cerns over selection bias have consistently plagued the volunteering 
empirical research (Wilson 2000).
Nevertheless, the study enriches the scarce empirical research on 
volunteering specifically for refugees/asylum seekers, by portraying the 
profiles of volunteers providing solidarity to thousands of refugees/
asylum seekers arriving in Greece. Undoubtedly, volunteers have been 
key actors in welcoming and helping refugees/asylum seekers contrib-
uting to the first step towards newcomers’ integration into the new 
host countries. However, volunteers’ contribution should not be 
treated as substitute to core state obligations towards refugees/asylum 
seekers. Policy interventions at the Greek and EU level are urgently 
necessary to manage the refugee crisis effectively and allow the reset-
tlement of refugees/asylum seekers in safe countries where they can 




Original survey question Recoded %
[agegroups] How old are you? {1.18–24 years, 
2.25–34 years, 3.35–44 years, 4.45–54 years, 
5.55–64 years, 6.65 years and older}
1. 18–34 years old (1 through 2) 23.4
2. 35–54 years old (3 through 4) 38.9
3.  More than 55 years old (5 
through 6)
37.8
[class] Which option best describes the sort of 
paid work you do? {1. Professional or higher 
technical work, 2. Manager or senior 
administrator, 3. Clerical, 4. Sales or services, 
5. Foreman or supervisor of other workers, 6. 
Skilled manual work, 7. Semi-skilled or 
unskilled manual work, 8. Other (e.g. farming, 
military), 9. Not in employment}




2.  Middle occupational class  
(3 through 5)
54.3
3.  Occupational class-manual  
(6 through 7)
17.2
[mainact] What you have been doing for the 
past seven days?{1. In full-time (30 or more 
hours per week) paid work, 2. In part-time 
(8–29 hours a week) paid work, 3. In 
part-time (less than 8 hours a week) paid 
work, 4. In education (not paid for by 
employer) even if on vacation, 5. Unemployed 
and actively looking for a job, 6. Unemployed 
but not actively looking for a job, 7. 
Permanently sick or disabled, 8. Retired, 9. In 
community or military service, 10. Doing 
housework, looking after children or other 
persons}
1. Full-time 26.7
2. Part-time (2 through 3) 10.5
3. Other (4 and 7 through 10) 35.6
4. Unemployed (5 through 6) 27.3
[income_GR] What is your household’s 
MONTHLY net income? {1. Less than 575 
Euro, 2. 576–775 Euro, 3. 776–980 Euro, 4. 
981–1190 Euro, 5. 1191–1425 Euro, 6. 
1426–1700 Euro, 7. 1701–2040 Euro, 8. 
2041–2500 Euro, 9. 2501–3230 Euro, 10. 
3231 Euro or more, 11. Prefer not to say}
1.  Less than 775 Euro (1 through 
2)
35.5
2. 776–1425 Euro (3 through 5) 41.3
3.  More than 1426 Euro (6 
through 10)
23.2
[votenat1_GR] Did you vote in the national 
election on 20 September 2015? {1. No—but 
I was eligible to vote, 2. No—because I was 
not eligible to vote, 3. Yes, 4. Don’t know)
1. No—but I was eligible to vote 18.0
2. Yes 82.0
[metfriends] Met socially with friends during 
the past month {1. Less than once this month, 
2. Once or twice this month, 3. Every week, 
4. Almost every day}
1.  Once or twice this month or 
less (1 through 2)
45.0
2.  Every week or almost every 
day (3 through 4)
55.0
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notes
1. Displaced individuals include refugees, internally displaced people and asy-
lum seekers. A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her 
home country and is unable or unwilling to return due to fear of persecu-
tion. Internally displaced individuals include those who were forced to flee 
their home but they did not cross a state border. Asylum seekers include 
individuals who have made a claim that they are refugees and are in the 
process of waiting for the acceptance of rejection of their claim.
2. FRONTEX, Migratory routes map. Retrieved from http://frontex.
europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/.
3. FRONTEX, Eastern Mediterranean route. Retrieved from http://frontex.
europa.eu/trends-and-routes/eastern-mediterranean-route/.
4. The Guardian, 12 March 2016. Refugee crisis: How Greeks opened their 
hearts to strangers. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/mar/12/refugee-crisis-greeks-strangers-migrants.
5. The Huffington Post, 6 June 2016. The Hidden Heroes of Greece’s 
Refugee Crisis. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
volunteers-with-greek-refugees_us_574f54b3e4b0eb20fa0cb52c.
6. Such as unemployed and disabled.
7. Exceptions included Hong Kong and Latvia.
8. Active volunteers are individuals who regularly provide services which 
meet the primary goals of their group/organization. Passive volunteers are 
individuals who just pay dues/fees to their group/organization.
9. In Mexico active members had no differences with passive ones in any 
measures of political involvement.
10. It should be noted that additional activities include attending a march, 
protest or demonstration, donate money, donate time, buy or refuse to buy 
products in support to the goals and engage as passive member of an orga-
nization (pay cheque membership). These solidarity practices are not 
included in the present chapter, as the main research question is primarily 
associated with volunteering for refugees/asylum seekers.
11. Variables’ recoding are included in Appendix.
12. According to Marsh and Kaase (1979), unconventional political participa-
tion includes petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, rent or tax strikes, unof-
ficial industrial strikes, occupations of buildings, blocking of traffic, damage 
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CHAPTER 8




The study of civic and political engagement has often been addressed in 
the social sciences within altruistic perspectives encompassing prosocial 
behaviour beyond the narrowed approach of self-interested individualism 
(Giugni and Passy 2001). Altruism refers to actions and attitudes on 
social issues revolving around another persons’ well-being. These can be 
aligned with solidarity beyond one’s own group membership (interper-
sonal relationships), as individuals or collective acts in defence of the 
interests, rights and identities of others. Altruism is a freely chosen behav-
iour that benefits others, a group or a cause. It is typically proactive, 
requiring resources—time, effort or money—from individuals (Brady 
et al. 1995; Butcher 2010). Nowadays, this kind of behaviour accounts 
for a fair share of goods and services provided in modern societies, in 
form of volunteering or engagement in communities and associations 
and through the participation in community service programmes. 
Solidarity practices relate to altruism by underscoring individuals’ will-
ingness to help others in need but also through the contribution to 
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 collective endeavours. In addition, the range of solidarity practices 
include various forms of actions (e.g. donated money, donated time, 
engage as passive or active member of an organisation, engage in lobby-
ing and advocacy). These actions might be explicitly political when 
directed to social and political change or civic when directed to social 
goods and involvement. Societies rely heavily on these forms of solidarity, 
but how can we account for differences between the solidarity practices 
(civic and political)? Which types of factors (e.g. socio-economic charac-
teristics, attitudes, networks and resources) promote and trigger these 
forms of civic and political engagement?
Scholarship has frequently examined volunteering as a form of solidarity- 
based behaviour. Individuals enact in solidarity towards each other, as a 
form of prosocial behaviour based on norms of reciprocity and altruism 
(Manatschal and Freitag 2014). Building upon the analysis of the indi-
vidual factors that promote this kind of behaviour, researchers have exam-
ined: education level, gender, age, race, income, free time and citizenship 
as “human capital” determinants of volunteering (Wilson 2012; Wilson 
and Musick 1997). In addition, social capital and cultural factors have 
been also considered as explanatory resources for volunteering. In the 
social capital perspective, this is often seen as deriving from embeddedness 
in social networks, trust and social identification (Stadelmann-Steffen and 
Freitag 2010; van Deth et al. 2007; Wilson 2000; Putnam 2000). The 
2014 Swiss Volunteering Survey showed that at least 33% of the resident 
population in Switzerland aged 15 and older was involved in at least one 
form of formal or informal voluntary work. Volunteering has been defined 
as “any activity in which time is given freely to benefit another person, 
group or organisation” (Gundelach et  al. 2010; Wilson 2000, p. 215). 
Recent research on the interaction between micro and macro factors has 
examined cross-country variations or in the case of Switzerland to the 
expected variance between volunteering cultures and interactions between 
cantons’ welfare regimes effects—crowding-in and crowding-out 
(Manatschal and Freitag 2014; Gundelach et  al. 2010). Likewise, in 
Switzerland, the analysis of regional and cantonal associational cultures 
has been examined through manifestations of direct democracy that are 
expected to impact the type of organisations within the civil society 
(Baglioni 2004). It has also confirmed that the propensity to volunteer is 
highest in the German-speaking part of Switzerland, followed by the 
French-speaking and Italian-speaking regions (Manatschal and Freitag 
2014). Volunteering as a civic form of solidarity practice produces sus-
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tained social and community involvement enhancing social networks 
based on relationships of trust and reciprocity (Putnam 2000; van Deth 
1997). Interestingly, in Switzerland, the densities of these networks differ 
substantially through linguistic and cultural regions.
Besides, people engage socially in a number of ways within and outside 
of the political domain. A substantial body of research examines citizen-
ship behaviours and emphasises the importance of solidarity practices to 
respond individually or collectively to social problems and to common 
goods dilemma. Particularly interesting for our present purposes are the 
sociological and psychological perspectives on prosocial behaviour. These 
studies have centred the attention on the individual interpersonal orienta-
tions, traits and motivation explaining why and when individuals act pro-
socially as well as which social mechanisms, as norms, induce towards 
reciprocal and altruistic behaviour (Fetchenhauer et  al. 2006; Simpson 
and Willer 2015). The analysis on the interpersonal orientations and emo-
tions underscores the importance of empathic concerns when proving 
assistance to others (Batson 1998; Batson et  al. 1983; Flam and King 
2005; Flam 1990). In addition, individual traits as general dispositions of 
personality are presumably fundamental to engage in collective endeav-
ours showing that extrovert people tend to involve more in collective 
forms of social participation (Omoto et al. 2010). Much of research on 
prosocial behaviour motivations conclude that actions as volunteering 
enhance psychological well-being which is associated with a sense of effec-
tiveness and the expression of personal values (Piliavin and Siegl 2007). 
Motivation refers to the process that determines the initiation, intensity, 
direction and persistence of a behaviour (Vallerand and Thill 1993). In the 
following analysis of solidarity practices, individual factors (socio- economic 
characteristics and attitudes) and social capital factors are coupled with 
motivations. We inspire on the Volunteer Function Inventory (VFI) by 
Clary et al. (1998) to assess the function and the orientation of the moti-
vations of the solidarity practices, as self-regarding or other-regarding and 
to stress the distinction between altruistic and egoistic behaviour. This 
motivational orientation investigation might shed some light on the 
“why” and “how” of the solidarity-based behaviour.
As mentioned before the venues for citizens’ participation in collective 
endeavours are multiple. Given the objectives of this chapter, we will use a 
simple binary typology to characterise citizens’ solidarity-based engage-
ments as civic or political. Under our study and following Brady’s (1999) 
definition of political participation, political solidarity practices are actions 
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carried by ordinary citizens to influence some political outcomes that could 
benefit others, a group or a common cause. On the other hand, civic soli-
darity practices refer to a wide variety of activities ranging from informal 
and formal voluntary work to organisational involvement. This definition 
of civic engagement underscores citizens’ participation collectively or indi-
vidually to help or to improve the conditions for others or of a community 
(Ekman and Amna 2012; Adler and Goggin 2005). Obviously, several 
aspects of this typology are controversial and non-exhaustive. For instance, 
associational involvement could be characterised as political when referring 
to activism, however it is characterised as civic when referring to active 
engagement in charity organisations. We will use this twofold typology for 
an empirical analysis of citizens’ solidarity practices, focusing on behaviours 
directed by an intention to influence and assert political demands, to vali-
date the distinction between the two types (Teorell et al. 2007).
Broadly, this chapter analyses the motivational orientations of the soli-
darity practices and seeks to unveil if these are primarily motivated by other-
regarding orientations. Conceptually, it links solidarity practices to civic 
and political forms of participation following previous research on volun-
teerism and activism (Omoto et al. 2010; Fraser et al. 2009; Caputo 2009; 
Caputo 1997). More precisely, it aims to analyse solidarity practices in 
Switzerland beyond volunteering behaviour. We first identify the forms of 
solidarity and examine the socio-demographic characteristics, attitudes, 
social capital and motives of the people engaged in these forms of action. 
Secondly, we examine whether solidarity is based on interpersonal relation-
ships and social proximity, differing from altruistic concerns. For this pur-
pose, we seek to unveil whether political and civic forms of solidarity- based 
behaviour are similar across three vulnerable groups, migrants, unemployed 
and people with disability, or whether we observe differences between 
forms of solidaristic engagement when targeting one group or another. 
That is, which factors tend to promote or inhibit generalised forms of soli-
darity across groups at the individual level? Finally, we investigate regional 
variations in solidarity practices by comparing the major linguistic regions 
of the country, namely, the German-speaking, French- speaking and Italian-
speaking regions. We therefore also take into account the country’s cultural 
diversity. We control if belonging to a particular language community 
impacts civic and political forms of solidarity practices as for volunteering 
behaviour (Gundelach et  al. 2010). We contribute to the literature by 
inspiring in the Volunteer Function Inventory (VFI) model to understand 
variations on forms of solidaristic individual engagement when targeting 
three different beneficiary groups in Switzerland.
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MeasurIng solIdarIty PractIces: 
Between VoluntarIsM and actIVIsM
The conceptual link between solidarity and civic and political engagement 
has been mainly developed through the lenses of political activism or the 
study of acts of compassion. Still, these analyses depict solidarity-based 
behaviour as a connection with others, enhanced by the membership to a 
group that presupposes some specific duties (Rochon 1998; Wilson 2012). 
This presupposition of belonging is expected to impact the relationship 
between the actor and the recipient. As a result, the degree of social prox-
imity and attachment also affects individual motivations and consequently 
the form of individual or collective engagement (van der Zee 2006). In 
addition to these factors, social tolerance also plays a fundamental role. 
Tolerance (social and political) is not limited to the acceptance of diversity 
but also to the acceptance on equal terms of certain unpopular and target 
groups (Leite Viegas 2007). Thus, social tolerance as a covariate for 
explaining solidarity practices (civic and political) relates to individuals’ 
distance to social groups which is then to be peered to social identification 
as attachment.
The experimental design of the dictator game implemented by Fowler 
and Kam (2007) showed that social identification and altruism both trig-
ger political participation. However social identification enhances particu-
larised forms of solidarity, as the norms of reciprocity are stronger within 
groups than between groups. Still, generosity and unilateral giving behav-
iours have been shown from other experimental research to cascade indi-
vidual contributions to public goods (Simpson and Willer 2015; Fehr and 
Schmidt 2006; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). The perspective of solidarity 
as prosocial behaviour based on a sole membership/connection (social 
identification) suggests that additional acts of support or compassion that 
target the well-being of others are mainly driven by an altruistic concern. 
In line with these two perspectives, we use social identification and social 
tolerance to better understand in-bond (within-group) and out-bond 
(outer-group) solidarity. We assume that solidarity practices are related to 
both particularised concerns (within-group) and to more general altruistic 
concerns (outer-group).
Hypothesis 1a
Individuals reporting higher levels of social group identification are more 
likely to engage in activities aimed at enhancing within-group well-being.
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Hypothesis 1b
Individuals reporting higher levels of social tolerance are more likely to 
engage in unilateral giving activities enhancing out-group well-being.
Besides, we argue that social dispositions and attitudes are key to under-
stand prosocial behaviour. The analysis of individual social dispositions 
allows us to explain how solidarity practices are conditioned to interper-
sonal relationships of proximity and common experiences or to target- 
oriented projects beyond interpersonal ties to the immediate community 
(Rippe 1998). Prior research showed that cosmopolitanism and altruism 
are associated with redistributional attitudes and political participation 
beyond interpersonal solidaristic ties (Bechtel et al. 2014). Cosmopolitanism 
and altruism, as covariates to solidarity practices, are means to other forms 
of belongings at the margins of the groups, communities and nation- 
states’ boundaries. Cosmopolitanism refers to an interest towards groups 
or individuals that are distant culturally or geographically in opposition to 
localised and interpersonal interest, while altruism refers to the willingness 
to incur in personal loss to support distant others’ welfare (Elster 2006). 
We complement the analysis of the in-bond and out-bond solidarity prac-
tices by examining how social dispositions explain the possible variance 
between forms of solidarity-based behaviour across three vulnerable 
groups (migrants, unemployed and people with disability).
Hypothesis 2a
Individuals reporting higher levels of cosmopolitanism are more likely to 
engage in activities foreseeing the well-being of undistinguished vulnerable 
groups.
Hypothesis 2b
Strong communitarian attachment and cultural proximity decrease target- 
oriented solidarity towards migrants and refugees.
Since we are also interested in the underlying motivations of the solidar-
ity practices, we build upon the behavioural psychological perspective on 
prosocial behaviour to examine the “why” and “how” of the solidarity- 
based behaviour (for review, see Fetchenhauer et al. 2006). We follow the 
argument that the motivational and functional assessment of the action are 
key to understand how diverse motivations converge into the same form of 
behaviour. In this sense, the Volunteer Function Inventory (VFI) developed 
by Clary et al. (1998) showed that individual behaviour embodies various 
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types of motivations and that the distinction between motivational orienta-
tions (self- or other-regarding) is associated with the psychological function 
of the action. For instance, two persons could do the same volunteering 
work for an association; however, for one individual, the motivation orient-
ing his/her behaviour is mainly the enhancement of his/her professional 
skills. While for the other individual, the motivation orienting his/her 
behaviour is primarily the interest in his/her community. As a result, one 
same action fulfils two contrasting functions related to two distinct motiva-
tional orientations at the individual level. In addition, we use the analysis of 
the solidarity practices’ motivational orientations to examine the distinction 
between forms of solidarity practices: civic and political. First, in line with 
Rippe (1998) definition of non-interpersonal solidaristic ties, we argue that 
solidarity as “acts carried out in order to support others, or at the very least 
to describe a disposition to help and assist” (Bayertz 1996, p. 308; Bayertz 
1999) relates to interpersonal and non-interpersonal relationships. This 
definition captures a solidaristic behaviour based on generalised and particu-
larised concerns, capturing both communitarian loyalties and altruism. 
However, it is mainly related to civic engagement as it responds to societal 
problems, and it does not assert political demands. On the other hand, soli-
darity as a political practice refers to “a moral relation formed when indi-
viduals or groups unite around some mutually recognized political need or 
goal in order to bring about social change” (Scholz 2015, p.  732). 
Consequently, the grounded commitment to enhance social change is key 
to differentiating between solidarity forms, which primarily tend to provide 
help, services and relief to others or to upraise political voicing—advocacy, 
products’ boycotting and activism (Stjernø 2012; Scholz 2008). As a result, 
when assessing the motivational orientations of the solidaristic engage-
ments, we first identify the form, as political or civic, and then we analyse its 
motivational orientation. The motivational orientations of the solidaristic 
practices in this chapter are defined within three categories: self-regarding, 
based on  individualistic concerns; community-regarding, based on interper-
sonal and community concerns; and other-regarding—based on generalised 
concerns. Previous literature on the motivational orientations assessment 
has served to distinguish civic forms of volunteerism from political forms of 
volunteerism as activism. Omoto et al. (2010) showed that other- regarding 
orientations are a strong covariate to civic and political engagement but that 
community-regarding orientations are more correlated to civic volunteerism 
than to activism. In addition, various studies have shown that self- regarding 
orientations are still important to understand prosocial behaviour because 
individual motivations are multifaceted. “It appears that many volunteers’ 
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motivations cannot be neatly classified as either altruistic or egoistic, both 
because some specific motives combine other- interested and self-interested 
considerations and because many people indicate that they have both kinds 
of reasons for volunteering” (Clary and Snyder 1999, p. 157). In this chap-
ter, we expect to explain the maximum amount of variance between civic 
and political solidarity practices based on the distinction between commu-
nity-regarding and other-regarding orientations while loosely associating 
both to individual concerns. Additionally, we examine how the motivational 
orientations account for the variation between the forms of solidaristic indi-
vidual engagement when targeting three different vulnerable groups. We 
underscore the importance of the motivational orientations to unveil the 
support or lack of support to migrants and refugees’ populations confronted 
to unemployed and disabled populations.
Hypothesis 3a
Individual solidarity practices, civic and political, are partly associated with 
self-regarding orientations and strongly related to other-regarding and 
community- regarding concerns independently of the beneficiaries’ 
populations.
Hypothesis 3b
Differences on solidarity actions across groups are likely to be more associated 
with community-regarding orientations than with other-regarding 
orientations.
Also as part of our analysis of solidarity practices, we will control for 
human and social capital factors. Scholars have tended to confirm the impor-
tance of socio-demographic factors and social traits (e.g. age, gender, educa-
tion, religion, social class) as covariates to assess the conditions for civic and 
political engagement. Previous research on political participation has identi-
fied factors such as income and education as important socio-economic pre-
dictors of political attitudes and actions (Dalton 2008). In addition to these, 
the research on volunteering behaviour have underscored the importance of 
gender when assessing woman’s role in caring activities; thus we will control 
for the cultural allocation of women’s role as more emphatic and mainly 
deploying higher solidaristic behaviour than men (Wilson and Musick 
1997; Gallagher 1994). Since Almond and Verba (1963; Verba et al. 1995), 
survey evidence has generally confirmed that education is linked to civic and 
political engagement. Likewise, we will control for the covariations related 
to the impact of people’s social embeddedness and religiosity on solidaristic 
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practices. In this sense, social capital approaches are also of crucial impor-
tance, as it is understood to enhance social trust and tolerance (Putnam 
2000; van Deth et al. 2007). A large part of the literature has measured 
social capital through the proxy of trust closely related to social cohesion 
and solidarity. Social capital has been also related to the establishment of 
bonds and norms for cooperative endeavours, as shown in studies of the 
impact of the social capital of migrants on their political participation (Eggert 
and Giugni 2010; Morales and Giugni 2011; Smith 1999). In this perspec-
tive, solidarity practices are mainly seen as norms of reciprocity which link 
citizens together (Stolle and Rochon 1998).
data and Methods
Our analysis draws upon a comprehensive eight-country dataset, collected 
in 2016, within the EU project “European paths to transnational solidar-
ity at times of crisis: Conditions, forms, role models and policy responses” 
(TransSOL) which aims to measure individual forms and conditioning fac-
tors enhancing transnational solidarity in Europe. The dataset sample con-
tains 2221 observations for Switzerland, with its corresponding weights. 
It matches national quotas on age, gender, region and education. Appendix 
1 to this chapter contains all the variables recordings, used in our models. 
The statistical procedures applied first give a descriptive overview of the 
dependent variables—civic and political solidarity practices. Secondly, we 
propose a logistic regression model to assess the effects of the covariates 
on solidarity practices by target group: unemployed, migrants/refugees 
and people with disability.
The study examines six binary dependent variables, one for each kind of 
solidarity behaviour (civic and political) and per target group (unem-
ployed, migrants/refuges and people with disability). We used three ques-
tions to measure civic and political solidarity practices (see Table 8.1):
—Have you ever done any of the following in order to support migrant or refu-
gees’ rights?—Have you ever done any of the following in order to support disable 
people rights?—Have you ever done any of the following in order to support 
unemployed people rights? (each of the questions had the same seven possible 
options: “Attended a march, protest or demonstration” and/or “Bought or 
refused to buy products in support to the goals” and/or “Donated money” and/
or “Donated time” and/or “Engaged as passive member of an organisation” 
and/or “Engaged as active member of an organisation” or “None of the above”).
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From these questions, we operationalised three binary civic solidarity 
practices variables (one per group), in which respondents have stated to 
engage in at least one of the following actions: “Donated money” and/or 
“Donated time” and/or “Engaged as passive member of an organisation” 
and/or “Engaged as active member of an organisation” or “None of the 
above”, and three binary political solidarity variables (one per group), in 
which respondents have stated to engage in at least one of the following 
actions: “Attended a march, protest or demonstration” and/or “Bought 
or refused to buy products in support to the goals” or “None of the 
above.” Political solidarity practices clearly refer to unconventional and 
consumerism political behaviour as defined in the literature (for a review, 
see Teorell et al. 2007) while civic solidarity practices refer to passive and 
Table 8.1 Proportions of solidarity practices towards vulnerable groups in 
Switzerland (in %)
Activities: Support refugees 
and migrant




Attended a march, 
protest or 
demonstration
4.1 Attended a march, 
protest or 
demonstration




Donated money 17.5 Donated money 41.6 Donated money 11.4
Donated time 11.3 Donated time 24.9 Donated time 11.6
Bought or refused to 
buy products in 
support to the goals
11.2 Bought or refused to 
buy products in 
support to the goals
23.2 Bought or refused to 
buy products in 
support to the goals
13.7
Engaged as passive 
member of an 
organisation
3.7 Engaged as passive 
member of an 
organisation
11.5 Engaged as passive 
member of an 
organisation
4.5
Engaged as active 
member of an 
organisation
4.9 Engaged as active 
member of an 
organisation
7.0 Engaged as active 
member of an 
organisation
4.5
None of the above 66.9 None of the above 33.2 None of the above 67.5
Civic solidarity 
practices
27.3 Civic solidarity 
practices





13.6 Political solidarity 
practices
25.3 Political solidarity 
practices
16.0
N 2221 N 2221 N 2221
Civic solidarity practices variables (one per group): respondents have stated to engage in at least one of the 
following actions: “Donated money” and/or “Donated time” and/or “Engaged as passive member of an 
organisation” and/or “Engaged as active member of an organisation”
Political solidarity practices variables (one per group): respondents have stated to engage in at least one of 
the following actions: “Attended a march, protest or demonstration” and/or “Bought or refused to buy 
products in support to the goals”
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active forms of social involvement (Morales and Geurts 2007). As men-
tioned previously in the introduction of the chapter, several aspects of this 
typology are controversial and non-exhaustive as some forms of social 
involvement could be considered to have different weights with respect to 
the extent of the civic involvement. Still, the key distinction for the typol-
ogy is the intention to influence and assert political demands through the 
engaged action. These actions might be explicitly political when directed 
to social and political change or civic when directed to social goods and 
involvement.
In addition, two key blocks of independent covariates were used to 
examine civic and political solidarity practices: motivational orientations 
covariates (self-regarding, other-regarding and community-regarding ori-
entations) and social dispositions covariates (social distance and cosmo-
politanism). With respect to the motivational covariates, we used the 
following question:
People do unpaid work or give help to all kinds of groups for all kinds of reasons. 
Thinking about all the groups, clubs or organisations you have helped over the 
last 12 months, did you start helping them for any of the reasons on this list? 
Choose up to 5 reasons that were most important to you. Please select at least 1 
and a maximum of 5 answers (seventeen possible options).
Then we performed factormat, a factor analysis of a correlation matrix, 
using a tetrachoric matrix of correlation of the 17 items, to group the 
items within three categories: self-regarding, other-regarding and 
community- regarding concerns. As a result, self-regarding motivational 
orientations refer to: “I wanted to meet people/make friends”; “I thought 
it would give me a chance to learn new skills”; “I thought it would give 
me a chance to use my existing skills”; “It helps me get on in my career”; 
“I had spare time to do it”; “It gave me a chance to get a recognised quali-
fication”. Other-regarding motivational orientations refer to: “I felt that it 
was a moral duty to help others in need”; “I felt that it was important to 
help because I might be in a similar situation sometime”; “It’s part of my 
philosophy of life to help people”; “It’s part of my religious belief to help 
people”; “It’s part of my philosophy of life to help people”; “I wanted to 
improve things/help people”; “The cause was really important to me”. 
Community-regarding motivational orientations refer to: “I felt there was 
no one else to do it”; “My friends/family did it”; “It was connected with 
the needs of my family/friends”; “I felt there was a need in my 
community”.
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With respect to the social disposition covariates block, we focused in 
two key measures. First is social distance, an 18-item additive scale, mea-
sured with the following question:
Please say whether you would mind or not having each of the following as neigh-
bours? (items correspond to 18 target groups, e.g. migrants, people suffering 
from AIDS, left wing extremist, right wing extremist etc. in which the higher 
score corresponds to large social distance and low social tolerance)
Secondly, we used two questions to capture two dimensions of cosmopoli-
tanism, cultural openness and attachment to humanity. We operationalised 
cosmopolitanism as cultural openness referring to multicultural appraisal:
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: It is a 
good thing to live in a multicultural society. (5—item answer: 1—Strongly 
disagree, 2—Disagree, 3—Neither, 4—Agree and 5—Strongly agree)
And we operationalised cosmopolitanism as attachment to humanity 
using the following question:
Please tell me how attached you feel to the world/humanity? (5-item answer: 
1—Not at all attached, 2—Not very attached, 3—Neither, 4—Quite attached, 
5—Very attached).
Besides, we used several other measures to capture the factors that may 
predict the probability of engaging in solidarity practices. These predictors 
include a battery of socio-demographic covariates and attitudinal covari-
ates defined in the Appendices (1 and 2) and discussed in the regression 
model session. Finally a descriptive overview of the proportion and distri-
bution of civic and political solidarity practices (see Table 8.1) shows that 
two thirds of the individuals have engaged to support the rights of people 
with disability, while only a third have engaged to support migrant or 
unemployed people’s rights. The disability field is the most ‘crowded’ field 
in terms of solidarity engagement. It has the largest share of social capital 
(as membership to organisation) doubling the other fields. Also within the 
disability field, we observe that the most frequent form of engagement is 
donating money (42%). Conversely, this field seem to be the least conten-
tious; protest-oriented practices are the lowest for disability. Still political 
solidarity practices are higher than in the other two fields. With regards to 
solidarity practices, donating money and political consumerism are the 
most relevant practices. These results are in line with previous analysis on 
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volunteering and associational involvement. Pay-check involvement seems 
to be very strong in Switzerland where people tend to donated money to 
more than two associations on average (Morales and Geurts 2007).
cIVIc Versus PolItIcal solIdarIty PractIces: 
exPlanatory logIstIc Model
In this section, we propose six logistic regression models to assess the effects 
of human, social, motivational and contextual covariates on civic and political 
solidarity practices by target group. We regress six binary dependent variables, 
one for each kind of solidaristic form per target group: unemployed people, 
migrants and refugees’ groups and people with disability. Custom to all mod-
els are a block to control for socio- demographic covariates effects, which 
include (age, education, gender, income and living with children); a block of 
social and political covariates (discuss politics and meet with friends) to 
account for the effects of interpersonal ties on the solidarity practices; a block 
of motivational orientations covariates (self-regarding, other-regarding and 
community-regarding motivations) to investigate the process that facilitates 
the initiation and orientation of the solidarity behaviour; a block of attitudinal 
and social dispositions covariates (social distance, social trust, fairness, attach-
ment to country and to humanity, religiosity, multicultural appraisal and 
xenophobic attitudes) to account for the variation in social dispositions of the 
individuals engaging in solidarity practices; and lastly we also included a block 
of contextual covariates for the three main linguistic regions of the country to 
control for the linguistic cultures effect in the solidarity behaviour.
In general terms, the three civic dependent variables refer to 1 when in 
engaging in at least one form of civic action per target group—for example, 
“Donated money” and/or “Donated time” and/or “Engaged as passive 
member of an organisation” and/or “Engaged as active member of an 
organisation.” Equally the three political dependent variables refer to 1 
when engaging in at least one form of political action per each target 
group—for example, “Attended a march, protest or demonstration” and/
or “Bought or refused to buy products in support to the goals.” For inter-
pretative purposes, the six logistic models are presented as odds ratios 
instead of log odds, which express the odds variation of the dependent 
variable for each unit of change in the covariates. With respect to the over-
all explained variance, the civic models of solidarity have the highest explan-
atory power, more specifically the model explaining the civic support to 
migrants and refugees counts for 15% of the overall variance, while the 
other two are limited to 9% (see Pseudo-R2 in Tables 8.2 and 8.3). Similarly, 
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Table 8.2 Logistic regression models on civic solidarity engagement strength 
(odds ratios)
Support to refugees 
and migrant





Age 0.95* (0.02) 1.04* (0.02) 1.03 (0.02)
Age2 1.00* (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00)
Gender (ref. woman) 1.02 (0.11) 1.01 (0.10) 0.61*** (0.07)
Income (ref. low- 
income groups)
Middle income 1.13 (0.15) 1.14 (0.13) 1.13 (0.15)
High income 1.49* (0.26) 1.19 (0.19) 1.05 (0.19)
Education (ref. 
secondary school or 
lower)
BA or equivalent 0.96 (0.13) 1.04 (0.12) 0.95 (0.13)
MA or higher degree 1.07 (0.15) 1.10 (0.14) 1.22 (0.18)
Live with child 1.15 (0.16) 1.03 (0.13) 0.92 (0.13)
Discuss politics 1.04 (0.02) 1.04* (0.02) 1.05* (0.02)
Meet with friends 0.94 (0.06) 1.09 (0.06) 0.91 (0.06)
Self-regarding 
motivation
1.35** (0.15) 1.30* (0.15) 1.63*** (0.19)
Other-regarding 
motivation
2.16*** (0.27) 2.08*** (0.22) 2.22*** (0.29)
Community-regarding 
motivation
1.33* (0.15) 1.45*** (0.16) 1.53*** (0.18)
Social distance 0.94*** (0.02) 0.97* (0.01) 0.97 (0.02)
Social trust 1.11 (0.13) 1.01 (0.11) 0.98 (0.11)
Fairness 0.87 (0.10) 1.01 (0.10) 1.24 (0.14)
Attachment to country 0.55*** (0.10) 1.11 (0.18) 0.63** (0.11)
Attachment to 
humanity
1.84*** (0.28) 1.36** (0.16) 1.20 (0.17)
Religiosity 1.11*** (0.02) 1.04** (0.02) 1.03 (0.02)
Multicultural appraisal 1.22** (0.09) 1.02 (0.06) 0.95 (0.07)
Xenophobic attitudes 
towards other cultures
0.89*** (0.03) 1.02 (0.02) 1.00 (0.03)
Swiss regions (ref. 
Swiss-German)
Swiss-French 0.59*** (0.07) 1.06 (0.11) 1.00 (0.12)
Swiss-Italian 0.46** (0.12) 0.88 (0.18) 1.36 (0.32)
Constant 0.38 (0.25) 0.07*** (0.04) 0.09*** (0.06)
Pseudo R2 0.151 0.089 0.090
N 2221 2221 2221
Note: Logistic regressions odds ratios shown with standard errors in parentheses (***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, 
*p < 0.1). Regressions also include dummy and indicators variables for income, region, education and 
gender (see references categories for interpretation)
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the political model concerning migrants and refugees’ support counts for 
12% of the overall variance, while the political unemployment support 
model counts for almost the 9% and the political support model towards 
people with disability explains 5% of the overall variance.
The models concerning the civic practices of solidarity per target group 
show that the socio-demographic covariates have mainly a positive effect 
on the dependent variables, but the odds are scarcely relevant (see 
Table 8.2). However, being a woman has a significant and negative effect 
on civic support practices towards unemployed people. Also individuals 
with high income tend to engage 1.5 times more than low-income indi-
viduals when supporting migrant and refugees’ groups. The social and 
political covariates are positive and fairly significant when explaining civic 
support towards unemployed people and people with disability, but still 
their odds coefficients are less revealing. With respect to the motivational 
covariates as presupposed in our Hypothesis 3a, self-regarding and other- 
regarding motivations are relevant to explain civic forms of engagement 
through all the groups, nevertheless the other-regarding motivations have 
a stronger explanatory power and positive statistical significance. Likewise 
as assumed in Hypothesis 3b, community-regarding motivations are posi-
tive and statistically significant when explaining civic support towards 
unemployed people and people with disability, but against our expecta-
tions these are still somehow relevant to explain civic support towards 
migrants. Within the block of attitudinal and social dispositions covariates, 
we have two types of significant effects: negative effects concerning strong 
communitarian attachment and xenophobic attitudes towards other cul-
tures and positive effects related to cosmopolitanism and religiosity. More 
in detail, in line with our Hypothesis 2b, communitarian attachment and 
xenophobic attitudes negatively impact solidaristic behaviour to support 
migrant and refugees. Likewise, as partly presupposed in Hypothesis 2a, 
cosmopolitanism (as multicultural appraisal and attachment to humanity) 
is positively associated with civic forms of solidarity. Still this is only rele-
vant to explain civic solidaristic behaviour towards migrants/refugees and 
people with disability. The cosmopolitanism variables were unable to cap-
ture the well-being of vulnerable groups as undistinguishable, as they did 
not have a significant effect across all three groups. Also religiosity, as 
expected and tested in other research, is positively related to civic practices. 
In addition, we can confirm Hypothesis 1b when describing civic solidarity 
practices across the three beneficiary groups, social distance does have a 
negative and significant impact on civic forms of engagement towards 
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migrants. Finally, with regard to the contextual covariates, these are signifi-
cant and negatively associated with civic support towards migrant and refu-
gees. On an average, people in Swiss-French regions tend to engage 0.6 
times less than in Swiss-German region when supporting migrants; within 
the same field, people in the Swiss-Italian region tend to engage 0.5 times 
less than in the Swiss-German region. These contextual results are particu-
larly interesting as they show that the linguistic cultures in Switzerland 
impact solidarity practices negatively when target oriented to migrants as 
solidarity recipients.
As for the civic models, the socio-demographic covariates have signifi-
cant effect in predicting political solidarity practices, but these are scarcely 
relevant (see Table 8.3). Only gender and income have a significant and 
relevant effect to explain political solidarity practices. Being a woman has 
a significant and positive effect when supporting migrants and refugees—
women engage 1.3 times more than men in this kind of actions. In com-
parison to civic models, the high-income covariate has a reverse effect; 
individuals with high income tend to engage less when politically support-
ing migrant and refugees’ groups. This suggests that income has undistin-
guishable positive effect across groups when examining civic solidarity 
practices. However, income affects negatively the particularised political 
solidarity support toward migrants. Previous literature results on political 
consumerism underscored income as a key variable to explain forms of 
consumerism (Stolle and Micheletti 2013) and some approaches on pro-
testing behaviour considered income to be no longer a preoccupation 
because of post-materialist values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Yet, with 
these results we could advance that unconventional and political 
 consumerism practices are negatively dependent on income when describ-
ing internal variations between generalised and particularised forms of 
political solidarity.
The political covariates are positive and statistically significant when 
explaining political support towards migrant, and social covariates are 
only relevant to explain political support towards people with disability. 
With respect to the motivational covariates, Hypothesis 3a is confirmed; 
other- regarding motivations are  the most relevant to explain political 
forms of engagement through all the groups. The other-regarding moti-
vations have a stronger explanatory power and statistical significance. 
Additionally as presupposed in Hypothesis 3b, community-regarding 
motivations are positive and statistically significant when explaining polit-
ical support toward unemployed people and people with disability, but 
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Table 8.3 Logistic regression models on political solidarity engagement strength 
(odds ratios)
Support to refugees 
and migrant





Age 0.95* (0.02) 1.01 (0.02) 1.09** (0.03)
Age2 1.00* (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00** (0.00)
Gender 1.29* (0.17) 1.14 (0.12) 0.87 (0.11)
Income (ref. low- 
income groups)
Middle income 0.76 (0.12) 0.96 (0.12) 0.87 (0.12)
High income 0.56** (0.12) 1.02 (0.17) 0.82 (0.17)
Education (ref. 
secondary school or 
lower)
BA or equivalent 0.89 (0.15) 1.19 (0.16) 1.26 (0.21)
MA or higher degree 0.99 (0.18) 1.17 (0.17) 1.26 (0.22)
Live with child 1.12 (0.20) 0.99 (0.13) 0.82 (0.13)
Discuss politics 1.12*** (0.03) 1.02 (0.02) 1.05 (0.03)
Meet with friends 1.00 (0.08) 1.15* (0.07) 1.09 (0.08)
Self-regarding 
motivation
1.52** (0.22) 1.13 (0.13) 1.37* (0.18)
Other-regarding 
motivation
1.91*** (0.32) 1.71*** (0.21) 1.88*** (0.29)
Community-regarding 
motivation
1.23 (0.18) 1.35** (0.15) 1.65*** (0.22)
Social distance 0.94** (0.02) 1.00 (0.02) 0.98 (0.02)
Social trust 1.11 (0.16) 1.21 (0.14) 1.29 (0.17)
Fairness 1.05 (0.15) 1.17 (0.13) 1.06 (0.14)
Attachment to country 0.48*** (0.10) 1.14 (0.21) 0.65* (0.13)
Attachment to 
humanity
0.87 (0.16) 1.01 (0.13) 0.96 (0.16)
Religiosity 1.04* (0.02) 1.01 (0.02) 1.04* (0.02)
Multicultural appraisal 0.96 (0.09) 0.94 (0.06) 0.96 (0.08)
Xenophobic attitudes 
towards other cultures
.85*** (0.03) 1.01 (0.03) 0.96 (0.03)
Swiss regions (ref. 
Swiss-German)
Swiss-French 1.23 (0.18) 0.98 (0.11) 0.93 (0.13)
Swiss-Italian 1.13 (0.35) 1.12 (0.26) 1.50 (0.40)
Constant 0.69 (0.10) 0.05*** (0.04) 0.01*** (0.01)
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.045 0.087
N 2221 2221 2221
Note: Logistic regressions odds ratios shown with standard errors in parentheses (***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, 
*p < 0.1). Regressions also include dummy and indicators variables for income, region, education and 
gender (see references categories for interpretation)
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these are not relevant to explain political support towards migrants. 
Within the block of attitudinal and social dispositions covariates, we con-
tinue to have two types of significant effects, negative effects concerning 
strong communitarian attachment and positive effects related to social 
trust and religiosity. Also as presupposed in Hypothesis 2b, attachment to 
the country negatively impacts solidaristic behaviour to support migrants 
and refugees. Yet, country attachment is still negatively associated with 
political support to unemployed people. On the other hand, religiosity 
continues to have a positive effect when supporting politically vulnerable 
people. For both types of actions civic and political, religiosity patterns 
are clearly consistent with the volunteering literature. Lastly, Hypothesis 
1a and 1b are confirmed, as social distance has a significant negative 
impact when explaining political forms of solidarity towards migrants and 
refugees and not across all three beneficiary groups. Finally, with regard 
to the contextual covariates, in contrast to the civic engagement models, 
contextual covariates have no significant impact on political solidarity 
practices.
FIndIngs
Differentiating Civic and Political Solidarity Practices
The results reported in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show that motivational orienta-
tions account for the variation between civic and political solidarity prac-
tices. The psychological perspectives on prosocial behaviour have allowed 
us to evaluate the function and orientation of the solidarity behaviours. 
We have showed that solidarity practices are primarily motivated by 
 other- regarding orientations even though individual motivations are mul-
tifaceted (Clary and Snyder 1999). Hypothesis 3a suggested that civic and 
political solidarity practices are associated with other-regarding and with 
community-regarding concerns independently of the beneficiaries’ popu-
lations. However, our analysis shows that this is the case only for civic soli-
darity practices. Political solidarity practices with respect to motivational 
orientations are more complex. First, all political solidarity practices pre-
suppose a strong dependence on other-regarding concerns, while the 
other two motivational orientations are dependent on the target group 
(beneficiaries). Second, we were expecting to confront political solidarity 
practices against civic solidarity practices through the analysis on 
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community- regarding orientations. To our surprise the models showed 
that community-regarding concerns do not explain the variation between 
political and civic solidarity-based behaviours as for volunteerism and 
activisms (Kleres 2017; Omoto et  al. 2010; Miller and Krosnick 2004; 
Caputo 1997) but the variation of political solidarity engagements between 
the groups as partially suggested in Hypothesis 3b. Thus, we underscore 
the importance of the motivational orientations to unveil the support or 
lack of support to migrants and refugees’ populations confronted to 
unemployed people and to people with disability. In our particular case, 
we could suggest that the differences on political solidarity actions across 
these three groups are associated with interpersonal ties to the community. 
More precisely, the marginal effects on the civic and political forms of soli-
darity (see Figs. 8.1 and 8.2) corroborate that the motivational orienta-
tions effects are relevant to both kinds of practices independently of the 
Fig. 8.1 Marginal effects on civic solidarity practices by target group. Note: 
Marginal effects for each model in Table 8.2. The horizontal lines indicate 0.95 
confidence intervals
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reference group. However, with respect to this block of covariates, the 
other-regarding orientations have the strongest marginal effect, while the 
other two orientations covariates translate into differentiated solidaristic 
support across groups.
In addition, the marginal effects in Figs. 8.1 and 8.2 also highlighted 
the relevance of the social dispositions covariates to examine civic and 
political solidarity practices, especially with regard to the support to 
migrants and refugees’ populations. The social dispositions were used to 
understand how the degree of social identification and attachment to a 
group affect forms of individual engagement, because the membership to 
a group presupposes some specific duties. In our models when controlling 
for social distance, attachment to country and cosmopolitanism, we con-
firmed Hypothesis 1b and showed that social distance relates negatively to 
civic and political solidarity practices almost independently of the 
Fig. 8.2 Marginal effects on political solidarity practices by target group. Note: 




 beneficiary group. Still, the model also confirmed that social identification 
is strongly significant only to solidarity-based behaviours towards migrants 
and refugees’ groups. As a result, civic and political forms of solidarity 
unveiled that high levels of social identification enhance within-group 
well-being concerns, while decreasing out-bond solidarity towards other 
vulnerable groups specially migrants.
Finally, our analysis showed that general altruistic concerns are nega-
tively correlated to social identification and attachment to a group. Yet, 
cosmopolitanism as covariate to solidarity practices in opposition to local-
ised and interpersonal ties showed that other forms of belonging at the 
margins of groups, communities and nation-states boundaries are only 
relevant to understand civic solidarity practices towards migrants 
(Hypothesis 2b). Against Hypothesis 2a cosmopolitanism captured impor-
tant variation across the support to the well-being of our three target 
groups. So how should one interpret the strong association between 
 cosmopolitanism and solidarity-based behaviour only towards migrants 
and refugees? One possibility is to argue that communitarians forms of 
belonging are robust in the other two cases, so the civic or political mobili-
sation to support unemployed or people with disability is rooted in strong 
interpersonal ties of reciprocity within the community which give little 
place to cosmopolitan forms of belonging.
concludIng reMarks
People engage socially in numerous ways within and outside of the polit-
ical domain. Solidarity practices are ways to respond individually or col-
lectively to social problems. Substantial body of research have examined 
citizenship behaviours and emphasised the importance of prosocial 
behaviour to contribute to collective endeavours. Through the chapter, 
we have argued that these actions might be explicitly political when 
directed to social and political change or civic when directed to social 
goods and involvement. The study of civic and political solidarity prac-
tices in Switzerland has allowed us to analyse solidaristic behaviour in a 
twofold process within and at the margins of group membership per-
spectives. Our analysis refers to the impact of social dispositions and 
motivations to understand prosocial behaviour, beyond the narrow 
scope of self-interest. We have confirmed that socio-demographic factors 
as well as socio- political attitudes are relevant to explain various forms of 
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prosocial behaviour but that social dispositions and motivational orien-
tations seem to be the key triggers for civic and political solidarity prac-
tices. More precisely, following the motivational and functional 
assessment proposed by the VFI model, we have corroborated that the 
motivational orientation effects are multifaceted. In this sense, we have 
shown that solidarity practices are not only motivated by other-regard-
ing concerns but strongly driven by these. And we have shown that in 
contrast to one of the major distinctions between volunteerism and 
activism, political solidarity practices are also driven by community-
regarding orientations. Precisely, the community- regarding orientations 
seem only to account for the variations in political solidarity-based 
engagements across groups.
In addition and pertinent to our analysis was the differentiation 
between civic and political forms of solidaristic behaviour. They have 
shed some light on the covariation between other-regarding and 
community- regarding orientations to explain target-oriented support to 
groups which embodied spatial referencing (migrants). Variations 
between civic and political solidarity actions across the three vulnerable 
groups, unemployed people, people with disability and migrant and refu-
gees’ groups, have been associated with interpersonal ties to the commu-
nity, which increase social identification and decrease out-bond solidarity 
towards other vulnerable groups specially migrants. Finally, the chapter 
results also point toward complementary research venues. We could 
investigate the role of interpersonal ties, altruistic and emphatic concerns 
on solidarity practices. This particular analysis will robust the commu-
nity-regarding orientations taking into account interpersonal measure-
ments of community ties. Secondly, we might need to complement our 
analysis of cosmopolitanism by analysing other forms of social identifica-
tion and belonging—for example, ethnic- or gender-driven identities, 
regional identities and/or European identities—to show how these could 
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Appendix 2: Generalised and particularised solidarity practices by geographical 











No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Political solidarity practices












86.8 13.2 75.4 24.6 81.6 18.4 69.3 30.7 5.1
Total 86.4 13.6 74.7 25.3 84.0 16.0 68.6 31.4 100
  Gender
  Man 88.0 12.0 75.2 24.8 82.8 17.2 70.1 29.9 53.1
  Woman 84.7 15.3 74.2 25.8 85.3 14.7 67.0 33.0 46.9
Total 86.4 13.6 74.7 25.3 84.0 16.0 68.6 31.4 100
N 301 561 356 697 2221
Civic solidarity practices












81.6 18.4 47.4 52.6 72.8 27.2 59.6 40.4 5.1
Total 72.7 27.3 40.7 59.3 75.8 24.2 50.4 49.6 100
  Gender
  Man 73.5 26.5 39.9 60.1 71.7 28.3 49.4 50.6 53.1
  Woman 71.7 28.3 41.7 58.3 80.4 19.6 51.5 48.5 46.9
Total 72.7 27.3 40.7 59.3 75.8 24.2 50.4 49.6 100
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CHAPTER 9




Solidarity has come under heavy strain in Europe over the last decade, at 
the same time as the economic, social, and political crisis of 2008 has had a 
tremendous impact on the attitudes and behaviours of European citizens 
(Giugni and Grasso 2015). In the media, the crisis has often been discussed 
using footage depicting human despair. These images have included pic-
tures of destitute unemployed people queuing outside soup kitchens or 
sleeping rough (Department for Communities and Local Government 
2015), in the face of general indifference on the part of bystanders 
(Andersson and Sundin 2016; Darley and Latané 1968) or of refugees and 
their babies drowning in European waters due to the negligence of rescue 
officers, without altering the broad indifference of the general public.1 In 
Europe, appeals to human solidarity have also gone unheard at difficult 
moments like when Europe faced the threat of Grexit, or in the aftermath 
of the UK referendum on European membership (Berend 2016; Calhoune 
2017). This widespread “desensitisation” (Arendt 1982; Wilde 2013) went 
so far that some commentators chose to refer to a handful of countries with 
very little direct responsibility for the global economic crisis as PIGS 
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(Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain), in a tendentious attempt to single 
out culprits (de la Dehesa 2006). Ultimately, the idea that solidarity—a 
notion which has had an essential influence on the emergence of a sense of 
European citizenship—may well have lost its importance has given rise to 
systematic criticisms of the European project (Dainotto 2007).
The possibility that Europe may have entered a new homo homini lupus 
era calls for further research on the topic of solidarity, in order to assess 
whether Europeans can still rely on solidarity as a community resource 
(Bourgeois 1896; Hanagan 1980; Hyman 1986), or whether they have 
fractured into different and dispersed archipelagos of special interests. 
Nowhere is an analysis of solidarity more crucial than in France, which in 
this respect seems to stand at a crossroads. Solidarity is one of the major 
pillars of the French constitutional ethos, an essential component of 
“Fraternity” (Fraternité), a notion symbolically portrayed in the revolu-
tionary tricolour, and that plays a prominent part in the national anthem. 
In recent years, however, many public policies based on solidarity have 
been scrutinised, heavily criticised, and eventually restricted so as to shrink 
the country’s welfare expenditure (Cinalli and De Nuzzo 2017).
This chapter approaches the study of solidarity in France by comparing 
three important vulnerable groups, namely, the disabled, the unemployed, 
and refugees. If we begin with the disabled, one notes that protection for 
the disabled has worsened in France, particularly if we consider the impact 
of public expenditure cuts and the reduction in the overall scope of gov-
ernment action. While public authorities do oversee a generous healthcare 
system, they only dedicate a minor fraction of its resources to disability 
policies, prompting increasing outcries from disability groups. In terms of 
the erosion of welfare entitlements, another group that has been massively 
affected are the unemployed, who have faced a significant decline in the 
amount of financial support made available to them and in their chances 
of being reinserted into the labour market (Chabanet 2014, 2017). 
Refugees, meanwhile, have been the target of many restrictive measures. 
This underscores how negative the agenda of successive French govern-
ments has been, both on the left and on the right, and this has deterred 
new arrivals and has made it difficult for citizens to show their solidarity 
with refugees while staying within the boundaries of the law (Müller 2009, 
2014).
The way we approach solidarity in this chapter is quite comprehensive 
and hinges on an important distinction between two different meanings of 
solidarity: solidarity understood as an input and solidarity understood as 
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an output. On the one hand, we focus on areas where solidarity expresses 
itself as a process, whether at the individual level of empathy with the vul-
nerable or at the political level through partaking within the republican 
community. On the other hand, we also consider the instances where soli-
darity expresses itself through one-off actions carried out by individuals at 
a specific time and place. In particular, we are attentive to the very varied 
nature of the repertoire of actions carried out by different individuals 
(Teorell et al. 2007), including when they act as part of a group (Tilly 
1978). Our dual focus on solidarity as an input and as an output thus 
enables us to distinguish between various “trajectories of solidarity” and 
thereby to better understand the way certain individual variables (such as 
self-identification and proximity) combine with political variables (like 
voting, an interest in politics, or the reading of newspapers) in very differ-
ent ways, to produce different configurations of solidarity actions in each 
of the three fields of vulnerability considered here.
Our first major goal in this chapter is to provide a detailed analysis of 
the way solidarity actions vary within and across the three fields of vulner-
ability analysed here. The second, more ambitious, goal of the present 
chapter is to search for the broad causes that could help to explain these 
variations in the nature of the solidarity actions carried out. In this specific 
instance, the distinction we establish between individually based and polit-
ically based solidarity trajectories makes it possible for us to determine 
whether solidarity actions are propelled more by self-identification and by 
a great degree of proximity between individuals in the private sphere, or 
whether they are the outcome of the republican process of transforming 
the “general will” into specific policies and laws through the mediation of 
public institutions. The chapter starts by presenting the three fields of 
vulnerability that are the focus of our analysis, and it outlines the theoreti-
cal foundations for choosing these groups in particular. We also focus on 
the difference between various solidarity actions (and thus on solidarity as 
an output) and on the two main trajectories that lead to this type of 
actions, one centred on the individual and one on communal republican 
processes (here solidarity is understood as an input). The following step 
consists in focussing on different degrees of solidarity and on the various 
forms solidarity takes across all three fields of vulnerability (section “The 
Different Repertoires of Solidarity Actions”), before moving on to exam-
ine the two main trajectories that inform solidarity actions (section 
“Explaining the Dynamics of Solidarity: Individual Closeness Versus 
Republican Citizenship”). Finally, we sum up our most important findings 
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and identify some important challenges that need be tackled by future 
research on vulnerability and solidarity (section “Conclusion”).
SolIdarIty and VulnerabIlIty: a croSS-FIeld 
theoretIcal Framework
Any study of solidarity in France must take a critical distance to the ide-
alised picture of “Fraternity” (Fraternité) that is typically presented as an 
essential pillar of French republicanism. Undeniably France is a country 
where health standards and the provision state protection in cases of illness 
remain relatively high compared to other developed countries, where dis-
missed workers have often united with other vulnerable groups under the 
same banner, and where some children of refugees (and of migrants more 
generally) have achieved leading positions in the business world and also 
at the head of the state itself.2 Beyond this evidence however, we also 
know that the decreased protection offered by the state to various vulner-
able groups and welfare retrenchment in general have been going on for a 
long while, an evolution which is bound to have had an impact on the 
meaning and practice of solidarity. Fraternity has increasingly become a 
fundamental value in words only, unable to prevent vulnerable groups 
from being marginalised. Fraternity has also become a somewhat fuzzy 
term with respect to its ontological content; and progressively, political 
references to solidarity as a “public” fundamental, an essential aspect of 
republican citizenship, have become few and far between, replaced by a 
more individual notion of solidarity understood as a private virtue.
In the case of the disabled, for instance, there has been a change for the 
worse both in terms of health policies and in terms of the protection 
offered to sick people, particularly when one takes into account policies 
designed to reduce public spending. Throughout the 2000s and the 
2010s, disability aid has suffered regular cuts in spite of the outcries of 
major French disability groups.3 As regards the unemployed, contentious 
issues such as work activation, long-term unemployment, and social 
dumping have all featured prominently in the public debate throughout 
the 2000s and the 2010s, with huge protests having been organised to 
denounce an overly contractualist approach to welfare as well as the 
broader, supply-focused trend governing many EU policies. The condi-
tions governing unemployment benefits have become more restrictive, the 
use of sanctions has increased, while the latest reform of the French labour 
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market in 2016, the Loi Travail, has outlined a range of cases where 
employers are now entitled to resort to economic redundancy. Lastly, 
political developments throughout the 2000s and 2010s have also resulted 
in an increasingly restrictive stance, on the part of the French state, towards 
refugees. This restrictive response has led to many evictions as well as to 
the final closure of the “jungle”, a refugee camp close to Calais; it has also 
resulted in the tough border controls implemented at the time of the 
“Arab Spring” and of the Syrian war, which effectively expressed a lack of 
solidarity with the large number of Tunisians and Syrians who were fleeing 
from slaughters and inhuman conditions. This hardline position has even 
led to coercive measures being enforced to punish “solidarity crimes” 
committed by individual activists, on the basis of article L622-1 of the 
CESEDA, the Code regulating the Arrival and Residence of Foreigners 
and the Right of Asylum (Müller 2009, 2014).
These developments across various fields of vulnerability in France call 
for a more systematic evaluation of the trajectories that lead to solidarity 
actions, solidarity being understood both as an input and as an output. As 
an output, we analyse solidarity by considering the various forms of soli-
darity action that French citizens carry out across the fields of disability, 
unemployment, and support for refugees. In so doing, we draw on some 
of the seminal literature that appeared between the end of the 1990s and 
the early 2000s, and that focused on “altruism” and on the concrete 
instances of mobilisation carried out by pro-beneficiaries on behalf of weak 
groups (Cinalli 2004; Giugni and Passy 2001; Simeant 1998), but which 
has not so far resulted in many empirical studies of a systematically com-
parative nature (see however Lahusen 2013; Baglioni and Giugni 2014). 
While social research on solidarity has developed over the last decade, it 
has tended to focus on attitudes, commitments, and norms, for example, 
in terms of social citizenship (Bellamy et al. 2006), readiness to share one’s 
own resources with others (Stjerno 2012: 2), support for fiscal policies of 
redistribution (Rehm 2009), resilient cleavages within Europe (Delhey 
2007), and the weakening of bonds between member states. What our 
specific focus on solidarity as an output should allow us to do is to shed 
light on solidarity actions that either reinforce or weaken the position of 
vulnerable groups.
While the following section focuses mostly on the importance of dis-
tinguishing between the various forms that the solidarity repertoire can 
take, the main point we wish to make here is that by looking at these 
configurations, we also want to trace them back to solidarity understood 
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as an input. In so doing, we approach solidarity as an active force, which 
itself tends to change according to the context in which it expresses itself. 
More specifically, our ambition is to determine whether solidarity actions 
follow from (1) trajectories that originate in the private sphere and that 
are triggered by emphatic feelings of self-identification and real proximity 
between pro- beneficiaries and vulnerable beneficiaries or (2) trajectories 
that originate within the French body politic that are triggered by a feel-
ing of Fraternity as understood under republicanism. In the latter case, 
this type of trajectory must be related to a series of variables that are 
almost ubiquitous in the scholarly works that look at the interpenetration 
between citizens and their broader political community (Nie et al. 1996; 
Parry et al. 1992). In addition to another variable that considers informa-
tion-seeking through the medium of newspapers, we examine voting and 
having a general interest in politics: these variables have often been used 
by scholars, for example, to establish a positive relationship between 
political interest and voting (Verba et al. 1995) or, on the contrary, to 
question this relationship (Lassen 2005).
By taking into account the complex relationship between solidarity as 
an input and as an output, our ultimate aim is to distinguish between on 
the one hand a “private-individual” (henceforth, individual) solidarity tra-
jectory and on the other hand a “public-republican” (henceforth, politi-
cal) trajectory. This dual approach to solidarity is also valuable since it 
allows us to understand the interplay between different citizenship tradi-
tions that have developed either through mutual acknowledgement and 
shared purposes or through access to the policy domain of rule-making 
(Cinalli 2017). More specifically, the distinction we establish between an 
individual solidarity trajectory and a political one works as follows. On the 
one hand, we expect individual variables including self-identification and 
closeness to vulnerable groups to be especially relevant in the field of dis-
ability, owing to the universal sense of responsibility that people for whom 
solidarity is important can appeal to when they act in support of fellow 
citizens who often suffer from a disability that neither they nor power 
holders can be held responsible for. On the other hand, political variables 
including the internalisation of republican norms are expected to be espe-
cially relevant in the field of unemployment, owing to the politically based 
sense of responsibility that French people can appeal to in support of fel-
low citizens who are vulnerable as a result of politics, and specifically of 
unemployment policies and of specific decisions taken by power holders.
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Lastly, the field of refugee assistance provides us with a further oppor-
tunity to disentangle the individual and political determinants of solidarity 
actions. In this case, the main expectation going into the study is that 
individual variables will prove to be more effective in terms of leading to 
solidarity actions. Since refugees are not part of the republican community 
of citizens, the solidarity trajectory leading French nationals to help them 
should logically be determined by individual rather than by political vari-
ables. France often considers itself to be a “civilising power” (Burrow 
1986), a country where refugees (and migrants in general) are the objects 
(rather than the subjects) of politics, at least until they become fully inte-
grated into the republican community of citizens (Schnapper 2003).
Given that both solidarity trajectories are relevant when it comes to 
support for the disabled, we expect to find a much higher level of solidar-
ity actions in the field of disability than in the other two fields. We expect 
the individual trajectory to be rather ineffective in the field of unemploy-
ment and the political trajectory to be likewise ineffective as a means of 
triggering support to refugees. This also means that we expect the general 
level of solidarity actions to be at its lowest in the field of refugee assis-
tance, since self-identification and a feeling of proximity are determinants 
that are likely to work less well when we have a high number of national 
respondents being polled about their solidarity with non-national refu-
gees, who represent a much more distant community of equals, compared 
for instance to the disabled. Furthermore, we also anticipate some impor-
tant variations in the pattern of solidarity actions in each of the fields con-
sidered. We expect individual types of action to prevail in the field of 
disability and in the field of refugee assistance owing to the greater impor-
tance of the individual trajectory in these fields. Conversely, collective 
forms of solidarity mobilisation are expected to prevail in the unemploy-
ment field, since this issue appears at lot more straightforwardly political 
in its nature.
the dIFFerent RepeRtoiRes oF SolIdarIty actIonS
As we said earlier, our cross-field comparison of solidarity follows two 
main steps. We start by analysing the repertoire of solidarity actions carried 
out by French citizens, in order to examine whether different fields of 
vulnerability are characterised by different configurations of solidarity 
actions. We then continue by focusing on intra-field variations in solidar-
ity, in order to examine whether specific forms of action are prevalent in 
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each of the fields considered here. This is grounded on scholarly work that 
has emphasised the necessity to distinguish between the various facets of a 
varied repertoire of individual action (Teorell et al. 2007); in our study this 
analysis of individual actions must also include instances where individuals 
participate in larger, collective forms of mobilisation (Tilly 1978). In par-
ticular, we analyse “donating money” and “donating time” as types of 
solidarity actions that are individually based and less direct while also tak-
ing into account actions such as “protesting” and “buying or refusing to 
buy specific products”, which are collective and more direct forms of 
mobilisation.
The figures in Table 9.1 reflect the relative importance of these four 
types of solidarity action across the three fields. The large cross-field varia-
tions (cf. the totals in first column) clearly show that solidarity actions vary 
substantially depending on the specific vulnerable groups that they target. 
Our first important finding is that a large majority of the people in our 
sample (54.7% out of 2098 respondents) engage in multiple forms of soli-
darity action at the same time (as suggested by the fact that the percent-
ages add up to more than 100%). The individuals who take part in these 
actions are particularly mobilised by disability issues, while their level of 
participation decreases steeply when the focus is on unemployment, and 
even more so when actions are meant to help refugees. More specifically, 
Table 9.1 shows that when all variables are combined, 47% of the individu-
als in the sample are willing to support the disabled: in this case the most 
common types of solidarity actions carried out are “donating money” and 
“donating time”, which account for respectively 27% and 17% of the 
actions carried out by the surveyed population. “Buying or refusing to buy 
specific products” only concerns 12.9% of the sample, while protest actions 
Table 9.1 Overall support and specific forms of solidarity actions per field (in %4)




Buying or refusing to 
buy specific products
Disability 47.6 6.6 27.4 17 12.9
Unemployment 21.8 5.2 6.6 9.4 7.4
Refugees 17.7 3.8 8.3 6.1 5.6
Total 54.7 
(2098)
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such as demonstrations or strikes concern a much tinier proportion of 
6.6%.
In the unemployment field, the proportion of people engaging in soli-
darity actions decreases to 22% of the total sample. The percentages of 
people ready to donate time and money reflect the patterns in the disabil-
ity field, since they also indicate that the participants’ repertoire consists 
primarily of actions that are individual and less direct. Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, it is more common to contribute time rather than money in the field 
of unemployment, while the opposite is true in the field of disability. This 
must no doubt be related to the more financially precarious position of the 
unemployed, who are systematically excluded from the labour market. 
However, the percentages indicating people’s participation in collective 
and direct forms of solidarity—by means of product boycotts or protests—
show that there is no direct analogy between solidarity for the unem-
ployed and solidarity for the disabled. In particular, contributions of time 
and money do not clearly prevail over more direct and collective forms of 
solidarity actions, which together represent nearly 13%. Lastly, we find the 
smallest percentages of participation in solidarity actions in the field of 
refugee assistance: fewer than 18% of respondents stated that they would 
actively participate in support actions for refugees. 8.3% of the individuals 
in the sample said they had donated money, and a smaller proportion 
(6.1%) had donated time to help refugees through volunteering. Compared 
to the fields of disability and unemployment, participation in protest 
actions represents no more than 3.8%, and buying or refusing to buy spe-
cific products concerns 5.6% of the total sample.
The evaluation of field-specific actions further enhances our under-
standing of internal, field-related dynamics. In the second phase of our 
comparative analysis, we have therefore indicated percentages only as a 
ratio of the total number of people engaging in solidarity actions 
(n = 1149) and no longer as a ratio of the entire sample of interviewed 
people. In this way, intra-field differences can be tracked more precisely, 
and it is easier to see the difference between the types of actions that are 
individually based and less direct (like donating money or time) and those 
that are collective and that entail direct mobilisation (such as participating 
in protests or in product boycotts). Overall, the general patterns charac-
terising each of the three fields of vulnerability are confirmed, and we can 
once more see that solidarity increases as we move from support for refu-
gees to support for the unemployed, and then to support for the disabled. 
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These figures also confirm that individuals engage in several types of soli-
darity actions at the same time.
However, a closer look at field-specific percentages also shows that in 
the field of disability, individual and indirect forms of action clearly pre-
dominate over other forms of action. The latter are practised by almost the 
entire sample of people who engage in solidarity actions (over 93%). 
Individual forms of action also prevail in the field of unemployment, but 
with a much lower margin. In this case, findings show that a majority of 
the people in the sample also engage in collective forms of direct mobilisa-
tion (57.5%). This is more or less in line with the general perception that 
France is a country where social movements are a pillar of republican citi-
zenship (Sirot 2014). Lastly, as regards refugees, our findings show that 
this field has the smallest group of people engaged in solidarity actions 
(n = 372, just over a third of those active within the field of disability). Just 
as in the field of disability, people who help refugees overwhelmingly 
choose solidarity actions that are individually based and less direct. In fact, 
this is where we note a significant gap between the individually based and 
the collectively based repertoire, given that the latter represents two thirds 
of the former (53.2% vs. 81.1%; larger than the same gap in the field of 
unemployment).
To sum things up, Tables 9.1 and 9.2 confirm that a majority of people 
in France engage in solidarity actions, with more than 54% of individuals 
participating in one or more forms of solidarity to support the disabled, 
the unemployed, or refugees. The main result to emerge from this analysis 
consists in the much greater level of participation in solidarity actions in 
the field of disability than in the other two fields: findings show that sup-
port for the disabled is the most frequent expression of solidarity in France, 
followed by support for the unemployed. Support for refugees stands out 
by its low level; refugees receive help from fewer than one-fifth of the 
people in our sample. However, findings also show that each field is 
Table 9.2 Individual versus collective repertoire (in %)
N Collective mobilisation Individual participation
Disability 999 40.9 93.1
Unemployment 458 57.5 73.1
Refugees 372 53.2 81.1
Total 1149
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 characterised by its own, typical repertoire of solidarity. Individual forms of 
action prevail in the field of disability and, in relative terms, also in the field 
of refugees (in the latter case, in an overall context of much lower solidar-
ity). By contrast, collective forms of action prevail in the field of unem-
ployment. These first results concerning the amount of solidarity expressed 
and its repertoire certainly go some way to confirm our expectations. 
Solidarity expresses itself most strongly in the field of disability, since it 
brings together both of the trajectories that connect French citizens to the 
disabled. On the one hand, emphatic feelings of self-identification and 
proximity—which express themselves most strongly in the case of people 
who do not enjoy the same good health as the majority of the popula-
tion—go hand in hand with a high prevalence of individual forms of soli-
darity actions. On the other hand, since the disabled are themselves 
citizens, it is logical that their problems should also be seen as issues that 
concern the whole republican community, hence the high amount of col-
lective forms of solidarity action. Solidarity actions are less common in the 
field of unemployment. This is also in line with our theoretical framework, 
since our expectation was that feelings of empathy would not play the 
same role as in the case of the disabled. Just as expected, the high preva-
lence of collective types of solidarity actions indicates that unemployment 
in France tends to be seen as a political matter rather than as an individual 
one and that the whole republican community is held accountable for the 
problem. Lastly, solidarity is at its weakest in the case of refugees, which 
further serves to reinforce our argument. Since their status means that 
they stand outside the republican community, refugees only benefit from 
the type of solidarity that springs from a general empathy with human suf-
fering and an ability to see all people as fellow human beings (yet, as said, 
a much more distant community of equals than fellow citizens).
We can now move on to consider the respective impacts of the indi-
vidual trajectory and of the political one. Indeed, the results in this section 
suggest that the links between these trajectories and solidarity actions 
deserve additional scrutiny. We must therefore pay closer attention to the 
specific assumptions underpinning these expectations, namely, that each of 
these two trajectories represents significant predictors of solidarity action 
in the field of disability, while only one of the two functions as a significant 
predictor in the other two fields (the political trajectory in the case of the 
unemployed and the individual trajectory for the disabled).
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explaInIng the dynamIcS oF SolIdarIty: IndIVIdual 
cloSeneSS VerSuS republIcan Citizenship
This section is designed to assess and explain some of the important argu-
ments that have driven our analyses throughout this chapter, namely, that 
solidarity actions are more likely to result from an individual trajectory or 
from a political trajectory depending on the specific field of vulnerability 
under consideration. For example, we have argued that the political trajec-
tory is most likely to have a strong impact in the field of unemployment, 
which would go a long way towards explaining why we did indeed note 
the large amount of collective forms of solidarity action in the field of 
unemployment. And we have argued that the individual trajectory would 
be a stronger trigger for solidarity actions in the fields of disability and 
refugees, which would go a long way towards explaining why we did 
indeed note the extensive prevalence of individual forms over collective 
forms.
Regression data does show that in all three fields, the individual trajec-
tory proves relevant when the respondent is empathetically concerned by 
one of vulnerabilities respectively. Two variables have been included in 
the first regressions: (1) whether or not the respondent belongs to a vul-
nerable group (the disabled, the unemployed, or foreigners)5 and (2) 
whether the respondent has relatives or friends who are either disabled, 
or unemployed, or of foreigner origins. The assumption here is that if 
individuals are themselves affected by these processes, or if they have a 
close relationship to other people being affected by same processes, then 
they are also more likely to be actively engaged in solidarity actions in the 
relevant field. The second trajectory proves to be more relevant when the 
respondent’s mobilisation follows the political prescriptions of the French 
Republic. In this case, the crucial variables include being interested in 
politics, being politically active by voting, and following the political 
debate by regularly reading newspapers. The objective is to understand 
whether a political trajectory, informed by political participation and 
interest in public issues, can help to explain cross-field variations in terms 
of solidarity actions.
Tables 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5 examine in some detail to what extent solidar-
ity actions in each field follow from the individual trajectory. On the basis 
of the arguments and of the data that have been laid out in the previous 
sections, we expected this first trajectory to prove much more important 
when it comes to solidarity with the disabled and with refugees than for 
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solidarity with the unemployed. Conversely, the second, political trajec-
tory will presumably play a more important role in the field of unemploy-
ment. Tables 9.6, 9.7, and 9.8 therefore combine individual and political 
variables, in order to show to what extent solidarity can be explained by 
empathy or by a practice of republican citizenship. Finally, the model also 
relies on control filters, namely, gender, level of education, and age.
Findings show that individuals who are personally affected by disability 
or who self-identify with the disabled are not more likely to participate in 
activities to support the disabled than any other individual. However, the 





Considers him-/herself as having a 
disability
0.0289 0.0346 −0.0390, 0.0969
Has family or friends who are disabled 0.184*** 0.0262 0.1330, 0.2360
_Cons 0.431*** 0.0125 0.4069, 0.4561
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1





Declared that he/she was 
unemployed
−0.052 0.0377 −0.1269, 0.0212
Has unemployed family or friends 0.033* 0.0190 −0.0036, 0.0709
_Cons 0.209*** 0.0115 0.1866, 0.2318
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1





Born in France 0.045 0.0407 −0.0346, 0.1253
Has family, friends, or acquaintances 
coming from a different country
0.033* 0.0174 −0.0011, 0.0673
_Cons 0.122*** 0.0412 0.0412, 0.2032
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Considers him-/herself as having a 
disability
0.0353 0.0341 −0.0315, 0.1022
Has family or friends who are disabled 0.170*** 0.0258 0.1200, 0.2216
Voted in the most recent 2012 elections 0.0743*** 0.0246 0.0259, 0.1227
Reads the newspaper +3 days a week 0.125*** 0.0218 0.0831, 0.1687
Considers him-/herself to be moderately 
or very interested in politics
0.076*** 0.0226 0.0319, 0.1205
_Cons 0.274*** 0.0236 0.2284, 0.3210
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1





Declared that he/she was unemployed −0.041 0.0371 −0.1147, 0.0311
Has unemployed family or friends 0.036** 0.0186 0.0003, 0.0735
Voted in the most recent 2012 elections −0.008 0.0206 −0.0488, 0.0322
Reads the newspaper +3 days a week 0.118*** 0.0182 0.0830, 0.1543
Considers him-/herself to be moderately or 
very interested in politics
0.097*** 0.0188 0.0604, 0.1344
_Cons 0.099*** 0.0205 0.0592, 0.1398
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1





Born in France 0.054 0.0401 −0.0246, 0.1327
Has family, friends, or acquaintances 
coming from a different country
0.022 0.0171 −0.0108, 0.0565
Voted in the most recent 2012 elections −0.071*** 0.0191 −0.1090, −0.0340
Reads the newspaper +3 days a week 0.114*** 0.0168 0.0811, 0.1470
Considers him-/herself to be moderately 
or very interested in politics
0.091*** 0.0174 0.0576, 0.1262
_Cons 0.061 0.0422 −0.0214, 0.1444
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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second variable of empathy, namely, proximity, does indeed appear to be 
correlated with solidarity as an output, thus confirming our hypothesis: 
the individual trajectory is highly relevant when it comes to explaining 
solidarity actions in support for the disabled.
The integration of political indicators into the survey improves the 
model’s accuracy. In particular, we observe that both an interest in politics 
and voting have some impact on solidarity actions in the field of disability, 
while reading the newspaper has a strong impact. The introduction of 
political variables does not, however, bring into question our expectations. 
The individual and the political trajectory both stand out as relevant when 
it comes to explaining variations in terms of solidarity actions within the 
field of disability. We can conclude that it is when the individual trajectory 
and the political trajectory combine that we see the highest levels of 
 solidarity actions across the three fields (cf. section “The Different 
Repertoires of Solidarity Actions”).
The incorporation of a number of sociodemographic controls has a 
limited effect on the results obtained in Tables 9.3 and 9.6. The model 
proves to be slightly more effective than the earlier ones at explaining soli-
darity actions in support of the disabled. Table 9.9 shows that age is not a 
relevant factor when it comes to explaining solidarity as an output. The 
same is true of the respondents’ level of education. The distribution of 
individuals with university-level education who do not engage in solidarity 
actions is equivalent that of less educated people who are likewise not 
active. Similarly, of all those with secondary-level education, 53% do not 
participate in disability-related solidarity actions, compared to 46% who 
can be qualified as active or engaged in such actions. A similar conclusion 
can be drawn in terms of gender. The proportion of women who are active 
and not active is very similar to the proportion of men who fall in both of 
these categories.
Data for the field of unemployment proves to be quite different from 
what we have observed for the field of disability. First of all, Table 9.4 
establishes a weak negative relationship between self-identification and the 
decision to engage in solidarity actions. Even though the validity of this 
interaction may be limited by the small number of unemployed people 
featured in the sample, it is nevertheless somewhat surprising to observe 
that four-fifths of the unemployed are not active, with only one-fifth of 
them actively engaged in actions designed to combat unemployment. The 
low ratio of participation suggests that other external factors are likely to 
be relevant, such as social processes of stigmatisation and defeatism, all of 
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which have been discussed in the literature (Jahoda et al. 1971; Schnapper 
1981; Demazière and Pignoni 1998). When it comes to having a relation-
ship of empathy with unemployed people, figures reveal that the individ-
ual trajectory only has a weak impact on solidarity actions, indeed far less 
influential than in the field of disability. This confirms that individual vari-
ables are inadequate in order to explain the variations in solidarity actions 
in the field of unemployment.
The political variables provide us with further material to explain soli-
darity actions in the field of unemployment. We observe that the impor-
tance of proximity becomes less relevant than before if we add a number 
of political variables. In particular, both an interest in politics and (espe-
cially) reading newspapers have a positive correlation to the choice of 
engaging solidarity actions. However participating in elections does not 
appear to increase solidarity towards the unemployed, which reinforces 
the argument, outlined in several scholarly works, that there is a great 
distance between traditional politics and the politics of unemployment 
(Piven and Cloward 1977; Bagguley 1991, 1992).
The use of controlled regressions suggests once more that sociodemo-
graphic variables have a low impact. As far as age is concerned, findings 
show that being young or old makes no difference when it comes to being 
actively engaged in support actions—as we had already seen in the case of 






Considers him-/herself as having a 
disability
0.036 0.0343 −0.0310, 0.1035
Has family or friends who are disabled 0.171*** 0.0259 0.1204, 0.2224
Voted in the most recent 2012 elections 0.055** 0.0267 0.0032, 0.1081
Reads the newspaper +3 days a week 0.127*** 0.0218 0.0845, 0.1701
Considers him-/herself to be moderately 
or very interested in politics
0.074*** 0.0231 0.0292, 0.1199
Gender 0.011 0.0218 −0.0317, 0.0540
Age 0.001* 0.0007 −2.07e−07, 0.0029
Level of education 0.033 0.0232 −0.0115, 0.0794
_Cons 0.178*** 0.0575 0.0660, 0.2917
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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disability. The same conclusion can be drawn for educational level. Given 
that out of the total number of respondents who support the unemployed 
(N  =  458) one-third has finished their secondary education, and two- 
thirds have undertaken higher studies, education appears to have a more 
important influence than age but nevertheless not a determinant one. The 
same pattern repeats itself in the case of gender-related indicators, since a 
similar proportion of men and women engage in solidarity in the field.6
To sum things up, Table 9.10 depicts the main drivers behind solidarity 
towards the unemployed. The most salient indicators in the field refer to 
the political trajectory. We conclude—in line with our expectations—that 
solidarity vis-à-vis the unemployed is not best explained by the individual 
trajectory, but rather by the political trajectory that is rooted within French 
republicanism.
As regards solidarity, the first individual variable taken into account 
is the individual’s place of birth, which is used here to deduce whether 
he or she is a refugee or more broadly a migrant. Our findings reveal 
that French nationals are more likely to engage in solidarity actions to 
support refugees, compared to both non-nationals and individuals 
born abroad. However, the relationship between place of birth and 
solidarity actions only has a limited significance. Following the same 
logic, an individual who has relatives or friends that are refugees or 






Declared that he/she was unemployed −0.061* 0.0372 −0.1345, 0.0117
Has unemployed family or friends 0.035* 0.0186 −0.0005, 0.0724
Voted in the most recent 2012 elections 0.023 0.0223 −0.0206, 0.0668
Reads the newspaper +3 days a week 0.115*** 0.0181 0.0801, 0.1512
Considers him-/herself to be moderately 
or very interested in politics
0.085*** 0.0192 0.0480, 0.1235
Gender −0.050*** 0.0181 −0.0857, −0.0145
Age −0.002*** 0.0006 −0.0037, −0.0012
Level of education 0.005 0.0191 −0.0320, 0.0432
_Cons 0.277*** 0.0488 0.1817, 0.3735
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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migrants will be slightly more inclined to become active in this field. In 
this case, we find that self- identification seems to play a major role and 
proximity a minor one for refugee-related solidarity (contrary to what 
we had observed for disability).
The inclusion of political indicators provides a clearer picture of the 
mechanisms accounting for solidarity towards refugees (Table  9.11). 
While voting has a weak relationship to participation in solidarity actions, 
interest in politics and reading the newspaper come across as relevant 
explanatory variables. Therefore, we can conclude so far that the political 
trajectory appears to account more effectively for the choice to engage in 
solidarity actions. Undeniably, this is the most surprisingly finding of all, 
which deserves full consideration in our last section, where we deal with 
the main results of this chapter.
As regards our control variables, they appear to confirm the patterns 
that emerged from our study of the two previous fields, since educational 
level, age, and gender do not appear to be essential factors in explaining 
solidarity towards refugees. Even though younger people have a slightly 
stronger tendency to become activists, the correlation with age is never-
theless not very significant. In the same way, but with a clearer discrepancy, 
men appear to be slightly more active than women. In particular, we see 
that in the sub-samples of men and women, 19% of the former and 16% of 






Born in France 0.045 0.0402 −0.0335, 0.1241
Has family, friends, or acquaintances 
coming from a different country
0.021 0.0171 −0.0122, 0.0548
Voted in the most recent 2012 elections −0.037* 0.0207 −0.0784, 0.0028
Reads the newspaper +3 days a week 0.111*** 0.0167 0.0787, 0.1443
Considers him-/herself to be moderately 
or very interested in politics
0.082*** 0.0178 0.0472, 0.1171
Gender −0.026 0.0167 −0.0596, 0.006
Age −0.002*** 0.0005 −0.0035, −0.0012
Education level 0.021 0.0177 −0.0132, 0.0565
_Cons 0.193*** 0.0601 0.0758, 0.3118
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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the latter are activists. Lastly, educational level has a more limited impact 
here than in the case of unemployment, but a more important influence 
than in the field of disability.7
concluSIon
This chapter has analysed variations in the pattern of solidarity actions 
designed to support the disabled, the unemployed, and refugees. These 
three groups have become increasingly vulnerable in France during the 
last few years as a result of decreasing social protection and of welfare cuts: 
the notion that one ought to feel an unconditional solidarity towards the 
vulnerable has lost its hold, paving the way for a new state approach to 
“conditional” forms of welfare and protection. As a result, state-run soli-
darity systems now require the vulnerable themselves to assume ever more 
responsibility for their problems (Cinalli and De Nuzzo 2017). Against 
this background of increasing policy restrictions, the present chapter has 
analysed the bottom-up dynamics of solidarity linking French people to 
some of most vulnerable groups. The main aim has been to understand 
which factors are more likely to lead to solidarity actions (this is what we 
mean by solidarity as an output). In particular, we have focused on two 
major solidarity trajectories—an individual trajectory and a political trajec-
tory (that is what we mean by solidarity as an input)—with the expectation 
that both of them would prove important in accounting for variations in 
the amount and the type of solidarity actions in each of the fields of vul-
nerability considered here.
What characterises the individual trajectory is that the solidarity actions 
in which a person chooses to engage (the output) must be understood as 
a direct consequence of individual variables of empathy, in this case self- 
identification and proximity (the input). Conversely, in the political trajec-
tory, solidarity actions (the output) are determined by political variables 
like voting, having an interest in politics, and keeping abreast of the public 
debate (the input). We did not, however, expect that both trajectories 
would always combine in the same way. For example, if one considers the 
usual argument of social capital scholarship that associations are extremely 
important since they enable individuals to form human bonds (the indi-
vidual variables, in our theoretical framework) while also engaging in pur-
poseful political action (the political variables, in our theoretical framework) 
(Rosenstone and Mark Hansen 1993; Lichterman 2005; Putnam 1993, 
2000), this could have prompted us to simplistically assume that both 
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trajectories would have worked in synergy for all vulnerable groups. On 
the contrary, we suspected that for some vulnerable groups, individual 
bonding could in fact reinforce their self-exclusion from politics (cf. the 
notion of “polarisation” in Sunstein 2002). In the case of the unemployed, 
for instance, self-identification can be hampered by the increasing stigma-
tisation they face in society at large.
The only field where we expected both trajectories to neatly combine 
was the field of disability, given that solidarity with the disabled can be 
triggered by both individual and political variables. We expected that 
the political trajectory would prevail in the field of unemployment, 
given that solidarity, in this case, is directed towards fellow citizens 
penalised by specific policies, but with whom it might not be easy to 
form bonds (especially in terms of self-identification). Lastly, we 
expected the individual trajectory to prevail as a driver of solidarity 
actions for refugees, since the latter can be seen as fellow human beings, 
but not as fellow citizens since their status places them outside the polit-
ical community.
Our results did indeed prove that the individual trajectory and the 
political trajectory combine in various ways and that they can help to 
account for variations in the amount and forms of solidarity actions 
across different fields of vulnerability, even when controlling for impor-
tant sociodemographic factors like age, education, and gender. Among 
the expectations that were confirmed by our data was the suspicion that 
the political trajectory was the only possible driver of solidarity actions 
in the unemployment field. As expected, French citizens who engage 
with politics and follow the public debate are also more likely to see 
unemployment as the consequence of certain political choices and of 
specific policies, which makes it a problem to be solved by calling for 
collective action and for public solutions. Solidarity actions will there-
fore be carried out (mainly in a public and collective way) in spite of the 
processes of stigmatisation that are at work and that weaken the effec-
tiveness of the individual trajectory. By contrast, the individual trajec-
tory plays an important role in the field of disability, where it combines 
with political variables in a way to lead to the highest level of solidarity 
actions across all three fields.
However, the main point to emphasise is that results did fall short of 
our expectations when it came to solidarity towards refugees. While we 
were initially unsurprised to see that solidarity actions were at their 
lowest level in this field, and that they were mainly the result of an 
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individual and private repertoire, we were quite surprised to discover 
that solidarity actions were especially tied to political variables. This 
means that the political trajectory proved to be the one with a relevant 
impact even in the case of a vulnerable group that falls outside the 
political community of republican citizens. This result stands out as an 
important discovery, insofar as it undermines two of the assumptions 
on which we based our research. One of these was that republican citi-
zenship can only account for solidarity that is acted through a collec-
tive, public understanding of political intervention. But manifestly this 
is not the case given that the political trajectory proves relevant to 
explain the dynamics of solidarity across all fields of vulnerability, 
including in fields where the individual and private repertoire prevails 
significantly over the public and collective repertoire. Secondly, and 
most importantly, our findings show that in spite of the prevailing cul-
ture of disenchantment towards public institutions, people in France 
remain interested in politics, and, one could say, very republican. The 
political community cannot be in such bad health in France as pundits 
and commentators repeatedly claim it is, if republican citizenship 
appears to be a key mechanism to mobilise people when dealing with 
vulnerability.
This chapter has focused on the French case, but it has a much broader 
relevance since it shows that the notion of solidarity is neither simple nor 
monolithic, and that one should ideally talk not of one, but of several 
“types of solidarities” to account for the complex articulations of the dif-
ferent trajectories that link solidarity as an input and solidarity as an output. 
The same can be said for the notion of vulnerability, since we have shown 
that trajectories of solidarity do indeed change, and quite significantly so, 
depending on the specific vulnerable group that they target. While our 
scholarly pride may have been piqued by the discovery that our theoretical 
framework was not adequate to account for our unexpected results in the 
field of refugees, as citizens, these results provide us with much to rejoice 
over. In particular, we have discovered that the political trajectory of soli-
darity can have a remarkable potential even when it comes to helping vul-
nerable people outside the boundaries of the political community in France. 
Or put more simply, republicanism appears, at least this once, to fully live 
up to its universalist ideals. This may be due to the resilience of French 
republicanism but also, more broadly, to the fact that the strength of a 
community of nationals, either in France or elsewhere, can exceed the 
strict definition of its borders, both in human and in geographic terms. 
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The resilience of the French citizenry does not, therefore, necessarily play 
into the hands of those who increasingly seek to use it as an instrument to 
further extremist views that preach the rejection of refugees and of non-
national “aliens” in general.
noteS
1. See, for example, the article entitled “11 October 2013 migrant tragedy: 
Italians navy officers placed under investigation”, The Independent, 23 
October 2016, or the article “Stiamo morendo, per favore: le telefonate del 
naufragio dei bambini”, L’Espresso, 9 May 2017.
2. Cf. the article “How Nicolas Sarkozy’s father once lived rough in Paris”, The 
Telegraph, 11 April 2009.
3. http://www.connexionfrance.com/social-benefits-student-housing-dis-
ability-home-help-cut-income-support-rsa-11820-view-article.html.
4. N sample is 2098. All variables in the tables were weighted.
5. Self-identification with refugees was assessed through a broader reference to 
foreigners in general. The assumption was that self-identification and prox-
imity to foreigners and people of foreigner origins provide some strong 
bases for empathy with refugees.
6. Yet, the effect of sociodemographic variables in the model appears to be 
relevant, since the impact of self-identification increases, while the impor-
tance of voting changes to a positive and slightly more significant one.
7. Once again, the impact of sociodemographic controls on the model proves 
to be crucial, since they improve the model’s accuracy. In particular, includ-
ing these controls illustrates the impact of all the respective variables. It 
reduces the negative impact of voting. Since the reading of newspapers and 
having an interest in politics remain important factors, we are drawn to con-
clude that the political trajectory stands out as the most important path 
accounting for support towards refugees.
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CHAPTER 10




Citizens across Europe are committed to solidarity in its various manifes-
tations. As we know from previous studies, almost two-thirds of the pop-
ulation support redistributive policies aimed at reducing income 
inequalities (Burgoon 2014). Asked about their own commitment in 
practical terms, every fifth European citizen reports to have donated time 
or money to non-profit organizations (Bauer et al. 2013), and every third 
says to have joined an unconventional protest such as signing petitions or 
boycotting products (Hafner Fink 2012). Overall, the European citizenry 
cherishes solidarity as a private and public virtue. However, differences 
between the European people are considerable, particularly when com-
paring the high levels of voluntary engagement and political participation 
in Northern Europe with the lower rates in the Mediterranean and Eastern 
European countries (Anheier and Salamon 1999; Oorschot et al. 2006). 
Moreover, people tend to differentiate between groups in deciding whom 
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to support. In this respect, they see the elderly and the sick as more 
deserving than the jobless and the latter as more deserving than immi-
grants (Oorschot 2000, 2006). Solidarity is thus a complex and multidi-
mensional phenomenon.
The chapters of this book validate these general findings by making use 
of survey data gathered in the winter of 2016 by a EU-funded project 
(TransSOL). A significant proportion of the European population sup-
ports redistributive policies in order to equalize income levels within soci-
ety and substantial numbers of citizens are committed to donating money 
and time to the needy and to participating in political protests in support 
of people deprived of their rights. Additionally, national studies high-
lighted also that citizens are not only committed to support people in 
need within their own country but to engage in acts of solidarity with 
those living in other European countries and beyond the European 
continent.
This book focuses on cross-national solidarity and allows for providing 
a richer account of solidarity in Europe than previous studies have done. 
Evidence presented in this book not only paints a vivid picture of social 
solidarity within European countries but also  helps to ascertain and 
demarcate the role of European solidarity within this broader panorama. 
The findings of the previous chapters enable us to compare levels of soli-
darity between countries and to identify levels of support toward different 
target groups such as the disabled, the unemployed, and the refugees/
migrants. Additionally, they also highlight the degree to which citizens 
are committed to support other fellow Europeans, when compared to the 
solidarity they exhibit with people living in their own country and out-
side of Europe.
The previous chapters have presented and discussed country-specific 
findings, thus highlighting the specificities of each national case. These 
insights require a comparative assessment and reflection on the project’s 
findings. For this purpose, we will present the evidence gathered through 
our dataset by means of a direct comparison of country-specific levels of 
solidarity. In particular, we wish to highlight important manifestations of 
European solidarity by means of a series of tables describing the extent to 
which citizens in the eight countries under analysis are committed to prac-
tices of solidarity and redistributive policies at EU level. This evidence will 
be discussed in a concluding section, highlighting the main forces driving 
European solidarity and the implications of our findings for the future 
prospects of social cohesion in Europe.
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EuropEan SolIdarIty: a comparatIvE panorama
Our empirical analysis of European solidarity focuses on two manifesta-
tions. On the one hand, we deal with interpersonal forms of solidarity by 
comparing different levels of reported solidarity practices in eight European 
countries. On the other hand, we focus on the respondents’ views on 
redistributional policies at the national and European level. In both 
respects, we wish to unveil the motivations and rationales guiding and pat-
terning these forms of solidarity.
In the first step, we direct our attention to interpersonal, social soli-
darity. Our questionnaire had asked respondents to indicate the kind of 
activities they have been engaged in support of other people. They could 
report about a variety of conventional and unconventional activities 
(Grasso 2011, 2016), specifically the following six items: attended a 
march/protest/demonstration, donated money or time, bought or 
refused to buy products, engaged as a passive member or as an active 
member of an organization. For simplicity reasons, we examined whether 
citizens showed interpersonal solidarity by engaging in at least one 
activity.
Table 10.1 summarizes the findings by differentiating the answers of 
our respondents according to the six target groups of our study. The find-



























Denmark 47 23 35 44 27 30 2183
France 47 25 30 50 24 20 2098
Germany 51 31 40 52 27 34 2064
Greece 62 35 36 62 58 36 2061
Italy 47 32 33 49 36 28 2087
Poland 59 35 37 65 40 27 2119
UK 38 19 25 35 19 22 2221
Switzerland 59 34 45 67 33 33 2083
Total 51 29 35 53 33 29 16,916
‘Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups? Attend a 
protest, donate money or time, buy or boycott a product, passive or active membership in an organization’
Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
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ings show that a considerable number of European citizens report having 
been engaged in solidarity activities for other people, including donating 
money or time, protesting and engaging in voluntary associations. 
Concerning the spatial dimension, we see that practiced solidarity is stron-
gest at the national level and that solidarity with fellow Europeans is lower 
than the support for people outside the EU. As we will see below, this 
seems to reflect the attachment of citizens to the various reference groups, 
because citizens feel most attached to their own country and to human-
kind, while fewer respondents feel European. At the same time, solidarity 
is more diffused in regard to disabilities, when compared to the jobless 
and refugees or migrants. Consequently, our data reflects what we would 
expect when taking previous studies into consideration (Burgoon 2014; 
Bauer et al. 2013; Oorschot 2000).
Differences in levels of solidarity emerge when disaggregating the find-
ings according to our eight countries. However, it is interesting to note 
that these levels of solidarity are more similar than one would expect con-
sidering the findings of previous comparative studies (e.g., Bauer et  al. 
2013; Burgoon 2014). Particularly Greek and Polish citizens (and  to a 
lesser extent also Italians) reported high levels of participation in activities 
of support toward people within and outside their country, and these rates 
are close to—or even higher than—the levels of solidarity in the other, 
supposedly more active countries. This could reflect the situation of crisis, 
uncertainty and transition experienced in these countries. Particularly in 
the case of Greece, we know that the economic and financial crisis since 
2008—as well as the refugees crisis of 2015/2016—have unleashed a 
wave of social solidarity initiatives (Sotiropoulos and Bourikos 2014; 
Giugni and Grasso 2016; Grasso and Giugni 2016). But also in other 
countries, the support for refugees and asylum seekers is rather high, when 
remembering that previous studies see these target groups far behind 
other potential recipients (e.g., Oorschot 2000, 2006). This observation 
applies to Denmark, Germany, Greece and Switzerland. The dramatic 
hardship experienced by refugees on their way to and through Europe to 
their countries of destination incited a wave of ‘welcoming’ initiatives in 
these countries (Evangelinidis 2016). In this sense, our data reveals that 
European citizens tend to deliver in terms of voluntary engagement in 
time of crisis and emergency situations.
In the second step, we move to another manifestation of solidarity, 
namely, public support for policies of redistribution and burden shar-
ing. Table 10.2 gives us a first impression by summarizing the findings 
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of a question measuring the general disposition of citizens to support a 
fair distribution of wealth. We see that every third respondent agrees 
that the goal of eliminating big inequalities is ‘very important’ and the 
proportion increases to more than two-thirds of the population when 
adding those who view this as ‘fairly important’. Differences between 
the eight countries are very pronounced and reflect what we know from 
other studies about the support of redistributive policies within coun-
tries (Svallfors 1997; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Burgoon 2014; 
Grasso et al. 2017). A complex set of factors plays a role, among them 
the level of prevailing inequalities, the standards of redistribution 
already in place, predominant political orientations and values.
For our own purposes, however, it is more telling to look at the differ-
ences in public support for redistribution at the global and European level. 
Table 10.3 presents the evidence in regard to the global scope of redistri-
bution. Respondents were asked to indicate how important it should be 
for the EU to help people in developing countries. A strong majority of 
respondents supports the attempts of the EU to help countries outside of 
Europe in fighting poverty and promoting development, with 62% sup-
porting and only 14% opposing these measures. Even though the biggest 
share thinks that this global commitment is only fairly important, every 
fifth respondent indicated that this engagement is very important.
Table 10.2 Eliminating inequalities















Denmark 5.4 12.7 33.1 32.8 16 2183
France 2.4 5.8 20.3 37.5 34 2098
Germany 2 6.2 22.8 39.3 29.7 2064
Greece 1.8 3.5 16.7 35.1 42.9 2061
Italy 1.4 3 14.9 40 40.7 2087
Poland 2.6 5.4 21.7 36.5 33.8 2119
UK 3.6 6.7 28.5 35.8 25.4 2083
Switzerland 3.2 7.9 22.3 38.9 27.7 2221
Total 2.8 6.5 22.6 37.0 31.1 16,916
‘In order to be considered fair, what should a society provide? Eliminating big inequalities in income 
between citizens’
Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
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When we move to the European level, we see that public support for 
EU-internal help is much more limited, particularly if specific measures of 
redistribution and burden sharing are at stake. Our questionnaire listed 
two questions that aimed at measuring redistributional preferences. On 
the one hand, we asked respondents whether they support the EU in 
pooling funds to help EU countries having difficulties in paying their 
debts. On the other hand, we wanted to know whether respondents agree 
to grant the EU with more funds in order to help refugees. In regard to 
Switzerland, respondents answered in a more hypothetical manner, but 
their responses are not very different to those of EU citizens. For the 
other countries, the picture is rather mixed.
In regard to fiscal solidarity between member states, the supporters 
outweigh the opponents only slightly (41% vs. 30%), with 29% undecided 
respondents (see Table 10.4). The biggest group of supporters are located 
in Italy (66% against 16% opponents) and Greece (64% vs. 11%). Poland 
leans more toward the helping side (39% vs. 20%), but this is also due to 
the number of undecided respondents. In Denmark, Germany and the 
United Kingdom the share of opponents is bigger than the group of sup-
porters, with 38% versus 28%, 41% versus 33% and 41% versus 34%. These 
findings show that countries on the giving and receiving side stress differ-
ently the idea of fiscal solidarity. While the population in countries that 













Denmark 4 8 26 43 19 2183
France 5 9 32 38 16 2098
Germany 3 6 18 46 28 2064
Greece 6 7 21 44 22 2061
Italy 4 7 18 46 26 2087
Poland 5 16 35 35 8 2119
United 
Kingdom
6 9 27 37 21 2083
Switzerland 3 8 20 44 25 2221
Total 5 9 25 42 20 16,916
‘The European Union provides development aid to assist certain countries outside the EU in their fight 
against poverty and in their development. How important do you think it is to help people in developing 
countries?’
Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
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have mastered the financial and economic crisis are more skeptical toward 
measures of fiscal solidarity, the countries affected more strongly by these 
crises tend to stress more overtly the fact that EU member states should 
conform to one of their values, namely, interstate help and solidarity. This 
contrast is even more evident when considering that the share of respon-
dents fully agreeing with measures of fiscal solidarity is very low every-
where, with an exception of Italy and Greece.
In regard to EU funds in support of refugees, we find very similar 
results. Table 10.5 shows that the group opposing more funds for EU 
measures slightly outweighs the supporters (39% vs. 35%), again with a 
considerable share of undecided respondents. Supporters of this measure 
are more numerous in Germany (47%), Denmark (41%) and Greece 
(39%), while least diffused in France, (26%), Italy (27%) and Poland (29%). 
Again, those countries faced with higher rates of forced migrants and thus 
more dependent on European solidarity are those calling for more finan-
cial help from all member states. Before this backdrop, it comes as no 
surprise that the Danish, the Germans and the British are among those 
‘strongly supporting’ this redistribution.
These findings highlight that public support for at least some kinds of 
EU-internal solidarity measures is rather moderate. However, there are 
important reasons we should abstain from comparing this modest support 
directly with the more extended endorsement of humanitarian aid for 













Denmark 14 24 34 23 5 1939
France 15 19 30 28 8 1903
Germany 15 26 25 27 6 1914
Greece 7 4 24 38 26 1975
Italy 5 11 18 47 19 1928
Poland 8 12 42 33 6 1938
United 
Kingdom
18 23 25 27 7 1861
Switzerland 14 22 31 28 5 1992
Total 12 18 29 31 10 15,455
‘The EU is currently pooling funds to help EU countries having difficulties in paying their debts. To what 
extent do you agree or disagree with this measure?’
Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
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developing countries. Measures of fiscal solidarity within the EU imply a 
more far-reaching commitment of member states than humanitarian aid. 
In fact, the magnitude and the implications of EU-internal fiscal solidarity 
seem to provide reasons for why public support might be more modest 
and for why the share of citizens fully agreeing with EU-internal measures 
of solidarity is lower. Among other factors, we need to consider that many 
policy areas within the EU are patterned by the idea of subsidiarity, and 
this means that nation-states take the responsibility for problem solving. 
The moderate support for EU-internal solidarity in some respects is thus 
to be taken for what it is: citizens are less enthusiastic about authorizing 
their governments to help other EU member states’ governments in solv-
ing the problems with their debt and refugees.
The moderate support for measures of fiscal solidarity raises the ques-
tion of what motivates respondents to be more cautious. An answer is 
provided by a question included into our survey. It asked respondents to 
specify the potential reasons for granting or denying fiscal support to other 
EU countries. The results presented in Table 10.6 show that fiscal solidar-
ity is conditional and seems to privilege reciprocity. In fact, our respon-
dents are not ready to support other EU countries in trouble 
unconditionally. Only a minority of 19% testifies that fiscal solidarity is a 
matter of moral duty. The largest group subscribes to the idea of reciproc-
ity, fairness, trustworthiness and deservingness (see Lengfeld et al. 2015; 













Denmark 16 17 25 27 14 2183
France 26 19 29 21 5 2098
Germany 12 17 24 35 12 2064
Greece 24 15 23 31 8 2061
Italy 21 25 28 23 4 2087
Poland 18 19 33 24 5 2119
United 
Kingdom
20 18 27 26 10 2221
Switzerland 21 25 20 28 6 2083
Total 20 19 26 27 8 16,916
‘Would you support or oppose your country’s government offering financial support to the European 
Union in order to help refugees?’
Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
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also Wheeless 1978; Thielemann 2003). Fiscal solidarity is a matter of 
giving and receiving for almost every second respondent, and one out of 
three citizens thinks that help should be given only to those countries that 
handle help responsibly. While countries diverge in the extent to which 
they subscribe to these statements, there is no doubt that both 
Table 10.6 Fiscal solidarity: reasons
Denmark France Germany Greece Italy Poland UK CH Total
Financial 





20 13 15 19 16 24 15 13 17
It is our 
moral duty 














33 37 45 59 52 49 31 42 44
Financial 
help should 






40 37 40 22 26 38 42 38 35
Don’t know 19 17 9 8 13 11 16 12 13
Total N 2183 2098 2064 2061 2087 2119 2083 2221 16,916
‘There are many reasons to state for or against financial help for EU countries in trouble. Which one of 
the following best reflects how you feel?’ Multiple answers possible (in %)
Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
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 considerations are the most widely shared forms of reasoning everywhere. 
Accordingly, European solidarity suffers immediately, when citizens have 
the feeling that support measures are one-sided and potentially misused. 
Interestingly enough, citizens’ judgments about fiscal solidarity within the 
EU do not seem to be very different to what we know about public norms 
guiding public support of redistribution within national welfare states 
(Bowles and Gintis 2000; Oorschot 2006; León 2012).
SolIdarIty wIth non-Eu cItIzEnS: attItudES 
toward mIgratIon and thE IncluSIon of mIgrantS
Migration policies have become a highly salient issue within the public 
sphere (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017). The growing inflows of forced 
migrants from the Middle East during the summer of 2015 have certainly 
contributed to this development. In particular, it has put the topic of 
European solidarity on the public agenda. In the previous section, we 
showed that almost every third respondent had been engaged in practices 
of support for migrants, especially in those countries that were on the 
migration routes of refugees and were confronted with a bigger need. But 
what can we say about policy preferences? Do citizens support immigration 
policies that welcome refugees within their country, and do they approve 
also of European policies of ‘burden sharing’? These aspects are important 
for our analytic purposes. Citizens’ attitudes toward immigration and immi-
gration policies are an important indicator of the society’s openness toward 
non-nationals and thus also for the inclusivity of solidarity. For this reason, 
we included a series of questions in our survey that were geared towards 
measuring public attitudes toward policies addressing groups migrating 
into one’s country from the EU and from outside of it. A particular focus 
in this respect were Syrian refugees fleeing their war- torn country.
Table 10.7 looks first at respondent opinions in terms of the types of 
measures they think their government should pursue in terms of economic 
migrants from within the European Union. As we can see, across countries 
most people tend to accept economic migration in so far as ‘there are jobs 
they can do’. Lower proportions are more liberal agreeing to ‘allow all 
those who want to come’. In particular, Greeks and Poles tend to be the 
most welcoming followed by Italians and Germans and Danes, then the 
French with the Brits and the Swiss being the least welcoming with only 
10% selecting this option. Indeed, the Brits and Swiss display the highest 
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proportions of respondents agreeing that there should be ‘strict limits on 
the number allowed to come’. Up to 8% of individuals in the UK would 
completely prohibit economic migration from the EU (8.1% also in 
France).
The same question was put to respondents in relation to non-EU citi-
zens, too, in order to get a sense of what the impact of EU citizenship 
might be. Table 10.8 presents these results, which show that people are 
considerably less welcoming across countries compared to the results for 
EU migrants presented in Table 10.6. The most welcoming are Italians 
with about 8% suggesting all the people who want to come should come, 
followed by 7.8% of Greeks, 7% of Germans, 6.2% in France and Poland, 
5.6% in Denmark, 5.3% in the UK and only 4.5% in Switzerland. In 
Denmark, Italy, Greece and Poland respondents are more likely to support 
economic migration provided there are jobs; whereas, in France, Germany, 
Switzerland and the UK respondents are more likely to prefer putting 
‘strict limits on the number allowed to come’ from non-EU countries. Up 
to 14.5% of people in France want to completely prohibit non-EU people 
from coming to their country, followed by 12.3% of Germans and about 
9–10% in the other nations adopting this very unforgiving position on 
migration.





Allow people to 
come as long as 
there are jobs 
they can do
Put strict 











Denmark 14.6 52.1 18.9 3.8 10.7 100
France 13.0 42.2 25.1 8.1 11.6 100
Germany 16.3 46.2 26.1 4.8 6.7 100
Greece 22.0 44.7 23.0 4.2 6.1 100
Italy 16.7 48.5 20.7 5.7 8.3 100
Poland 20.0 44.2 19.1 5.3 11.5 100
Switzerland 7.2 46.4 36.8 4.2 5.4 100
United 
Kingdom
9.7 41.2 31.8 8.0 9.4 100
Total 14.9 45.7 25.2 5.5 8.7 100
‘For each of the following groups, what measures do you think the government should pursue? People 
from European Union coming to ***COUNTRY*** to work?’
Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
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These findings raise the question of how strong the support for immigra-
tion is in regard to Syrian refugees, given that forced migration due to war 
was very high during the years 2015 and 2016 and underlined much of the 
public debates about immigration policies. Table  10.9 summarizes the 
answers to the question of whether Syrian refugees should be treated differ-
ently than the two more general groups discussed previously. Here the UK, 
Denmark and Switzerland stand out as the countries more likely to say higher 
numbers should be admitted. In most countries however, the largest propor-
tions of citizens prefer either keeping the current numbers or admitting even 
lower numbers (the latter is particularly true in Greece and Italy). In Poland 
36.3% argued that none should be allowed to come at all, followed by France 
with 25% taking this harsh position, 22% in Italy, 20% in the UK, around 17% 
in Denmark and Greece and 12–13% in Germany and Switzerland. The lat-
ter results show that these citizens have more restrictive preferences when 
refugees from Syria are concerned, as compared to the other two groups, 
that is, non-EU citizens and EU citizens. However, the fact that the general 
population seems to be more cautious about admitting Syrian refugees 
should not lead us to believe that solidarity is merely ethnically patterned. In 
fact, our questions addressed the preferred numbers of admitted migrants. 
The fact that respondents are more restrictive toward Syrian refugees might 





Allow people to 
come as long as 
there are jobs 
they can do
Put strict 











Denmark 5.6 40.3 31.8 10.7 11.6 100
France 6.2 32.8 34.3 14.5 12.2 100
Germany 7.0 32.1 40.3 12.3 8.3 100
Greece 7.8 38.0 37.2 11.1 5.9 100
Italy 8.0 46.6 27.4 9.3 8.8 100
Poland 6.2 34.8 33.7 11.9 13.4 100
Switzerland 4.5 35.3 45.1 9.2 5.8 100
UK 5.3 37.0 37.2 10.5 10.0 100
Total 6.3 37.1 35.9 11.2 9.5 100
‘For each of the following groups, what measures do you think the government should pursue? People 
from non-EU countries coming to ***COUNTRY*** to work?’
Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
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be conditioned by the higher number of migrants coming from these areas 
in the year preceding our survey and thus by considerations about the capac-
ity of the respondents’ countries to integrate them. As we have seen from 
previous tables, the support for immigration policies is conditional on 
respondents’ views of the capabilities of the situation of the labor market, 
that is, one could conceive,  on the ability to give migrants available job 
opportunities within the country. These findings converge with previous 
research in showing that the economic context matters when immigration 
policies are concerned. The economic strain perceived by citizens has a direct 
effect on the preferences for how restrictive immigration policies should be 
but also for the perceptions of ethnic threat that could be seen to fuel calls 
for restrictive measures, too (Gang et al. 2013; Setten et al. 2017).
These observations illustrate that conditionality is also at stake when soli-
darity with non-EU citizens is concerned. Our questionnaire included one 
item that aimed to measure this conditionality by asking respondents about 
the conditions under which migrants should gain access to social benefits. 
Table 10.10 shows that only a minority of 12% is against granting migrants 
access to social benefits and services categorically. Access is generally concev-
ied as being conditional on two things: they should have worked and paid 
taxes (42%), and they should become citizens of the country (30%). A minor-
ity of respondents (16%) is more generous, granting migrants access uncon-
ditionally or after a limited time of residence. In this sense, findings tend to 
indicate that for most citizens, solidarity is understood as rights-based and 












Denmark 17.1 29.0 27.0 16.8 10.1
France 10.0 21.1 29.8 25.0 14.1
Germany 9.3 35.8 37.0 12.7 5.3
Greece 8.6 18.9 49.5 16.9 6.1
Italy 8.7 23.4 34.8 22.0 11.1
Poland 9.2 24.5 15.8 36.3 14.2
Switzerland 15.6 38.0 27.3 12.2 7.0
UK 18.1 24.9 24.8 20.0 12.3
Total 12.1 27.0 30.6 20.2 10.0
‘How do you think your country should handle refugees fleeing the war in Syria?’
Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
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thus tied to some notion of citizenship, that is, delimited by legal entitle-
ments and mutual obligations (e.g., receiving social benefits and paying taxes 
or contributions). As such, this suggests that public policies furthering the 
active participation of migrants in the labor force and their naturalization 
could be beneficial to further support with respect to the norms of redistri-
butional solidarity echoed in our data.
EuropEan unIon mEmbErShIp and attachmEnt: 
corrElatES of SolIdarIty?
The findings discussed above have provided indications that Europe is a 
potential frame of reference impacting on the readiness of citizens to sup-
port others. Solidarity might thus be intricately tied to feelings of satisfac-
tion and belongingness with regards to the EU. In conceptual terms, we 
assume that solidarity as a relation of (mutual) support is tied to (imag-
ined) groups, which means that feelings of identity and belongingness 
should promote the individual’s readiness to engage in solidarity with 
members of these groups (Hunt and Benford 2004; Stets and McCaffree 
2014). At the same time, levels of satisfaction with the EU might condi-
tion the readiness to help other European and/or European governments, 
as well. A closer inspection of these factors is important, because they 
might help to explain the moderate rates of solidarity with other European 


















Denmark 7 9 37 36 11 2183
France 5 9 41 26 18 2098
Germany 9 13 46 24 7 2064
Greece 8 8 34 35 15 2061
Italy 8 7 38 36 12 2087
Poland 7 8 43 32 10 2119
UK 6 8 46 27 14 2083
Switzerland 6 9 52 23 10 2221
Total 7 9 42 30 12 16,916
‘When should migrants obtain rights to social benefits and services as citizens do?’
Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
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people and countries unveiled at least with respect to certain indicators 
from our previous analyses. Indeed, the more moderate rates of European 
solidarity could be conditioned by lower rates of identification and satisfac-
tion with the EU. In order to validate these assumptions, we need to take 
a closer look at these public attitudes and attachments toward the EU.
The satisfaction with the EU relates to more cognitive and instrumental 
considerations and motivations. Along these lines, we included a series of 
questions in our survey that encouraged respondents to evaluate the EU 
membership of their country, following the example of previous studies 
(Anderson and Reichert 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2007; Guerra and 
McLaren 2016). It is to be expected that EU-skeptic attitudes will go 
hand in hand with a lower disposition to act in solidarity with other 
European people. Citizens might be more cautious to support measures of 
European solidarity if they believe that the EU works badly. Hence, it is 
crucial to know how widely diffused is a negative assessment of the EU.
Table 10.11 presents results from respondents on whether they feel 
that on balance their country’s membership of the EU was good, bad or 
neither a good nor a bad thing. In Switzerland, we asked about potentially 
joining the EU. Reflecting once more the patterns found previously, the 
Swiss think joining the EU would be bad, and the Greeks think that being 
members of the EU is a bad thing. All the others think it is on balance a 
good thing, but the gap is smaller in the UK, Italy and France than in 
Denmark and particularly Germany and Poland.
Table 10.11 EU membership good/bad (in %)
A good thing A bad thing Neither good nor bad Don’t know Total
Denmark 38.9 25.3 26.3 9.6 100
France 34.4 26.5 29.8 9.3 100
Germany 53.3 15.6 26.6 4.5 100
Greece 30.7 34.0 31.1 4.2 100
Italy 35.8 30.6 26.4 7.2 100
Poland 62.7 9.2 20.9 7.2 100
Switzerlanda 8.0a 67.6a 18.1a 6.3a 100
UK 40.3 35.4 18.0 6.4 100
Total 37.8 30.8 24.6 6.9 100
‘Generally speaking, do you think that your country’s membership of the European Union is …?’
Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
aIn Switzerland we asked about joining the EU (joining the EU would be…)
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This evaluation could be tied to a more rational calculation about the 
advantages and disadvantages of EU membership. For this reason, we 
added a question asking respondents if they think their country has more 
directly benefited from being a member of the EU (in Switzerland we 
asked if they benefited from not being members). Table 10.12 presents 
the results. In Switzerland, over 70% think the country has benefited from 
not being part of the EU. In Greece, in Italy and—by a tiny margin—in 
France, higher proportions think the country has not benefited from 
membership. Even in the UK, a higher percentage felt they benefited from 
membership. In Denmark, Germany and Poland, again attitudes are very 
positive in terms of feeling that the countries benefited from being part of 
the EU.
Next to these more general evaluations of EU membership, we also 
asked respondents to assess the situation of the labor market, if the country 
were to be outside of the EU. As Table 10.13 shows, respondents had 
more difficulties here in giving clear indications. Overall, the proportion of 
respondents who believe that not being a member is detrimental for the 
labor market is higher when compared to those who say that the number 
of jobs would increase outside the EU. This is particularly true for Germany 
and Poland, in part also for Denmark and Italy. More Greek people believe 
that the labor market would perform better outside the EU. And the Swiss 
are convinced that a membership would have bad effects on the labor mar-
Table 10.12 Benefited from EU membership (in %)
Benefited Not benefited Don’t know Total
Denmark 48.6 29.8 21.7 100
France 36.2 37.6 26.2 100
Germany 58.5 27.4 14.2 100
Greece 37.2 53.1 9.6 100
Italy 28.2 52.7 19.1 100
Poland 70.9 14.3 14.8 100
Switzerlanda 70.3a 13.4a 16.3a 100
UK 43.7 37.0 19.3 100
Total 49.4 32.9 17.7 100
‘Taking everything into account, would you say that your country has on balance benefited or not from 
being a member of the European Union?’
Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
aIn Switzerland we asked if the country benefited or not from NOT being a member of the European Union
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ket, too. Across the countries, a sizeable proportion ranging from about 
17% in Greece and almost 30% in France think it would make no differ-
ence, and between 14 and 24% of respondents are not sure.
Overall, we see considerable skepticism with reference to EU member-
ship, which corroborates a general trend within the European citizenry 
identified by previous studies (McLaren 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2007; 
Leconte 2015). Against this backdrop, it is interesting to see how people 
in our eight countries would vote if there were a referendum on the EU 
membership of their country (in Switzerland we asked about joining). 
Results in Table 10.14 show once more that across countries, Switzerland 
prefers to stay outside and Greece would prefer to leave; there is a very 
slight preference for leaving in the UK much in line with the actual refer-
endum from June 2016. Once more gaps are smaller in Italy and France 
than in Denmark, Germany and Poland, showing that the latter tend to be 
more Europhile, while citizens in the former countries lean more toward 
Euroskepticism.
This grouping is replicated when asking respondents if they believe that 
the UK should remain or leave the EU. Table 10.15 shows that a slightly 
higher proportion of UK respondents felt the UK should leave than those 
saying it should remain. The same applies to respondents from Switzerland, 
Greece, France and Italy, who corroborated once more Euroskeptic ten-
dencies, whereas the Danes, Germans and Polish think the UK should 
stay. These citizens tend to defend the idea of the EU and the need to keep 
the countries within it.
Table 10.13 Effect on jobs and employment if country was *outside* the EU 
(in %)
Would be good Would be bad Would make no difference Don’t know Total
Denmark 16.2 37.8 21.7 24.3 100
France 23.8 27.6 27.8 20.8 100
Germany 14.4 43.7 26.5 15.4 100
Greece 38.4 31.2 16.5 14.0 100
Italy 25.9 35.4 21.9 16.8 100
Poland 10.6 52.1 18.1 19.2 100
Switzerlanda 11.3a 49.6a 25.0a 14.1a 100
UK 26.5 33.0 24.3 16.1 100
Total 20.8 38.9 22.7 17.6 100
Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
aIn Switzerland we asked if the country was *in* the EU
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In Table 10.16 we look at the relationship between membership of the 
EU and fiscal solidarity. The results show that there is a clear relationship 
between both: respondents more favorable to EU membership are also 
more likely to support fiscal solidarity.
Finally, we move to a question that tackles more directly the affective or 
emotional dimension of EU identification, because respondents were 
encouraged to assess their attachment to the European Union as well as to 
other entities including the world/humanity, one’s country and region 
and one’s city. Table 10.17 indicates that the EU scores the lowest levels 
Table 10.14 Referendum on EU membership (in %)
Remaina Leavea Would not vote Don’t know Total
Denmark 47.6 32.1 4.2 16.1 100
France 42.7 30.3 7.6 19.4 100
Germany 61.3 23.5 6.0 9.3 100
Greece 37.7 46.3 7.9 8.1 100
Italy 43.1 36.1 6.4 14.5 100
Poland 64.0 14.8 7.8 13.4 100
Switzerlanda 10.5a 74.3a 5.7a 9.5a 100
UK 44.3 45.2 3.7 6.8 100
Total 48.7 32.6 6.2 12.6 100
‘If there was a referendum on your country’s membership of the EU how would you vote?’
Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
aIn Switzerland we asked about joining the EU
Table 10.15 Should the UK remain a member or leave the EU? (in %)
Remain Leave Don’t know Total
Denmark 45.1 34.5 20.4 100
France 30.3 46.6 23.1 100
Germany 51.7 35.7 12.6 100
Greece 32.2 51.7 16.1 100
Italy 39.8 43.2 17.0 100
Poland 59.0 19.5 21.5 100
Switzerland 26.3 55.1 18.7 100
United Kingdom 45.3 47.1 7.6 100
Total 41.1 41.7 17.2 100
Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
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of attachment compared to the other spatial entities. The strongest attach-
ment to the EU is clearly in Poland, followed by Germany, Italy and 
France, then the UK, Denmark, Greece and Switzerland. When we com-
pare the attachment to the EU with the instrumental assessment of the 
EU membership (Table 10.8), we see that the proportions of people who 
feel attached to the EU match clearly the rates of those respondents con-
sidering EU membership to be a good thing. In France and Italy, almost 
every second respondent feels attached to the EU, but this does not pre-
vent them from assessing their country’s membership of the EU more 
critically. In Denmark, the relation is inversed, because the feelings of 
attachment are less diffused as the impression that EU membership is 
Table 10.16 Solidarity and support for EU membership (% a good thing)
Agreement with pooling 
funds to help countries 









Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
Table 10.17 Attachments (% fairly and very attached)
European Union The world/humanity Country Region City
Denmark 33.4 64.1 90.8 62.2 80.3
France 47.1 72.7 88.6 80.5 79.0
Germany 53.3 69.0 83.7 79.1 82.1
Greece 32.3 73.8 90.5 85.0 85.0
Italy 49.1 73.4 78.1 80.2 82.3
Poland 65.8 79.9 89.8 87.8 87.6
Switzerland 28.1 74.6 89.1 84.0 81.1
United Kingdom 40.1 67.7 82.5 75.8 79.7
Total 43.5 71.9 86.7 79.3 82.1
‘Please tell me how attached you feel to …?’
Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
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good for their country. We thus see that people’s feelings and instrumental 
reasonings converge, but not necessarily in all countries.
All these findings show that citizens identify with the European Union, 
even though these relations are nuanced. However, we should assume that 
citizens with a more developed European identity might be more support-
ive of the idea of European solidarity. In order to assess this assumption, it 
is necessary to measure the relationship between preferences for European 
solidarity and attachment to the European Union. For this purpose we use 
two questions introduced before: support for fiscal redistribution within 
the EU (see Table 10.4) and attachment to the EU (see Table 10.17). 
This allows us to have a look at the extent to which support for fiscal soli-
darity within the EU coincides with feelings of attachment to the 
EU.  Table  10.18 shows that those who share the strongest feelings of 
attachment to the European Union are also those that are most likely to 
support the pooling of funds to help countries in debt.
undErStandIng SolIdarIty aS a SocIal forcE: 
prElImInary concluSIonS
Solidarity is a pressing issue of our times. The various crises affecting the 
European Union since 2008 have increased the call for solidarity between 
the European people, especially when dealing with the consequences of 
the Great Recession and/or the welcoming of refugees fleeing from war, 
persecution and poverty. The evidence presented in this book paints a 
nuanced picture of solidarity within Europe. We found that a strong 
majority of respondents supports the attempts of the EU to help countries 
Table 10.18 Solidarity and attachment to the EU (% fairly and very attached)
Agreement with pooling funds 
to help countries in debt (see 
Table 10.4)








Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no. 649435)
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outside Europe in fighting poverty and promoting development; every 
second respondent reports having engaged in solidarity activities for peo-
ple in their country, including donating money or time, protesting and 
engaging in voluntary associations; and European citizens strongly sup-
port solidarity-based (redistributive) public policies with almost three- 
quarters considering the reduction of big income inequalities as an 
important goal.
However, our data revealed at the same time that solidarity is not uni-
versally and unconditionally granted. The analysis of the motives of people 
to support fiscal solidarity within the EU, for instance, shows that the larg-
est group subscribes to the idea of reciprocity and deservingness. In this 
sense, our findings subscribe largely to those insights provided by previous 
research. The group of people with a universalist or cosmopolitan sense of 
solidarity are largely in the minority. For most people, solidarity is more 
strongly tied to specific groups or entities (Markovsky and Lawler 1994; 
Hunt and Benford 2004; Stets and McCaffree 2014), and very often soli-
darity is closely tied to the notion of citizenship (Miller 2000; Keating 
2009). This is particularly evident when solidarity touches social rights 
and obligations, as, for instance, with regard to policies of redistribution 
at the national or European level. As our own data has shown, respondents 
prefer to restrict the access to social benefits to fellow citizens, to those 
working or paying taxes. And in regards to fiscal solidarity within the EU, 
citizens most strongly believe that solidarity should conform to norms of 
reciprocity and trustworthiness (see also Lengfeld et  al. 2015; also 
Wheeless 1978; Thielemann 2003). Additionally, our results showed that 
those who share feelings of attachment to the European Union are also 
those that are most likely to support the pooling of funds to help countries 
in debt. These citizens seem to acknowledge that European citizenship is 
in place and that members of this community are thus expected to support 
each other.
In sum, citizens’ views about fiscal solidarity within the EU tend to fol-
low a rationale that is very similar to the one underlying public support of 
national welfare policies (Bowles and Gintis 2000; Oorschot 2006; León 
2012). Additionally, these attitudes are not very distant from motives 
guiding civic and social solidarity within interpersonal relations and infor-
mal networks, because these solidarity relations are also governed by ideas 
of reciprocity, fairness, trustworthiness and deservingness (Markovsky and 
Lawler 1994; Oorschot 2000; Komter 2005; Molm et al. 2009). Solidarity 
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seems to be patterned similarly across various reference groups, be that 
peers or neighbors, fellow citizens, Europeans or people outside Europe.
The findings of this book do not only provide important lessons about 
the rationale guiding solidarity at various levels of organization—the 
national, the European and the global. They have also given indications 
about the social and political factors inhibiting or limiting solidarity and 
thus about those groups within the population that are closer or more 
distant from practices and attitudes of solidarity. In this way, a number of 
lessons can be drawn from the national studies.
In the first instance, solidarity seems to follow a cumulative logic. 
Citizens actively supporting other people in their country are more prob-
ably engaged also in solidarity with people within the EU and beyond, 
while people who are more passive in regard to one reference group will 
be also probably be more inactive with respect also to the others (see Kiess 
et al. in this book). Hence, the difference between activity and inactivity 
seems to be more important than the target group to which solidarity is 
directed. However, this cumulative logic is certainly not universally appli-
cable, particularly with respect to exclusive or antagonistic groups that 
mobilize their constituencies for their own sake and against others. 
Additionally, we have seen that solidarity across borders is less com-
mon within the European populations than solidarity practices within bor-
ders. However, our data indicate that solidarities are not necessarily 
exclusive and antagonistic. We might even hypothesize that most active 
people are engaged in multiple ways, even if these solidarities are pat-
terned—in their proportions—along concentric circles of proximity and 
distance.
The analyses assembled in this book also give indications about those 
social and political factors that impact on solidarity disposition and prac-
tices. Among the main factors to be highlighted are the following. First, 
interpersonal trust seems to be an important precondition and resource 
explaining the commitment of citizens to supporting others. The impor-
tance of this factor has been highlighted in all chapters of this book. 
Solidarity is more probable when citizens consider the recipient of their 
help as trustworthy, thus testifying that norms of deservingness and reci-
procity are at stake here, too (see also Wheeless 1978; Oorschot 2000; 
Brown and Ferries 2007). Second, religiosity influences solidarity as well, 
even though not all chapters testify to the importance of this factor for 
their countries. Religious people are more active in support of others than 
non-religious respondents, independent of the target group this support is 
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directed at. As argued by others, religion plays a role not only because of 
the ethical claims it makes but also since we examine institutionalized 
forms of religiosity that imply collective forms of help and care (Abela 
2004; Lichterman 2015).
Third, solidarity has a strong political component, not least because the 
idea of solidarity is part of the oratory of many social movements and their 
mobilization attempts (Giugni and Passy 2001; Hunt and Benford 2004; 
Scholz 2008). Additionally, we have been argued in this book that solidar-
ity has a political dimension per se, since it is more often than not implicitly 
or explicitly linked to rights and obligations stipulated within a specific 
group. This assumption is corroborated by the national studies also in 
regard to forms of interpersonal solidarity. In fact, solidarity practices can 
be differentiated along the distinction between civic and political orienta-
tions (see Fernandez in this book). Additionally, respondents testifying that 
they have been engaged in practices of solidarity are more often interested 
in politics (see Maggini or Cinalli and Sanhueza in this book), are more 
involved in unconventional forms of participation (see Kalogeraki in this 
book) and/or are more active as newspaper readers (see Montgomery et al. 
in this book). Their practiced solidarity seems to be motivated also by a 
dissatisfaction with government policies toward the respective target group 
(see Kiess et al. in this book). Poland is an interesting exception, because 
analyses identify it as disaplying  commitment to transnational solidarity 
that is not politically motivated (see Kurowska and Theiss in this book).
Fourth, in most countries, contacts with and attachments to the specific 
target groups (people with disabilities, the jobless, refugees) and identifi-
cation with spatial entities (the nation, Europe) make a difference with 
respect to promoting solidarity practices. The British case illustrates that 
solidarity practices may be also unevenly distributed within the territory, 
with higher rates of support for various target groups in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland (see Montgomery et al. in this book).
Finally, we see that socio-demographic traits and social structural 
resources play a less consistent and important role, when compared to the 
previously discussed factors. While previous research has highlighted the 
importance of some of these factors, among them gender (Neill and 
Gidengil 2006), age and biographical availability (Beyerlein and Bergstrand 
2013; Grasso 2014), education (Bauer et  al. 2013; Grasso 2013) or 
 occupational and class status (Wilson 2000), our own analyses do not draw 
a consistent picture. Age and gender do not play a consistent role across 
countries, although biographical availability seems to be relevant for volun-
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teering in Greece. Socio-economic status plays a role in various countries, 
but the relevant factors change from country to country. It is either higher 
education (Denmark, Germany and Poland), income and occupational sta-
tus (Denmark and Poland) or the respondents identifying with the middle 
classes (Italy) that matter in explaining solidarity practices.
These inconclusive findings are probably linked to the design of our 
analyses, since a more focused study on specific forms of solidarity prac-
tices (e.g., donating money or attending protest events for specific target 
groups) might have identified more specific social profiles of engaged peo-
ple. However, the aim of our analyses was to measure more general dispo-
sitions and practices of solidarity. In this regard, the lesser relevance of 
socio-demographic and social structural traits is telling in itself. Solidarity 
practices are not restricted to specific strata of the population but tied to 
different groups within society (Giugni and Grasso 2015).
What do we learn from these findings for making sense of the prospects of 
European solidarity? On the one hand, we have to expect that solidarity 
across borders is unlikely to be prioritized by European citizens. And this 
seems to be particularly true for European solidarity. This has to do with the 
fact that the feelings of attachment and identification with Europe and the 
European Union are less developed than those to one’s own country, region 
or town. Europeans tend to be more engaged with respect to fellow citizens 
and people in their proximity, and this also means that practices of solidarity 
targeting other EU countries are secondary. To this, we have to add that the 
discontent with the European Union seems to translate into a weaker disposi-
tion to support redistribution between states, and possibly also between citi-
zens. The rise of Euroskeptical sentiments in the population (McLaren 2007; 
Hooghe and Marks 2007; Leconte 2015) and the growing importance of 
populist parties rallying for nationalist and xenophobic agendas (Taggart 
2004; Krouwel and Abts 2007; Kriesi and Pappas 2015) have the potential 
to diminish the prospects of European solidarity within the citizenry.
However, against these negative views we argue that on balance there is 
more hope and that there is room for a further development of European 
solidarity (see also Börner 2014; Gerhards et al. 2016). The lessons drawn 
from our analyses seem to boil down to one major proposition. If European 
citizens privilege solidarity with fellow citizens, and if their solidarity is con-
ditional on the active involvement of the targeted recipients in a relation of 
trust and reciprocity, then the idea of social citizenship becomes a turntable 
for the development of European solidarity. So far, European citizens 
claiming their social rights are referred back to their country of residence, 
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since, within the EU, social citizenship is tied back to the nation-state. 
Truly European measures of redistribution are needed to bolster the idea of 
a European social citizenship, such as redistributive programs to which all 
European citizens contribute and from which they receive support in times 
of trouble. The reservation which citizens voice against redistributive mea-
sures among European member states may just reflect a general feeling that 
there is not yet a fair system of rules in place that balances the mutual rights 
and obligations of the European people within the EU.  The European 
Union is not yet an accomplished political community establishing and 
guaranteeing common social rights and obligations. The development of 
social rights and social citizenship, as widely discussed in the public 
sphere (Eder and Giessen 2001; Schmitter and Bauer 2001; Ferrera 2004; 
Keating 2009; Ross and Borgmann-Prebil 2010), could be an important 
instrument to increasingly develop and promote the readiness of citizens to 
support other European citizens—through either interpersonal help or 
public policies of redistribution moving forward into the future.
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